

INNER CITY
KILLING
STREETS
*Reviving
Community*

Horace Levy

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[INSERT KINGSTON INNER-CITY MAP ON THIS PAGE (?)]

INTRODUCTION

Jamaica stands out world-wide for its extremely high rate of homicides. Less known but no less significant is the steady and threatening rate of homicidal *increase* – and beyond the numbers the daily, endless weeping, the habituation to violence and its ingraining in the life of a people. Still less accessible to the world have been the *predictions* of knowledgeable observers on the ground for more than a decade that worse was to come. What did these observers see – who evidently did not find the source of the problem all that abstruse – that those did not who might have been able to check the increase, head off the consequences and prevent the pain? Or if they did, were slow or unwilling to act? And why so unseeing... and unwilling?

Over 40 per cent of the homicides in Jamaica – it used to be 70 per cent until the epidemic spread – occur in the communities of Kingston's inner city and in a context of community violence. It is clearly necessary, if this current of homicidal violence is to be checked, to examine the community context, the possible sources there of the violence and any countering attempts that have been made, those in particular that have been effective. Hopefully any conclusions reached will have some impact on policy with those who make it. The task then is to trace, even if fairly briefly, the trajectory of violence since the formation of political parties in the late 1930s and early 1940s, while paying special attention to the underlying continuity factor, which is community. A theoretical framework highlighting the importance of the community in civil society as well as the contrary significance of violence will also be tentatively and summarily advanced.

This study, then, adopts as a working hypothesis that, however insufficiently recognised by policy makers, community plays a critical role in local homicide. Historically on a national scale community has been paid enormous attention from the days of Jamaica Welfare, which was started in 1937 by Norman Manley, one of the "fathers of the nation". The

specific quasi-community or anti-community formation playing a role in homicide is the “garrison”.¹ It came into existence between 1965 and 1975 – the major exemplars, that is, and since then most of lower-income Kingston has been garrisoned – but had its foundations laid much earlier. The organization and structure of governance of the garrison are carefully scrutinized in this paper, with examination of actual instances leading to the identification of a typology that explains much of garrison behaviour.

Other approaches to this subject of crime and violence have selected other roots and contributory factors as well as corresponding “solutions”. In the mid-1990s, when the escalation in the murder rate began to attract attention, domestic murder was named by the police as the main trouble source, ‘domestic’ being defined quite broadly. The police at the same time maintained that they could do little about such a source: much of it was not sufficiently public. The ‘domestic’ has since been re-defined more narrowly to exclude mere acquaintanceship between killer and victim and appears, until recently at least, to have remained at a fairly constant rate even as the murder rate climbs. It continues to be given little attention by state and society, which is regrettable, since the level of domestic violence is high² and does end up contributing significantly to homicide levels, as does the interpersonal type excluded now from the ‘domestic’.

The next trouble source, as proclaimed by a former Minister of National Security, then became drugs, the international trade in drugs in particular, which fitted well with the concerns of the northern countries to which the drugs were going but locally came in for sharp criticism from knowledgeable sources.³ This meant that the funding needed to fight the drug scourge became accessible to Jamaica. However, successes in 2005 and 2006 in taking out some big traders and curtailing the trade – acknowledged and praised by the North American police whose collaboration made much of it possible – have not led to the subsequent slowing or reversal of the climbing murder level that should logically have followed.

Recently attention has turned to organized crime and the case is being made that this relatively new element, its new level of sophistication at any rate, is the main source of the climb in homicides. Over the past two decades, both on the local scene and in the international connections entailed, a new level of organization is described as taking place and having an effect.⁴ It is said to be an approach more advanced than those that gave rise to the “posses” of the 1980s in the United States of America, which have since been decimated by northern police. In those days when

the Jamaicans as newcomers were carving out an empire for themselves, they were ruthless in their methods and drew a police attention and competence they were unaccustomed to, with unwelcome (for them) consequences. Today's clever drug traders, on the other hand, steer away from the frequent murders that attract that kind of attention. Hence, unless competition can be shown to be also involved, it may be contradictory to be trying to pin an escalation in homicide on organization, even if in fact, as does appear to be the case, organized crime is on the increase.

The police and other experts are also currently attributing the high rate of homicide to gangs, which the police say number island-wide more than 200. Clearly this large number would have to include those identified in this study as community gangs as opposed to criminal gangs. The police do not officially distinguish them in that way, preferring to see them as an earlier stage of criminality. The attribution of most current murders to gangs by anthropologist Herbert Gayle rests on the view that many gangs in Jamaica are family based and that family feuds lie at the root of many inter-gang conflicts.⁵ While there is much to commend this view, at the same time it is my impression that homicides that would better be classified as simply inter-personal are on the increase. The classification of the sources of homicide has never been a strong point of the Jamaica Constabulary Force, perhaps because of weakness, now receding, in its investigative capacity.

It is not at all my intention to say that domestic conflict, drugs and organized crime are negligible factors in this matter. The intention is rather to put a spotlight on community, a major social organization of human beings and particularly important to Jamaican inner city people, as critical for *understanding and preventing* the occurrence of many of the large number of homicides taking place among them. This is by no means to ignore that some attention has been given to community over the past few years by academia in its effort to influence policy makers in their fight against crime⁶ as well as by sections of the political directorate.⁷

If there is a driving force and sustaining structure of community homicides in Jamaica to which this paper does point an accusing finger, it is party politics in the way it has functioned in Jamaica. Combined with a focus on the garrison, this will not be earthshakingly new: the 1997 *Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism*, which says much about garrisons, is eleven years old this year. However, even an old horse can carry a young rider to market and hopefully the community angle brought

forward by this paper may add the fresh light and weight needed to resolve a deepening crisis.

I argue for a simple point staring in our faces, that the root of the problem is to be found in what the political parties with popular consent have done in their quest for power – converted *communities* into garrisons and transformed instruments of unity and solidarity into war machines. Authoritarian garrison structure with *violent ways* turned communities into killing fields, robbing them of their cohesion, vitality and ability to function as communities. Youth corner crews, drawn into community defence, became *community gangs* and a *dominating force* in the communities. “Garrisonization” also facilitated along the way in some communities, as a natural by-product or corollary, the formation of several criminal enterprises. The focus here, however, is on the community gangs, which have operated not only in but also on behalf of their communities. Even while distinct from criminal gangs, they are to be held responsible for homicides in a significant number,⁸ the more so as they are being currently put through a “training” in criminality, a powerful process of *criminalization*.

SOURCES AND PLAN

This study is based largely on primary data. Secondary material is very limited in extent, concerns being focused elsewhere, as I have indicated. However, research by Gayle⁹ in specific communities and papers by Chevannes, Harriott and by Figueroa, Harriott and Satchell¹⁰ on communal aspects of inner city violence have material of great relevance to this little book.

Primary data have been drawn from three sources. The first source is the studies that I have been involved in over the past 13 years of some nine inner city communities, six of them in Kingston, as well as of several rural areas, using an action-research and team approach known as Participatory Learning and Action. This approach uncovers central issues and yields a grasp of the overall situation in many of its inter-related dimensions. Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) is a qualitative method of open-ended questioning and respondent diagramming that to a great extent allows the respondents to lead the process. In this way it produces a richer probing of their world and their experience than does the questionnaire pre-set by outsiders and “uppers”.¹¹ Often the exact quantitative figures in

respect, for example, of the ages of persons interviewed, witnesses killed, numbers convicted, or other similar information that the questionnaire offers must be obtained from secondary sources. But even the approximative information obtained in qualitative research on such matters provides valuable insights into people's perceptions and attitudes.

The second source of data has been the experience and the contacts provided over going on seven years, 2002-09, through active participation in the Peace Management Initiative in its interventions, weekly and sometimes several times a week, in the conflicts bursting out in communities. The charge given to the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) at its establishment by the Minister of National Security was precisely to head off or defuse these explosions of violence in the Kingston St Andrew Corporate (KSAC) area and adjoining sections of St Catherine; and further along, more will be said about the PMI, its methods and activities. Here it will be sufficient simply to note what the PMI experience as a source of data entailed: direct contact with and mediation between community gangs in nearly 60 communities and, in an effort to turn cease-fire into sustainable peace, a more intensive developmental engagement stretching over years in some seven areas involving more than two dozen communities, the restriction in these latter numbers being only imposed by PMI's limited resources. These continuous exchanges with community "shottas", as the youthful gang members are called, produced not only much information about their doings but also some insight into their underlying mind-set and orientation.

The third source of data is a set of in-depth, semi-structured interviews of experienced social and development workers, several of whom were also involved in the PMI, and of selected community leaders, some of whom had at one time or another been community "shottas" but had turned away from that violence to join the camp of the peace-makers. These voices contribute a breadth that I try to make full use of, though mostly without naming them.

This study, *first*, will argue the general relevance of community to the issue at hand, setting out what is meant by community and the close, almost rural features of inner-city communities, sketching the importance given to community in Jamaica's history and pointing out the distinct community character of some gangs; it will dip also into civil society as the theoretical infrastructure for community, standing over against the state and the private sector while together with them comprising

governance which in today's world has replaced straight government; *second*, outline the effect of social exclusion and garrison structures on interactions among inner city communities and between them and the wider society;

third, connect the increase in homicide to a criminalization of community gangs, to the principal sources of this process and to the resulting loss of community, its spirit and organizations; and

fourth, outline the community approach to community violence pursued by the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) and similar agencies, setting out the data on PMI's impact on homicide and on community gang behaviour and posing the alternative civil society path now being taken by many young leaders and their communities with the help of PMI and a few other bodies.

RELEVANCE OF COMMUNITY

In any discussion of the deterioration of human morals and societal values considerable attention is usually given to the family and to the importance of good parenting and correctly so. Recent research, according to William Brueggemann, citing Judith Rich Harris, is challenging, however, this conventional wisdom in its *blanket* ascription to parents of “the power to turn their children into happy and successful adults or to mess up their lives very badly”.¹² Of course early nurture and love from parents are essential for normal social and even brain development. Family breakdown can often bring psychological trauma to children; severe abuse by parents will usually cause permanent damage to a child; boys are negatively affected by the absence of a male role model. But these (the extremes especially) aside, as children begin to interact with other children, it is not with parents but with other children that they identify. It is from the peer group that they take norms and practices.

To understand the shaping of children’s characters and values requires, therefore, focusing on peer, neighbourhood and community groups. These are the crucial agents of character building and social maturation. It is through these that they learn and accept the rules of society, or are turned towards drugs, intolerance and violence. In keeping with this view, Brueggemann devotes the second part (of five) of his outstanding text to “The Practice of Social Work With Communities” and begins it with the words: “A quiet revolution is revitalizing neighborhood after neighborhood across the North American continent... [N]eighborhoods are resisting the powerful cultural tides that threaten to drown their autonomy and overwhelm their uniqueness” (ibid., p 109-10).

Brueggemann defines communities as “natural human associations based on ties of relationship and shared experiences in which we mutually provide meaning in our lives, meet needs, and accomplish interpersonal goals”. He goes on: “Our predisposition to community insures that we

become the persons we were meant to become, discover meaning, generate ethical values, and develop a culture which would be impossible for single, isolated individuals to accomplish alone" (ibid., p 114).

While recognizing the threats from urbanization, industrialization and the degradation brought on by poverty, while recognizing as well the numerous instances of dysfunction, it is critical then to appreciate the fundamental importance of community for not only addressing social concerns but also, within and through the social linkages, shaping personal goals, identity and fulfillment. Community, it is true, can be extremely narrow and constraining in these regards, for example when linked to concerns of ethnic survival and cultural integrity. It can also be very open, enlarging and encouraging. Whichever way it goes, the fact is that community (beyond the family) in some form or other is absolutely fundamental to development and transforming change or to their blockage. It is a given, not a choice, in the human make-up. We belong to community by our very nature, only which one(s) left to us as individuals to choose, create, or, sooner or later, have imposed on us.

Historically, the national importance of community was recognised in Jamaica from as early as 1937 when Jamaica Welfare was established by Norman Manley. Its name notwithstanding, Jamaica Welfare (JW) under executive director Thom Girvan grew in its first two decades into a highly effective *community development* tool. It organized by 1955 some 120 community councils linked in 13 district councils involved in activities such as cottage industries, cooperatives, savings club and adult literacy. The energiser in Girvan's success was the ground-up approach he pursued. He abandoned early as starting points the erecting of community centres in villages – Jamaica was then a largely rural country. Regional and even international fame and imitation followed. What could not be so easily copied abroad was the critically important "spirit of *nation-building* by bettering village life [that] flowed strongly through the undertaking".¹³ Communities were perceived to be integral and important to the development of the entire country.

When private funding – one US cent per bunch of bananas from corporations exporting to Britain – dried up under the impact of World War II Nazi submarines, JW became a government agency and after a number of name changes ended up in the 1960s as the Social Development Commission. Its effectiveness declined, however, as a result of government bureaucracy and especially the centralizing and top-down

approach of Minister of Development and Social Welfare Edward Seaga. His Hundred Villages idea with its revived community centre building programme and its pre-selection of straw-work and particular sports as prescribed in a *Manual of Community Development* was a distinct failure.¹⁴

In 1977 Michael Manley announced a renewed thrust in community development, urban now as well as rural, and by November 1979 at the second National Conference of Community Councils over 500 community councils were reported to be actively functioning throughout the island. The basic idea of the PNP administration was for community councils to be given legal status and to this end a Green Paper setting out their structure, functions, membership, etc, was tabled in the House of Representatives by Minister of Youth, Sports and Community Development Hugh Small. This effort was never brought to completion as the elections of 1980 put an end to the PNP's term in office. The councils themselves had got caught up in the political polarisation of the period. A key feature of these councils was the Community Enterprise Organisation (CEO), the concept of which had been advanced by Professor George Beckford of the University of the West Indies, and by 1980 some 127 CEOs were in existence. However, in Ruel Cooke's careful assessment, "as an experiment in fostering self-reliance and economic democracy the CEO programme might be described as a miserable failure".¹⁵

The 1980s government of Edward Seaga put an end to the CEO programme, replacing it with Solidarity, a loan programme for individual micro business that had considerable success. However, in community development Seaga showed no interest. In fact, local government itself had several of its portfolios removed to central administration. Even Michael Manley in 1990 had lost interest. According to Paul Burke, "In dismissing our concerns, he [Manley] said that no one was being prevented from forming community councils if they were [?] wanted, but that it was not on the government's priority agenda."¹⁶ In 1993, nonetheless, other forces in government persisting, Ministry Paper 8/93 set out a programme of local government reform which would turn it away from its previous focus on central government toward communities, and by 1995 the first Parish Advisory Council, now the Parish Development Committee (PDC), was in existence.

Today every parish has its PDC, although only a few function at a desirable level of activity. To feed into these Committees the Social Development Commission began in the late '90s to address the formation of

Community Development Committees and Development Area Committees. This structure, along with some rigidity on the part of the SDC in determining community boundaries, suggests that the lesson of the inefficacy of over-direction by the state of civil society that began to manifest its heavy hand from as early as the 1950s, reaching unacceptable heights under both Seaga and Manley, is yet to be fully learned. The role of the state in relation to civil society, of which community is a central component, is to facilitate, not dictate.

Meanwhile, if progress with PDCs has been slow and uneven, this is in large part because local government reform stalled from 1998 after Arnold Bertram took over as Minister of Local Government. Even after his departure in 2002, movement was minimal. What the new JLP administration does in this regard, especially as it relates to communities, still remains to be seen. But its abolition of a separate ministry of local government is declared to be meant to strengthen local authorities, not weaken them. One crucial needed ingredient is for the SDC to be given the resources to return to giving more attention to a basic building block – community based organizations, and for youth clubs to get parallel attention from an also adequately resourced National Centre for Youth Development (or SDC). Care of these on the ground has been very uneven.

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The full relevance of community can only be truly grasped, however, by giving it the central place that is its due within civil society and that, as a result, brings it into a critically important relationship with the state and the private sector. For this the history of the concept and place of civil society will be helpful, even if only briefly sketched.

The term ‘civil society’ goes back to the Latin translation, *societas civilis*, of the Greek *politike koinonia*, or political community/society, which was what Aristotle called the *polis*, the city-state. Except for slaves and women, the political community or state, for the Greeks, was all-inclusive. The *oikos* or household also lay outside the Greek state and only as “a residual category, the natural background of the *polis*”¹⁷, not as a distinct world or society. Households related to one another through their heads, the male citizens, who were *in* the *polis* where they shared a common *ethos* or set of values and norms and made the laws. Political

society was the sole public system. There was no distinct economy or private sector apart from that society.

While Roman law drew a clear line between the private and the public and while the middle ages and later feudal monarchies gradually introduced some pluralization, it was only with Hegel in the eighteenth century that the distinctness of civil society from the state became explicit and formal. Community was not included, however, in the concept of civil society that was put forward by Hegel and neither was family. Hegel's theoretical construct was essentially dualist inasmuch as civil society is distinguished from the state. Statism is very strong in Hegel, the state being the ideal to which human development moves. Civil society for Hegel included the "system of needs" (that is, economic production and exchange as conducted by different classes), the administration of justice with its various regulatory and public welfare agencies (*polizei*) which today are regarded as part of the state, and the "corporation", that is associations of various kinds such as learned bodies, churches and craftsmen.¹⁸

It was left to Gramsci, although a follower of Marx, to reverse Marxist economistic reduction of civil society to the political economy. Although his statements were at times contradictory and boundaries at times blurred, he recognized the distinctness of modern civil society – with its trade unions, clubs, cultural bodies, voluntary associations, neighbourhood associations and political parties – not only from the state structure but also from the capitalist economy. An important part of Gramsci's originality was this tripartite scheme.

Gramsci perceived, for example, how the Catholic church, although no longer a part of the Italian state, was able to exercise power in civil institutions of a cultural kind and how this power was sufficient in a particular period to prevent the ruling class from achieving "*hegemony*" over the working class, win, that is, its real *consent* as opposed to simply "dominating" it, coercively compelling obedience through law, bureaucracy and the military apparatus. Consent achieved through persuasive communication, Gramsci discovered, was the mechanism central to the functioning of civil society and to its coordination of action, in contrast to the mechanisms employed in the economy through wealth, or backed by law and coercion in the case of the state,¹⁹ an extremely perceptive characterization of this threesome. "Thus [for Gramsci] civil society, and especially its cultural institutions, appeared as the central

terrain to be occupied in the struggle for emancipation.” (Cohen & Arato, p 144).

However, in Gramsci’s view, where the ruling class is bourgeois, the associational and cultural forms and values of civil society will be precisely those most adequate to reproducing bourgeois hegemony and manufacturing consent from all social strata. His dominant intellectual frame of reference, which was the proletarian revolution against capitalism coupled with his support for the Soviet Union, led him away from reaching a concept of an alternative in which civil society could genuinely flourish without being either the mere tool of capitalism or entirely absorbed by a utopian “socialist” state.

The first important point emerging from this summary historical account is the tripartite scheme inclusive of a distinct civil society, which has had its opponents²⁰ but is today quite widely accepted. It has been advanced by the United Nations Development Programme as the structure of *governance*.²¹ This model in my view offers a useful framework for a theoretical probing, understanding and possibly integration of the basic components of socio-economic reality – class, race, gender, law, state, economy, environment, and basic issues of rights, democracy and justice. Although the place for carrying out that exercise is elsewhere, it is raised and noted here in order to highlight the importance of civil society and therefore, as a main subsequent point brings forward, also of community.

A notable exception to this point of view is Ellen Meiksins Wood. While acknowledging the value of Gramsci’s conception of civil society, she overlooks the distinct place he accorded it not only from the state but also from the market.²² After a brilliant exposition of Marx’s critique of capitalism and of his historical materialism, she takes the mistaken position that civil society advocates lump everything non-state and thus civil society with the market. Wood also maintains that in celebrating the pluralism of non-state institutions and defending them against the power of the state, they fail like trends on the Left, “busy conceptualizing away the very idea of capitalism”, to understand and give proper weight to Marx’s insights into capitalist exploitation, its “totalizing logic” and class relations and they believe that social movements can substitute for the economic struggle.

There is substance to this last point of Wood’s about capitalism and its impact. While its amplification is not possible within the limited

objectives of this study, the governance model promoted by this study would have to be joined, paradoxical as it might appear, with civil society grasping the kind of analysis and rejection of capitalism set out by Wood. An example of a powerful critique in this direction is *Jamaica for Sale*, the video documentary put together in late 2008 by the NGO, Jamaica Environmental Trust, on the damage done by some transnational hoteliers to the environment, the tourist industry, the welfare of fisher folk and every Jamaican beach user.

The second point to be made here is the substantive place of community in civil society, a point that has been overlooked from the time of Hegel and needs to be corrected. Even more than family, community must be considered as central to civil society. Voluntary associations of various kinds are usually highlighted as components of civil society and rightly so; indeed along especially with social movements they can be regarded as the cutting edge of civil society. However, many of these associations, those at least known as non-government organisations or NGOs, exist precisely to serve and assist the developmental programmes of communities and community bodies. Hence, what is happening to communities, what communities are doing or can do, how they relate to the state – these are critical to the role of civil society and to our understanding of it. It is noteworthy how often modern governments turn to the community – community care of the mentally ill and aged, community policing, community tourism, etc – to help solve national problems.

Third, as Gramsci also recognised, consent is to civil society what wealth is to the economy and force and law to the state. Consent is reached through communication, which is why Cohen and Arato turn the spotlight on the role of discourse as put forward and worked through by Habermas.²³ Habermas's discourse is dialogical. For the outcomes of dialogue to be binding, specific procedural conditions have to be fulfilled, so much so that a set of procedures become a metanorm above all other norms reached by discourse. Again, it is not my intention to enter into this discussion here but only to suggest a theoretical frame of reference requiring further exploration but for now serving to situate the present focus on community, violence, and attempts to rebuild community that start with dialogue and continue through consent.

What this position adds up may be of some relevance to those on the Left who have been groping for some way out of the confusion that followed the demise of communism and even, it has seemed to many, of

Left politics. In fact, Left politics is far from dead and cannot die as long as some humans refuse to accept the injustice, inequality and extreme poverty that capitalism creates. Indeed socialism – in the sense not only of its values but also of requiring the public regulation of the means of production and the ownership of some – faces a revival, promoted by the collapse of communism, as Tony Benn that perceptive British politician once observed,²⁴ and more recently by the US and global financial and economic crisis of 2008. What has passed away with communism is the 300-year-old age of violent revolution – replaced by the “people revolutions” of east Europe – and with it a politics of confrontation – replaced by a politics of dialogue and consensus. Which is not to say that everyone has learned these lessons.

INNER CITY COMMUNITY AS TRADITIONAL

Community in the Jamaican inner city, except in one crucial respect, is more traditional, almost rural community, than it is city. One thinks of city, ethnic concentrations aside, as cosmopolitan, as largely homogeneous while allowing for class differentiations, as mobile, as encouraging a range of interests, activities and preferences that carry people out of residential areas, so much so that residents hardly know their next-door neighbours. Even at home, television locks many viewers in their living rooms and (except perhaps for a church-going focused too often on personal salvation) away from communal encounters and social concerns. In Jamaica in truth, many middle class areas oriented to European or North American values have little or no community spirit, much less organization. Where organization does exist, its leadership is in the hands of elected professionals, senior or expert figures.

Inner city communities in Jamaica have none of these features. Each has its own distinct history and character, the consequence of years of shaping by rural origins, events and powerful leaders. All tend to be closed to outsiders, very suspicious of strangers, bonded more with country relatives who are visited from time to time, their people knowing everyone else in a web of family and friend relationships, physically and socially immobile, mostly ignorant (as a result) of the mores and geography of the wider city, possessed of a strong sense of community and led by a cadre of “youth”. Except for their crowded, sometimes squalid, ghetto conditions and concrete structures, nothing could be more unlike

what is generally thought of as modern city life.

It is the element of youth leadership that is contradictory to the traditional character of the inner city community referred to above. The leadership of teacher, Justice of the Peace, prominent businessman and pastor has sunk almost entirely out of sight, whether from emigration or intimidation or “war” climate – which always puts power in the hands of “generals”. It is a set of youth (a term interpreted broadly) that is now in the leadership seat.

With all that, it is the narrow closeness of community-as-it-used-to-be that rules. A regular task for those who are trying to address conflict in such areas has been to widen the horizons of the youth involved, help them overcome their fears of leaving their immediate neighbourhood to take part in a meeting or retreat, fears held for good reason, given the threat of violent death from encountering someone from a rival area in, say, a market downtown. The Jamaican, outer-city middle class, more influenced by Northern and European orientations, has little idea of the strength of community ties²⁵, of the *communal sharing* and *feeling* that, even in the midst of conflict, unites the majority of people in a lower income community. The importance of community to inner city people is shown by their use of banning from the community as a penalty for certain crimes: it is a meaningful penalty when community stands for a concentration of family, friends and a familiar environment.

This powerful sense of community springs, one strongly suspects, from the African roots more intimately felt of the preponderantly Black population of the inner city, the same African roots that have given rise to the creative music and song that have made Jamaica famous. Inner city people love and take delight in the bonds they have with their community neighbours. Even when those from Kingston have gone to live somewhere else, across the harbour in Portmore, for example, they will go back to socialize in the evenings, or for church worship, another socializing activity. Outside commentators who casually recommend bulldozing inner city areas to make space for industry or commerce and “moving people *elsewhere*” talk as though established communal living spaces are no more than cattle pens, their people to be herded around like animals.

COMMUNITY GANGS

It is normal for adolescents, especially male adolescents, to belong and

want to belong to a group of some kind, whether a club or a uniformed entity (e.g. boy scouts) or a gang. The group provides a sense of belonging, responds to a need to be recognized, to get attention, to be someone. The group has rules, a structure, which along with recognition gives the security that is another profound need of youth growing up. Small groups are a kind of community, creating solidarity with others, calling for loyalty to them, providing the ingredients and the orientation that go into building personal identity.

"Gangs satisfy a whole range of normal adolescent needs", writes Deborah Prothrow-Stith, M.D.

The most significant of these is the adolescent hunger for peer approval and acceptance. *But violent gangs are not normal.* When young people feel that their lives are knit into the fabric of the society at large and when they face the future knowing that a fair share awaits them, they do not form or join violent gangs, although they do form social clubs, fraternities, sororities, and other age-mate groups. Violent gangs arise when young people face a future of limited opportunity and despair, when for military, political, social, or economic reasons the life that awaits a young person has been stripped of meaning and validity.²⁶

A grasp of the community reality, with its firm sense of collective identity, is essential for understanding the groups of male youth that I shall call 'community gangs' that are responsible for numerous homicides. Community gangs are comprised of males in their mid teens to late thirties, all termed "youth", but sometimes under the leadership of an older man, very occasionally woman, in their late thirties or forties, even fifties. It is partly for their often referred to, born-and-bred, community membership but chiefly for their function as community defenders, that these groups can be legitimately called *community* gangs rather than 'corner crews', as they are sometimes called and I myself have done in the past. However, as we shall see, in fact their role in communities came about with the formation of garrisons in the 1960s to '70s, but turned increasingly negative in recent years.

The existence of corner crews, or streets gangs as they are also sometimes called, as an urban phenomenon found in many countries, with an identity distinct from criminal gangs, is well attested to in the literature (Klein 1995, Sheldon et al 1997, etc). Earlier writing of mine called attention to the same distinction in Jamaica, although there the street gang has unique features and history and was to become more, as indicated, a *community* gang. For the corner or community crew the aim is

peer solidarity – “company” as one community person put it – and turf or group defense; for the criminal gang (see Gunst 1995, Blake 2002 for Jamaican examples) it is personal gain and, Harriott (2007) proposes, also power.

The two group types, 1) criminal and 2) community, represent therefore two diverse orientations and trajectories.²⁷ For many corner crew members, peer solidarity and turf defense have been an assertion of community and personal identity,²⁸ part of their quest for self-worth and respect, which is not generally typical of the criminal orientation, (although Obika Gray argues forcefully for its presence historically also in Jamaica, in the form of a protest against “Babylon”, the oppressive state²⁹). However, turf control can be pursued not in self-defence but as part of a power play using criminal means (as in recently observed instances), which supports the view expressed by Harriott referred to above.

The distinction between criminal and community/corner is far from trivial, nor is it a matter of degree but qualitative, involving two different kinds of men (and women). It is the difference between those acting with calculating intent and those whose “crime” occurs from some other “defence” or “rough justice” intention. Judges and jurors know the distinction when they are faced one day with a murder planned in cold blood and on another day with the fatality that emerges from a fight between teenagers, and this is reflected in distinguishing murder from manslaughter and self-defense, the adult from the juvenile. While these distinctions do not relieve community delinquents of responsibility for some wrong-doing or crime, still evaluation, treatment and penalties cannot be the same as for determined criminality. As can be appreciated, the combination of tight community and weak parenting³⁰ means that many youth are born, grown and schooled in a network of relationships and social conditions that forcefully pushes them into a behaviour pattern of violent conflict with other corners or communities. Entrenched social structures can be overwhelming. But as will shown further on, unlike criminal gangs community crews can be moved from inter-gang conflict and its resulting homicides through mediation and income-earning projects toward lasting cease-fires.

Youth groupings are normal, then, in urban settings, with records of the first such in Kingston going back to the 1950s. Chevannes has identified from his field research³¹ on the Rastafari the main gangs operating in central and western Kingston between 1955 and 1974 – the Vikings of

Back-o-Wall, many of them dreadlocked Rastafari, until they were dispersed by the bull-doing of that area, the Park or Culbut (Culvert) men of Wellington Street top in Denham Town, the Regent Street boys who became the Spanglers, and the Salt City gang renamed later Phoenix City. He has also outlined some of their sport and other activities, legal and illegal, and their political tendencies or efforts at neutrality, in particular the severe pressure to affiliate to the ruling party through linkage to the Youth Development Agency (YDA) for the sport gear and equipment it offered. The YDA was established by the Minister of Development and Welfare who was also the constituency representative. After the election of 1972, which brought the People's National Party to power, the YDA was reorganized under the Social Development Commission.

"Until 1963", Chevannes writes, "inter-gang rivalry was unknown." (p 394) The 1967 election and the more bitter one of 1972 changed that decisively, bringing its fatalities, some of them listed by name by Chevannes. Youth gangs, it is clear, were purposefully drawn by the two main political parties into their contestations for control of depressed urban communities and of the government of the country and thus into the parties' violent confrontation, almost civil war, of 1980. The communities themselves, from the elections of the 1940s and 1950s, had already lined up behind one or other of the two major parties, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People's National Party (PNP). With the methodical formation of garrisons in the 1960s and 1970s, a number of communities became indelibly stamped as "Labourite" and "Comrade", "Garden men" (for Tivoli Gardens, JLP stronghold) and "Jungleists" (for Trench Town, PNP stronghold), to the point where these became the dominant element in the very identity of the members of these areas and of their gangs.³²

These divided housing estates and territories with their guns and their "dons" (a later term replacing "rankings" for gang and community leaders) formed the living framework of the youth groups turned community gangs responsible for much of the violence of that period. This framework continues to shape the experiences of the youth of today. While *They Cry 'Respect'* only lightly touched on these gangs,³³ my work in Whitfield Town in 1998 and research in August Town in 2000 made clear for me the marked difference between community violence and criminal violence, "shottas"³⁴ and "criminals", in the way the communities understood and used those words³⁵ and indeed objectively.

WHEN IS A "CRIME" TRULY CRIME?

The distinction between the activities of criminal and community gangs takes a further turn when one moves to examine the nature of crime and to some specifics. According to Daniel Van Ness, "The modern concept of crime is legalistic: crime is considered an act or omission that has previously been declared punishable by an authoritative governmental body." However, for current restorative justice theory "crime is primarily conflict between individuals resulting in injuries to victims, communities and the offenders themselves; only secondarily is it lawbreaking."³⁶ "Crime", says Zehr in the same vein, "is a violation of people and relationships."³⁷ These contrasting concepts of crime are relevant to the question at hand.

Thus, in Jamaica unlike the United States the possession of a firearm without a license is an offence against a law passed by the state, a serious offence drawing a multi-year prison sentence, "a crime". For their part, in a context of many years of ineffectual official policing, community gangs have become convinced that guns are a necessity for community and their own protection and therefore their possession not a criminal offence. The wounding or killing of a rival community gang member in what is regarded as a defensive operation, would not in community eyes be a crime or make its agent a criminal. On the other hand, community people do find the killing of young children or the burning to death of an old woman in her home by a community gang extremely repugnant and they class such acts as criminal. Clearly for many community people it is not legal status that is the determining factor. Their outlook, without any acquaintance with theory, is spontaneously more along the lines of restorative justice thinking.

However, the problem lies not in these clear-cut instances but in the ambiguous or grey areas. For example, a seemingly sharp rejection of criminality appeared when the inter-community conflict between August Town (proper) and Hermitage was ended in 1998 and this led to a clash with Anthony Baker. He was in prison at the time of the "peace" but attempted after his release to resume his previous criminal activities of robbery and rape. He was warned to stop it by the leading community gang (responsible on the August Town side for the cease-fire). But he persisted, even shooting after those who sought to check his criminal ways, until in the end they "took him out".

A first observation on this episode is that the rejection by the gangs was of major crimes, although for survival sake petty theft appears to have

been allowed, especially outside the community. The same rejection dominated the reconciliation meeting in Bennett Land in 1999 – “no rape, no bowing³⁸, no robbery” were the rules laid down, indicating what were considered serious crimes. *Sotto voce* the rule was to apply inside the community³⁹; behaviour outside the community was another matter, revealing the community gang’s sometimes dark side: some members of community gangs often engage in petty crime, small scale extortion and robbery. Secondly, therefore, the termination of Baker’s life can be viewed as a case of rough justice taken on the basis of the inability or corruption of the police and the court system to deal with the guilty. A community or group will argue, with some justification, that it has a right to protect itself from criminals where the authorized state bodies are failing in this regard.

While “self-defence” in the Baker case might be considered justified, the obvious danger and illegitimacy of unauthorized persons taking the law into their own hands comes starkly home to roost in its application to “defence” against a rival community. There homicide is a predictable consequence when rival community gangs shoot at each other with high-powered weapons but who started it and how are lost in a maze of attack and reprisal which become endless, self-justifying and destructive of community life. Then too, where the communities are party political rivals, a criminalization of partisan politics (not to be confused with politics used by individuals as a cover for their criminal activity) also comes into play, the idea that just about anything, homicide included, is justified for the sake of party power.⁴⁰

SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND THE GARRISON

It was the experience of growing up in politically polarized communities that initially and later has pulled many youth into community defense and its main agent the community gangs. What made this possible in the first place, however, apart from the drive of political party activism in quest of power and drawing them in as willing tools, was the poverty of the communities. It was also their looking for leadership to the parties ruled by the middle class as a result of ingrained orientations of dependency on and respect for their “betters”, the traditional ruling class, which was an important feature of their poverty.

On the subject of poverty community people on their own initiative tend to say very little, in part but not only because it is an abstract concept. They speak rather in specific terms about patched up houses, not enough food for four or five children, and especially about not having work; or about those who do “have it” – job, nice house, child going to a “good” school, domestic helper – and those who don’t. When the “poverty” term was put to them in a study conducted jointly by the University of the West Indies and the World Bank, the answer was firm: “me poor but me no poverty”.⁴¹ “Poverty” is reserved for the family-less old man in a shack, the beggar woman or orphaned street-boy. Most people do not really perceive themselves as living in *great* poverty, which is what “poverty” means to them.

Although, as is widely held, poverty can prompt theft, violence is another matter. Poverty certainly was not seen by community people as its source. Unemployment was what they cast in that role. This in Jamaica meant no income, it is true, no money to spend on shoes, house or children, some level of poverty in other words. However, it was not through deprivation as such – which is what poverty is usually taken to mean – that poverty induced to violence but through the idleness it enforced accompanied by access to guns in a context of inter-group conflict. It was especialoy also, I am suggesting, what this deprivation, incurred in refusal of employment because of where he lived, *meant* to

people, what it said to them about their standing in the wider societal context. And this was isolation, abandonment, *rejection*, for people who are community-minded a desolating experience that carried the further social meaning,⁴² of scorn, of *disrespect*.

The sense of abandonment comes in many forms. "Look at di road", a Whitfield Town man said to me, "tax money nah spen in ghetto." Another told of the bright youngster who had to quit school because "nobody nah look out fi 'im". A tailor, ever observant through door and window opening onto the street, described how "a whole heap a youth run up and dong now who don't have no modda nor no fadda. Is modda and fadda mek di creation but dem no tek no responsibility fi di youth who leggo free pon di road. If nobody no show mi love, dey argue, how mi fi love anybody?" Burke Road boys themselves recount how, recognizing from her television series a certain Miss Uptown in her car at the stop-light, they made an approach, only to be greeted by the window glass going up and a frightened negative head-shake to their plea for just a moment of word-exchange and admiration. Poverty is not just the boy of 13 or 14 going hungry to bed, nor 50 people living in one yard without a toilet, distressing as these are, but how these are interpreted.⁴³

"Social exclusion" is the technical name given by sociologists and governments today to this abandonment.⁴⁴ They view it as "dispossession of basic rights", "a vicious cycle" from which "escape is difficult", "a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, bad health and family breakdown".⁴⁵ Beyond these deprivations, there is, however, the serious omission in the literature of what the deprivations and the underlying agent attitudes *mean* to people, namely disrespect, a devastating meaning to which we will shortly come.⁴⁶

Nowhere is the exclusion more outwardly evident than in the 'fortress city' model of crime prevention as depicted by Hughes.⁴⁷ It is visible in Jamaica in those residential enclaves of the middle and upper classes that have moved beyond even the omnipresent grill on windows and doors to gated streets, private armed guards and 'armed response' signs. It is police and soldiers, on the other hand, who swarm and *contain* 'risky' communities, committing murder under the pretext of "shoot-outs" with criminals, manning intersections and setting up barbed-wire roadblocks for the sake of an 'outer city' that feels threatened by murderous inner city conflict. Paradoxically at first sight, some inner-city communities have set

up their own gated streets. They remove the grills of deep cross street drains, or block entry points with logs, boulders, car wrecks and other junk, in order to protect the community from drive-by shootings by men from rival areas.

The combination of high murder rate and visible impoverishment then inflicts an “area stigma” or “bad name”⁴⁸ that is a major obstacle to inner-city residents getting work, credit and even a prompt police response to reports of crime. The residents of certain communities regularly complain, for example, of having their applications for work turned down because of the home address they give – something that many refuse to lie about. This has been tested and proven over and over by the success of those who do give a false address. In addition to the deprivation of work and livelihood, this rejection is an experience that people find extremely hurtful, knowing as they do that the large majority of their fellow citizens are decent, law-abiding and deserving of respect.

DISRESPECT

Strange as it may sound then, socially excluded inner-city garrisons live *outside* the main currents of the city’s – and the country’s – economic and social life, while serving as tools of the power-seeking campaigns of their political representatives – for their own subordination and neglect. This condition, we now want to add, provokes to rebellious and violent action. How this comes about, as already suggested and extremely important to grasp, is through the channel not solely of deprivation – though there is plenty of that too – but of its mix with *dissing*⁴⁹ or disrespect which the exclusion or abandonment are read as signifying and which strikes deeply at the victims’ own self-respect. It is through this subtle interweave, rather than as the direct cause that is generally assumed and vigorously refuted, that urban poverty relates to violence.

The importance and role of respect in inter-gang conflict is identified and described by women and older heads in August Town as “male pride”⁵⁰ “I will never understand men. Look at the number of youth died in this war to prove dat unnu [you] bad.” “If it was for the women alone no war nuh go on. The men tell themselves that they are the soldiers... The slightest thing is a disrespect and that means war.” “Youth just feel dat if a man touch fi him crew ‘im haffi go prove it.”⁵¹ “Di men dem pride is dem rope. Yuh cyaan [cannot] do anyting to affect dem pride; dem kill you and

dat mean dem kill demself to'." The youth themselves were aware of this pride and in one diagram testified to its importance under the title "youth prove".⁵² An attack on Hermitage was defended with the words, "Dem know dat wi not going let car come an' run over wi. Dem come wake di sleeping lion." And as the object of disrespect and defense, it must be noted, inner city youth do not see individuals but the group and the community as perceived in the way portrayed earlier.

It is not only the slights in inter-gang conflict but also, in inner city comparison to the outer city, the degraded and demeaning conditions, the lack of adequate training and of employment, and the rejection carried by area stigma that are perceived as disrespect. Above all, a cultural⁵³ exclusion characterizes the society's treatment of a large segment of the population. Most inner city residents, the older residents at least, may appear to absorb passively this assault on their self-esteem, but in fact they feel it deeply and reveal their feelings, as we pointed out in the 1996/2001 study, in their depiction of the former glory of their community: more than old people's gossiping, this was assertion of the ground for respect from both self and others.⁵⁴

However, if they can muster only verbal and indirect forms of resistance,⁵⁵ not so the youth. Youth violence is a form of *protest* against dissembling, a demand *careless of public censure* – they live in a separate world – and taking the channel of violence as a result of family break-down, peer group encouragement, a context of long-standing political conflict and the other factors discussed below.

According to James Gilligan, Director of the Institute of Law and Psychiatry at the teaching hospital of Harvard Medical School since 1965 and for 25 years Medical Director first of the prison mental hospital and then of Mental Health Services for the entire prison system of the state of Massachusetts, the spontaneous reaction to disrespect, to being put down, *when the contrary indicators or proofs* of worth such as education, social standing or other kinds of status *are absent*, is violence. Gilligan has brilliantly illuminated this insight in his description and analysis of the psychology of hardened criminals and of North American society.

For Gilligan, four millennia has sufficiently tested and disproved "the hypothesis that we could prevent violence, or at least diminish its scale and intensity, by labeling it 'evil' and 'criminal'... and retaliating with more violence of our own, which we call 'punishment' and 'justice'".⁵⁶ In place of this "traditional *moral and legal* approach" (his emphasis) he

proposes treating violence as a public health problem. He begins from his experience in his psychotherapeutic work with violent criminals, a beginning that deserves citing at length.

I was surprised to discover that I kept getting the same answer when I asked one man after another why he had assaulted or even killed someone: 'Because he disrespected me.' In fact, they used that phrase so often that they abbreviated it to, 'He dis'ed me.' Whenever people use a word so often that they abbreviate it, you know how central it is in their moral and emotional vocabulary. References to the desire for respect as the motive for violence kept recurring, with remarks like, 'I never got so much respect before in my life as I did when I first pointed a gun at some dude's face.' On another occasion, I could not understand why one of the prisoners was engaged in a running battle with the prison officers that resulted in his finally being sentenced to solitary confinement and having every privilege and possession taken away from him. I asked him, 'What do you want so badly that you are willing to give up everything else in order to get it?'... In response, this man, who was usually so inarticulate that it was difficult to get a clear answer to any question, astonished me by standing up tall, looking me in the eye, and replying with perfect clarity: 'Pride. Dignity. Self-esteem.' And then he described how the officers were, he felt, attempting to take away his last shred of pride and self-respect by disrespecting him, and said, 'If you ain't got pride, you got nothing'.

These experiences, and many others like them, convinced me that the basic psychological motive, or cause, of violent behavior is the wish to ward off or eliminate the feeling of shame and humiliation – a feeling that is painful, and can even be intolerable and overwhelming – and replace it with its opposite, the feeling of pride. (ibid., p 29)

Gilligan goes on to show that the critical centrality of shame and pride was no original discovery, as he had first thought, but present in one or other of their numerous synonyms in the Bible story of Cain and Abel, in Aristotle, Aquinas and Hegel, and in the writings of many psychoanalysts and sociologists. His quotation from sociologist Elijah Anderson (*Code of the Street*, 1999) who for many years conducted ethnographic fieldwork in ghetto areas of Philadelphia is particularly relevant to this study.

The street culture has evolved a 'code of the street', which amounts to a set of informal rules of behaviour organized around a desperate search for respect, that governs public social relations, especially violence... At the

heart of the code is the issue of respect – loosely defined as being treated ‘right’ or being granted one’s proper due, or the deference one deserves. Respect is viewed as almost an external entity, one that is hard-won but easily lost – and so must constantly be guarded... Something extremely valuable on the street – respect – is at stake in every interaction... For people unfamiliar with the code this concern with respect in the most ordinary interactions can be frightening and incomprehensible... Many feel that it is acceptable to risk dying over issues of respect... There is a general sense that very little respect is to be had, and therefore everyone competes to get what affirmation he can from what is available. The resulting craving for respect gives people thin skins and short fuses. (p 34)

The correlation between inequality in wealth and homicide, which Gilligan points out has been established by some three dozen studies around the world, is traceable to the shame stimulated by inequality and unemployment. Thus “we speak of the poor as the lower classes” where lower means inferior, “the rich as the upper classes” (ibid., p 43). When everyone is poor, poverty brings no shame. Inferiority and shame are provoked by the gap between aspiration and achievement, which the poor encounter in societies that promote the myth of success resulting from hard work but refute it in reality, or by the equation of self-worth with net worth. “Age discrimination has the same effect,” Gilligan points out, “particularly for young males.” Honours and status “are disproportionately given to older males, and denied to younger ones.” (ibid., p 47)

While guilt is perceived as resulting from inside, from some sin that one has committed, shame, Gilligan argues, is seen as emanating from other people: one is shamed in the eyes of the onlooker. Guilt is relieved through confession or self-punishment or even ultimately suicide. Shame is relieved by achievements that win respect and honour from others and bring a sense of pride, or by arousing fear (= respect) or eliminating the other if this is seen as the only alternative to removing humiliation. “Punishing others alleviates feelings of shame because it replaces the image of oneself as a weak, passive, helpless, and therefore shameful victim of their punishment (their shaming) with the contrasting image of oneself as powerful, active, self-reliant and therefore admirable, and unshameable” (ibid., p 52). Gilligan is drawing here on *The Chrysanthemum and Sword* (1946) where Ruth Benedict introduces the two concepts in her study of Japanese culture, and on her description of an extreme case of a culture of shame, the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island (*Patterns of*

Culture, 1934) who committed atrocities against even friends and relatives in order to maintain pride and prestige.⁵⁷

THE GARRISON – ITS EMERGENCE

Elite exclusion, area stigma, disrespect and resulting violence are not the whole story. There is also their source and its other doings. They stem from authoritarian partisan politics led by middle-class politicians⁵⁸ in the interest of their own control (obtained through control of the political parties) and – to be emphasized – accepted for that reason by the wider society. Partisan political practice dominated by the middle and upper classes but whole-heartedly accepted by lower-income residents converted some inner-city communities into armed enclaves, “garrisons”, through the use initially of public housing.⁵⁹ Along with guns, this brought complete intolerance of rival party members, violent wars, and 100 per cent (or more in earlier years, now less as a result of improved electoral procedures) of the votes in national elections. It will come then as no surprise that Jamaica owes its place as the top crime centre of the world in large part to the inner city communities of Kingston where over 40 per cent of Jamaica’s homicides occur.

The road to the garrison was opened up in the very first years of party building by the placing of political rivalry on a foundation of violence led by trade union and community partisans. The Jamaica Labour Party brought its union members out to harass the public meetings of the Peoples National Party, which retaliated, first with the Fighting 69th from Matthew’s Lane community⁶⁰ in the downtown heart of the city, then with union members as its own trade union base grew. What followed, in spite of a peace treaty between the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in 1949, was an early killing that same year when partisans clashed in Gordon Town on the north-eastern edge of the city of Kingston. In the west of the city there was the “Battle of Rose Town” between the two main parties, which involved other deaths according to folk historian Robin “Jerry” Small and which forced the Chief Minister to re-locate to a safe rural seat.

“From 1947 to 1951 violence shifted from the political to the trade union or industrial scene”⁶¹. Those years and the early 1950s were a period of intense union activity as the Trade Union Congress re-organized itself to better compete with the JLP’s Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, and

the PNP, having ejected several leading leftists from the party, established the National Workers Union. On top of union conflict with employers opposed to their party or to unions themselves, there was fierce competition *between* the unions for members and this often led to clashes at work sites, some of which were extremely violent. Out of one such occasion involving pitched battles, several deaths and a declaration of a State of Emergency came a charge of manslaughter against JLP leader Alexander Bustamante himself of which he was acquitted.⁶²

All this changed in the 1960s and '70s when most conflicts came to be *inter-community* with the creation of the first urban garrisons. While over later decades trade unions were to move from close party affiliation toward a federation of unions and putting worker interests above those of party, political contestation moved into communities. Garrisons on a planned basis started out as communities lodged in government housing packed with supporters of the ruling party.⁶³ However, it wasn't housing (an element entirely lacking in some garrisons) or geography which made for garrisons but as the name (which came later) suggests, the *quasi-military organization* of the community. This consisted of, firstly, authoritarian leadership centered on a Member of Parliament and a local leader on the ground, who from "top ranking"⁶⁴ came to be called "don"; secondly, the objective of party control⁶⁵ of the constituency through election of its candidate; and to this end, thirdly, the employment of force, specifically the gun. The underlying thrust of this combination was a drive for control that tended to *subordinate every other value* – economic, social and cultural – *to politics*.

Before proceeding further, it might be useful to remind ourselves here of the significance of the issues involved as illuminated by the analysis of Hannah Arendt. She notes, a tradition, on the one hand, that equates politics with "a struggle for power" and the "ultimate kind of power ... [with] violence" (C. Wright Mills in *The Power Elite*). In other words, power is equated with "the organization of violence"; it is an instrument of class rule, of a state thus constructed following the estimate of Marx. For Arendt, however, the preferred tradition has power as the property of a group of people: without it the power of a leader evaporates, while to speak in other circumstances of a "powerful personality" is to use a metaphor for "strength". In this tradition "power and violence are opposites; where one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in

power's disappearance."⁶⁶ Power, the ability to influence or change the behaviour of oneself and of others, clearly stems from something much deeper than physical force, rather (although this is not explicated by Arendt) from knowledge, expertise and/or from moral wisdom, spirituality. It is important to keep this analysis in mind so as to better evaluate the great harm inflicted on politics and society in Jamaica by the creation of the garrison.

While the discriminatory selection of housing recipients was clearly wrong, the purpose of the arrangement seemed on the surface perfectly proper, namely to ensure community support for the election of the representative of a particular party, the party's continued control, therefore, of the constituency in which the community fell. People, after all, out of gratitude, would vote for the candidate who had provided them with housing, and later on loyalty would set in. Garrison residents were happy with this arrangement that gave and guaranteed free housing, light and water. However, it was in its use of force and intimidation to achieve the electoral goal, coupled with its inevitable corollaries, that the full menace and core nature of the garrison was revealed.

Mark Figueroa⁶⁷ from an electoral perspective has identified the corollaries. The first was that no campaign for the opposition came to be allowed within a garrison, and anyone attempting such risked serious hurt to person and property. Conform or depart was the message, if one wanted to keep one's health. This put the clamps on any garrison resident thinking of voting differently from his or her neighbours. To ensure this, manipulation of the voting machinery followed. Driving this hostility to opposed views seeking electoral expression was an exclusivist, authoritarian structure, imposed of course with the consent of those below. This kind of power-holding and power-seeking politics is intolerant politics, reliant on the only weapons it really has, the use of force and illegal means. It is totally at odds with and destructive of the open, inclusive, genuinely empowering, democratic community life that modern society demands and seeks to foster.

Another corollary of the garrison set-up was that any development from outside had to have the approval of the don, who as the political leader⁶⁸ on the ground acquired increasing authority. Restrictions of this kind on outside input worked fine where, as in Tivoli, an MP was able to channel in resources sufficient to keep improvements flowing into the community. Similar control came to be exercised by the don over

delinquencies committed by residents: a dispensation of “justice” based on solid information, proving far more swift and effective than the state’s, obtained the ready support of residents. To recover a stolen article or deal with a rapist, they simply went to the don rather than the police, the offender usually receiving prompt and harsh punishment.

In all these oversight activities – of voting, development and delinquency – a don’s control of an arsenal was critical to his centralized rule. It was no less important, at the same time, for confronting any nearby community aligned to a rival party. But defense against a rival party was also, in its best form, attack. With its pool of “soldiers” available to be trucked to another constituency where the party was waging an election campaign, the garrison became a very valuable resource for the party. It became actually a party’s forward position against the opposing party and as well, for the holder of a secure garrison seat, a source of status and influence *within* the party. Weaponry established in effect an armed enclave of protection and defense against also the police in search of a wanted man, a virtual state within the state of Jamaica.

THE GARRISON – FUNCTION AND TYPOLOGY

This brings us back to the purpose of the garrison as first established – party control through the election of a party’s candidate. Even if the candidate is not popular or suited to the position, he or she *must* get elected: the function of a garrison community is, in the first place, the good of (i.e. control by) the party, which is then, paternally, supposed to see to the good of the community – but is not too blamed if, as is often the case, this does not happen: once control is established, it remains. Nor is it intended that garrison residents should have much say in bringing about its own well-being. Rule is top-down.

This garrison feature of being centred on control for the party and its Member of Parliament has involved in practice an element of centralization, with this varying, however, from the very high level observable in Tivoli Gardens under Edward Seaga and Payne Land under Portia Simpson-Miller to the much looser levels evident in Trench Town, Southside, Dunkirk, Olympic Gardens and indeed most garrisons. In any of the latter, one finds several, even a dozen or more sections or corners – 17 in Southside, 13 in the Rema/Arnett Gardens/Jones Town complex – in conflict or alliance with one another, each with its own leader or lesser

don, but all usually, but not always, answering to a major don. Even Tivoli Gardens has not been immune to tensions with elements in its satellite, Denham Town, (reportedly over crime proceeds), or even internally as a recent police raid has revealed. The police went in after an outside gang which was able to insert itself there because it was in possession of *its own weapons*. The main fact remains, however, that *two types* of garrison have actually emerged, one highly centralized in the two instances indicated, the other much more common type more loosely organised.⁶⁹

This typology, taken as part of an evolving process, is helpful for understanding events and trends in the garrisons. It explains, to begin with, differences in conflict levels: calm and a lower level of crime and homicide in the highly centralized garrison, periodic turbulence and war where there are several independent sections. The greater availability of guns is everywhere but control of their use in disputes between individuals and groups is stronger where authority is exercised centrally and firmly. Payne Land has been classified as centralized because of its firm political party control but, with at least two competing factions, it is nearer to the more loosely organised type.

Second, the types clearly reflect the different cultures that have prevailed for a lengthy period in the two principal political parties, the highly centralized leadership exercised first by Alexander Bustamante and then Edward Seaga in the JLP in contrast to the more collective kind prevalent in the PNP (and descending in recent times into a crippling, almost anarchic divisiveness). Southside and central Spanish Town, though JLP by affiliation, have behaved more like PNP garrisons, in part by being more distant from the central Tivoli authority, in part as a result of local history.

Third, interventions of a developmental kind *from outside* have been able to penetrate the looser kind of garrison with relative freedom, for instance in August Town, Dunkirk and Waterhouse. This has even occurred, while not always welcomed (as I know from personal experience), in Whitfield Town and other sections of Southwest St Andrew, although represented by the same Member of Parliament as is the tighter garrison of Payne Land. Such interventions are unknown in the highly centralized garrison of Tivoli.

Fourth, the security forces similarly have been able to operate more freely in the less centralized areas. In 2007, in Jones Town alone the police killed thirteen⁷⁰ (a huge number for a population of 9,000 – in many cases,

by community report, cold-blooded extra-judicial killings, even if several of those slain were reputed criminals); and other areas like Dunkirk have received similar treatment, though fewer killings. On the other hand, after initially simply steering clear of Tivoli, the security forces have over several years established a pattern of periodic frontal assaults as the only way in their judgment, it seems, to deal with wanted persons or criminal elements in that community.

Fifth, opposition forces are likely to try to win support in the less centralized type of garrison and, although this is also likely to provoke a violent response, nonetheless (in an election climate of disaffection with a ruling party or a dominant corner) they are able to make some gains. Rollington Town is a case where recently attempted penetration by members of the rival party was repulsed vigorously, although perhaps only temporarily; August Town and Goldsmith Villa, on the other hand, which had been predominantly PNP (but tolerant toward individuals of JLP persuasion), now has sections solidly in the JLP camp and capable of resisting the efforts of a PNP-affiliated gang to dominate them. What the stabilization of gains would mean is that the community where it takes place would cease to be a garrison defined to refer to a community controlled *exclusively* by a single party.

However, with tolerance levels growing in some of the more splintered garrisons as partisanship declines (see below) but with gang and gun violence continuing, a broader scope combined with a sharper focus appears necessary for defining the garrison. Thus the employment of *intimidation and violence by gangs* would be the basic defining element of a garrison, whether this be against the members of a rival party or against a rival gang of even the same party. Where the violence is directed against rival party members, communities are turned into control-winning tools, war machines for a party every four to five years in which party activists “run tings”. Disruption occurs at even more frequent intervals in cases of inter-gang warfare among members of the same party. Every independent organizational effort has to simply make way for these periodic thrusts, suspend its activities and lose major ground as a result, or be crushed. Garrison behaviour works against spontaneous civil and community life.⁷¹

For full understanding of this scenario, account must be taken of what it has meant concretely on the ground, in combination naturally with other factors and specifically, in the 1970s, ideology and (in the view of some

that I share) foreign interference. Along with those factors, intense party rivalry spearheaded by the garrisons (much less fragmented than they are today) jumped homicides from that decade’s plateau of the 300s to 889 in national election year 1980, of which about four-fifths are estimated to have been political. A plateau of 400s held throughout the 1980s but in the 1990s became an upward spiral as garrison community conflict mushroomed once again, this time, however, under the influence of non-ideological factors.

Table 1: Homicides by year

Year	1963	1967	1980	1989	1990	1987	2008 July
	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
	9	9	9	9	9	0	0
	6	7	8	8	9	0	0
	2	6	0	9	4	0	5
Homocides	63	367	889	439	690	887	1674
							956

The first trigger of the spiral was the guns and money shipped into Jamaica by members of “posses” and “yardies” successful in gaining wealth from illegal drug trading in the United States and the United Kingdom. This enabled the independent acquisition of weapons by lesser corner leaders and even rank and file soldiers, severely cutting into the authority formerly wielded by big dons. These latter from their own drug trade were in some instances able to loosen to some degree their financial dependence on an MP. I say “to some degree” because independence of the MP is much exaggerated. He/she has still been influential and useful, at least to many lesser dons, by providing contracts – which mean jobs for the “soldiers” – and at times offering protection from the police. In any case, MP and don have by and large collaborated, working out to their mutual interest some distribution of control between them.

The second trigger of the renewed spiral was the decline in ideology, as the PNP from the time of Michael Manley’s return to power in 1989 adopted the JLP’s free market position on the economy, putting an end to the socialist/capitalist antagonism between the two parties. The ruling PNP then turned its attention away from social need – including the needs of community youth organizations – to the economic problems of inflation and the exchange rate control, big infra-structure projects, *and* winning elections. This loss of ideology carried with it a loss of vision for

youth, a declining interest in partisan politics, and a corresponding strengthening of the materialist impulse. This last had always been present between militants on the ground and aspiring candidates but it now gained dominance, showing up positively in putting economic well-being over partisan demands, and also negatively (but less often) in being swayed into using the gun for a political candidate by gifts of money, jewellery and cell phones.

ONSLAUGHT ON THE COMMUNITIES

I ncreased weaponry and fragmentation in garrisons coupled with other factors to be spelled out in this section naturally brought renewed conflict, outbursts of violence. At first, out of traditional allegiance rather than from passionate commitment although under a veneer of politics, these conflicts were between communities on different sides of the political fence. Then they moved to *inside* communities affiliated, of course to a single party, between different sections, separate blocks of housing erected at different times and divided by only a street (e.g., Arnett Gardens), or even in instances between the top and bottom of the same street (e.g., Gem Road off Maxfield Avenue).

CRIMINALIZATION & COMMUNITY DISINTEGRATION

With this transition over the past decade came another – the more brutal expressions of homicidal practice taking place across Jamaica. It is evident in the increased numbers of young children and women⁷² being abducted, raped, killed, others ruthlessly burnt alive in their torched houses. Bodies, usually male, bound and gagged are found in barrels, throats are slashed, victims are beheaded, three and five at a time are massacred, some politicians are shot at, police are killed even to the point, according to a newspaper report, of ‘a target list’. Prima facie these latter deeds appear to be the work of criminal gangs rather than of community gangs and this may be the more frequent case.

The point here, however, is of a general increase in *criminality*, by which I mean not just a numerical increase in homicides but their greater callousness, more gruesome nature, more calculated defiance. As Anthony Harriott pointed out in his early 2008 professorial lecture at the University of the West Indies, *new thresholds are constantly being crossed*. And this is across the board, showing up not only in the acts of professional criminal gangs but in community gangs and the subjective

hardening of the youth. These latter features connect to the intra-community warring that we have been focusing on. This kind of fighting between close neighbours existed earliest (from the mid-1990s at least) in Southside, Jones Town and Bennett Land (off the Waltham Park Avenue). However, with its growing spread – and weakened party political sentiment – have come other harsher elements, not just more violence but an *indiscriminateness* of target that can only be described as criminal and is so regarded by community people.

By its very divisiveness this level of internal conflict has brought tremendous pressure on communities, attacked their cohesion in randomly taking the lives of innocent relatives, friends or fellow community members of those who the attackers sought to vent reprisal on but could not find. “If you cyan ketch Quaco”, the local saying goes, “you ketch ‘im shut” [if you cannot catch your man, you catch his shirt, i.e. anyone connected]. Fear has been palpable in these situations, every relationship coming under strain, people keeping close to their yards; venturing out after the approach of nightfall is out of the question. Some people out of desperation simply pack up and flee, a very difficult step for the poor who generally have no alternative but to descend on relatives in their own already overcrowded quarters. Clearly no community organization can survive such a climate and community ability to cope as a community, i.e. with some form of organized community effort, entirely vanishes.

Take for example, the Jones Town Area Council, an outstanding community organization that came about in 1991 and flourished in the late 1990s and up to 2003 with the help of the Jamaica Social Investment Fund, Kingston Restoration Company and Jamaica Chamber of Commerce. One of the achievements of the Jones Town Area Council (JTAC), to which Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) made considerable input, was the production of a small booklet containing a Police Code of Conduct and of a video illustrating good and bad police conduct. Youth from Cockburn Gardens and Waterhouse in the west of the city, nearby Rema and Fletcher’s Land and elsewhere were drawn into making these productions and into their distribution. Along with Rockfort in the east they were impressed and influenced by JTAC’s leadership and organization. Throughout the 1990s there was no lack of strong leaders and organized youth groups for sport and other activities. Thanks to the assistance of its political leaders Rockfort itself, under responsible political and

strong community leadership, developed an enviable record for its high level of organization until it was shattered by recent gang conflicts.

Another achievement of JTAC was the erection of an amphitheatre to be used for cultural performances and to become with attached kiosks, rented to small business enterprises, a source of income. All this was brought to an end, however, once the war triggered by a deep split in the ruling Bibow posse erupted in Jones Town on Good Friday, 2004. Violence prevented any use of the amphitheatre. The small businesses had to close and income to JTAC dried up. Other activities such as the homework programme for 'schoolers' died, killed by the end to free movement as a result of the frequency of gun-play.

The sequence of events in adjoining Craig Town was very similar. Its Youth Organization formed in 1989 reached, after ups and downs, a quite extraordinary peak between 1998 and 2002. Over two to three years, thirty to forty young men packed weekly evening sessions on Black history and culture by lecturers from the University of the West Indies and prominent lawyers, took part in intense discussions and researched for and held vigorous debates on topical issues. At the same time a team led by the director of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung was doing something similar for the young women of the community along with literacy. All this was crashed by the violence and the fear consequently created in the community.

This climate of fear and sense of a loss of community reached unprecedented levels. From the early 1990s, as the study done in 1995 revealed, signs of stress were already beginning to show up. The lists that residents drew up of the different kinds of conflict and abuse, verbal and physical, much of it interpersonal, much sectional and group-related, described violence as an every day affair. *They Cry 'Respect'* commented that

the sense of belonging to a single community emerges most strongly where these divisions are most palpable and painful, namely in Zinc City, Mango Pen and Camp Town [Tawes Pen, Canterbury, Jones Town]... The effect of the fractures of the people of Zinc City and on those in the upper section of Mango Pen is a sense of bafflement and confusion... They are at a loss how to understand, how to explain, their experience and... they appear to be paralyzed and unable to cope with it in order to restore the 'community' (p 64-5).

What people most regretted was not so much the material deprivations to which the violence had led but the loss of those times when "people

lived good", that is with kindness and mutual help, enabling anyone to walk to any part of the city at any hour to link with friends and relatives (p 9-10). People were very clear on this decline in what was most precious in their communities, their togetherness and mutual help, their social capital.

But that was when the violence was still between communities and politically tinged, or between corners but on a minor scale and directed at active participants. Now it had moved *inside* them to a *street-by-street* level and beyond word abuse and yard quarrel to a more organized level and a deliberate indiscriminateness. One of the most revealing symptoms of the extreme level reached by this process has been the side-lining or killing of older leaders, more mature "older heads" whose experience went back to the 1970s and who exercised a restraining influence on the more aggressive younger ones.

These older leaders had witnessed the progressive social policies of the People's National Party in the '70s, and from its return to power in 1989 and throughout its 18-year rule kept hoping that its old slogan of "better must come" would at last bear some fruit. Theirs too were concerns for the wider community. Impatient of this talk and of the piecemeal efforts and measures proffered by the governing party, youth – no "betta" at all – increasingly took control to eliminate, or push aside and replace these older persons with others nearer to them in age or outlook. Whitfield Town's Herman "Buffy" Johnson, who gave positive leadership for the betterment of his community, was one victim of this process; Godfrey "Hopey" Lothian, leader of the Kingston and St Andrew Action Forum, a grouping of youth leaders from across the city, had to leave Greenwich Town to escape a similar fate. Another generation, ignorant of the past and unmoved by its politics, has been taking over and moving on, though without entirely abandoning the ingrained, taken-as-given loyalties of their communities.

The coldness of these teenage "turks" is well known in the inner city and accompanies a recent phenomenon in one or two of the more splintered communities that deserves special mention. This has been an effort on the part of one corner or section under a new leader to bring all the sections under its single authority, reversing the splintering trend of many years that we have described above. This kind of thrust is not a simple conflict over turf, nor does it appear to be mainly for an economic benefit, though that may be there. In its involvement of an indiscriminate killing

of members of the community who may not even be connected with rivals, it has the quality of a sheer lust for power and a distinctly criminal character. Where it comes after a period of relatively calm and peace, the impact on ordinary community people can be devastating.

BUT HOW COME?

When things reach the point where to step accidentally on someone's foot in a crowded space or spill fruit juice on him in a bus or "bad drive" him on the road is to have him reach for a gun with fatal consequence, the situation is truly deathly serious. And how come is the question prompted. In fact, we all know by now that it is the result of misconceived actions and directions of the past 45 years or so, though (as we claimed above) the roots go back much earlier. We also know many of the factors and misdirections in that period. Here without beating too much on the obvious we shall touch briefly on the major ones.

1. The economic factor

The factor that inner city people most promptly put forward is in the economic arena – the absence of *opportunities* for own-account enterprise, work and self-betterment. People's catch biblical phrase about "idle hands being the devil's workshop" may appear simplistic but carries the wealth of their hard experience. It is not a matter of a one-to-one necessity, since a loving home life under sensible parents and a religious upbringing will regularly trump the link-up of idleness with violence. However, with the former too often absent, idleness along with its degenerative power and the hopelessness and shame that it nourishes is a natural recruiting officer for delinquent, gun-armed, peer groups and their turf wars.

From turf wars and gun handling spurred by the lack of economic opportunity it is a relatively easy – though by no means an automatic – step, when the conditions are right, to criminal enterprise and criminal homicide. Among the conditions to be found on the Jamaican scene are (1) prolonged hardship, especially in a context of inequality when the latter is very open and shaming, and (2) competition for scarce benefits in the presence of guns and the absence of a central authority.

In respect of the first condition, prolonged hardship affecting entire communities, there can be no doubting inner city poverty over an extended period if one reads the data carefully. For while they speak of a

halving by 1998 of the 1989 poverty level of 30 per cent (it actually rose to 44.6 per cent in 1991 following on the deregulation of foreign exchange and consequent inflation), to be noticed is the fact that this halving is a shift of just a few percentage points: the people supposedly rescued from poverty have edged to only the other side of the poverty line, a move of very minor proportions. Furthermore, for many people most of the shift would have been through buying-and-selling of small items and other forms of petty hustling that the urban poor, women especially, manage. The simple fact is that the national economy only achieved a flat one per cent or less per annum growth throughout the 1990s and into the new century, with tourism (its gains in large part staying abroad) the one expanding productive sector.

It is the context, though, of inequality and the shame or disrespect it carries that paves the road from poverty into crime, as Gilligan and our own writing on respect have emphasized. On the inequality side, more felt in a society small in size, Jamaica, though not the worst in the hemisphere, in 2006 had per capita consumption expenditure in the richest quintile 6.5 times that in the lowest quintile; on non-consumption items the ratio was 6.1. The minimum wage, fixed for 2008 by the Government at \$3,800 or US\$53.52 per week for domestic workers, is recognized by all as putting them, once they have dependents, *below the poverty line*.

Impressionistic evidence bears this out. As I recently observed in England, while in a 50-car parking space you may find one or two SUVs, in Jamaica you will find 15 or 20. Jamaican middle and upper classes, in short, are not hesitant to flash their income level in gas-guzzling SUVs and monstrously large houses. Not also to be ignored is the impact of the scenes of luxury living in the United States that flood television screens and movie theatres in Jamaica. The lure of that country is manifest in the migration rates; yet because so many are refused visas, even these rates do not reflect the breadth of desire.

The second condition linking poverty to crime including murder is the one identified by Gayle (2007) – *competition* for scarce benefits such as work contracts in the presence of guns in abundance and the absence of a central authority. The majority of these contracts are in road work, construction, or security and it is often on these sites that conflicts erupt and that in the end homicides occur. Younger as well as older tradesmen compete for these earning opportunities, with usually the more aggressive

set winning control. It is this struggle to control building or road improvement sites that motivates many inter-corner explosions of violence.

One outstanding area of competition has been the *extortion* and *protection* racket into which hungry inner city delinquents easily slide from begging or pressuring a small shop-keeper for a pound of flour. Once these rackets were established as lucrative and steady methods of income, the authorities and even the shop owners turning a blind eye, as grew to be the case in downtown Kingston, they became very popular. What then excited to aggression and homicidal violence was the element of competition for control of the turf to be exploited. This is what occurred in the capital city until agreement was reached between two leading gangs for an equitable division of the markets, street-side vending and bus termini where ripe pickings are located. Where in some other areas a gang was seeking to carve out a new fiefdom for itself, or where agreement was slow in coming (e.g. in neighbouring Spanish Town), murder became a commonplace event in raging street battles.

The presence of guns, one of the other elements in the second condition, is shown by the large number recovered annually by the police. The absence of a central authority, the final element in the condition, obviously does not refer to the extraordinary political system of the Nuer population of the Sudan, where anthropologist Evans-Pritchard in 1940 reported feuding to be continuous and “legislative, judicial and executive functions are not invested in any persons or councils”. The reference is rather to the failure of the Jamaican authorities over many years to bring inter – and intra-community feuding under control. It is the absence of this authority *on the ground* that leads to disputes in situations of long-standing or even recent rivalry erupting in homicidal violence.

2. Criminalization by law and example

Nowhere is the absence of central authority more evident than in the general spirit of lawlessness that has come to pervade society and that many now see as resulting from the authorities ignoring *minor* infractions of the law, e.g. littering, violations of traffic laws, coarse language, abuse or outright theft of public property. Worse than absence, however, though clearly connected, is the central authority that positively fosters criminality by not responding decisively to *serious* violence. Such non-response has become commonplace when violence breaks out in

communities and the authorities do not mobilize a detachment of police and soldiers sufficient to bring it under immediate control. Not infrequently the public have to be calling for action before it happens, which creates the impression of a government that is either incompetent or just uncaring.

This is of a piece with legislation that makes illegal the possession and use of ganja (marijuana), a practice that is deeply embedded in Jamaican lower-class culture, in effect turning large numbers who break the law into criminals. Many as a result have suffered prison sentences and acquired criminal records, blighting any chance of foreign travel or future migration. Even if some easing in the application of the law has occurred in respect of smoking a spliff, the grave consequence remains of implicitly encouraging lawlessness, as long as the law stays on the books. Recommended by the commission set up by the Government several years ago was the decriminalization of possession of small quantities. But like so many other good recommendations this one too, out of fear of a US backlash (even as marijuana cultivation increases on its own soil), appears very unlikely to see implementation.

The virtual persecution of a whole class extends more widely, however, than over ganja use, and is a major criminalizing weapon. It is the criminal behaviour of sections of the police, representatives of the state, which has the principal criminalizing effect. To be fair, an inept court system that, with witnesses not coming forward, eventually puts those apprehended back on the streets creates enormous frustration. Understandably, then, but indefensibly some police divisional commanders regularly detain and charge inner city youth for crimes for which they are entirely innocent, ignoring or releasing the real criminals, too often at the instance of politicians. They fail to carry out real investigation (sometimes no doubt for want of human resources) but, feeling obliged perhaps to demonstrate to the public and to their superiors that they are doing something, they publicly, in the media, call the names of individuals they say are responsible for crimes, simply (it seems) because they know their names but not on the basis of objective evidence. By so doing, they make "outlaws" of those named and push them into linking with those involved in illegal or criminal acts. This harassment of the innocent embitters many youth against the police, whose motives they trace to the bribes they get from dons, or seek and accept from those detained who are willing and able to pay to be released.

Capping this conduct and far worse than anything else, are the numerous killings carried out by the police – as already noted, 227 in 2006, 252 in 2007, according to the Bureau of Special Investigations (BSI), and over 2,700 in the past two decades – possibly two-thirds of which, according to an experienced criminal lawyer, are cold-blooded murders. Coupled with its patent approval by the wider society, this conduct has taught inner city youth that their lives, therefore all human lives, including those of the innocent, are quite worthless. For at least the last 25 years this message has been relentlessly drummed in. The police make it very clear when, in failing to respond to calls and come promptly to a shooting scene, they have been heard to say, “Let dem kill dem one anodda off.”

The approval of the wider society is evident from the negligible number of police brought to justice. The investigations of police killings carried out by the BSI and the other divisions of the Professional Standards Branch get no further, in too many instances, than the desk of the Director of Public Prosecutions. According to a recent study by the respected human rights organisation, Jamaicans for Justice, of the over 1,500 cases of police shooting involving both fatalities and injuries between 1999 and 2007 referred by the BSI (which has the responsibility in such matters) to the Director of Public Prosecutions, only 134 were brought to trial and a mere 10 convicted. Society is charged by the inner city of hypocrisy, when it throws up its hands in horror at grievous murders by inner city persons but turns a blind eye to equally cold-blooded police deeds. It should surprise no one, that a low respect for human life has led to four or five murders a day, and only the six a day in May 2008 finally drew a howl of protest. Tendencies to criminality are further stimulated by the public knowledge of a reality referred to earlier – state, municipal authorities and business leaders, some undoubtedly out of fear, turning a blind eye to the extortion gangs flourishing in downtown Kingston.

3. A politics not of vision for guiding a nation but of power for a party

A further important, underlying factor in the whole process, noted previously, has been the progressive loss of interest among youth, as well as some older heads, in politics as the only game in town, as deserving to die for and to kill over. In the 1970s an earlier generation was willing to fight

fiercely for and against the socialist policies and programmes of the government of that day. Politics captured the imaginations of entire communities and inspired enormous dedication and energy in defense of the two main political parties. Today that has all changed.

According to recent polls, dedicated supporters for each of the two parties has slipped from about 40 per cent to between 20 and 25 per cent, and youth interest even lower. In the 2007 national elections, both of the main political parties struggled to win the youth vote. This loss of partisan feeling clearly connects with the decline in ideology referred to earlier. Ideologically, at least in party manifestos and public platform statements, there is little *in talk and on paper* to distinguish the two principal parties that competed to win the elections in 2007, little in terms of a vision for the future of the country and its people to grab the imagination of youth. Neither is there, among the party leaders, anyone with the charisma and the clear commitment to attract and draw them. Instead it is an image of corruption that has become attached to politicians. What does have that power today for youth are sport, as the triumphs in the Olympics and the reactions to it demonstrate, and music. In those spheres are heroes located, not in politics.

In respect of the political stance of youth, something very similar, though perhaps on a larger and sharper scale, which might help, nonetheless, to throw light on ours, appears to have occurred among youth gangs in South Africa in the transition from apartheid to democracy. The youth engaged in one period in a fierce struggle against racial oppression were the same category engaging in criminality after the April 1994 elections that brought Mandela to the presidency. An insightful explanation of this seeming paradox offered by one South African writer is, first, that the basic situation of the poorer class in terms of opportunities, jobs, income, housing, etc, had not changed; second, that the resilience of the youth with its resistance to oppression of any kind, which is the central ingredient on both sides of the transition, is *morally neutral, not the "positive" thing* it is spontaneously thought to be.

He writes:

If there is a striking lesson in the examination of patterns of youth violence during the South African transition, then it is that the line between *anti-social* criminal youth violence and the *socially functional* violence associated with political resistance, is somewhat finer than the debates ... would suggest. Indeed, it is argued here that the resilience of young people in response to their experiences of exclusion, marginalisation and

impoverishment, may in fact give rise to either response at different times. While this resilience is a powerful indicator of the dynamism of youth subcultures, it is not value-specific... [I]t disguises the possibility of the involvement in violent crime as one potential resilient means of acquiring status within a dominant culture from which young people are otherwise excluded.

We come back then, in the writer's words, to "exclusion, marginalization and impoverishment", the very same forces highlighted earlier in this paper as responsible along with garrisonisation for the activation of armed community gang warfare and all too often criminal acts of arson and murder. Earlier as well as currently these latter acts are to be found. Note that included in the earlier anti-apartheid struggle, but sometimes overlooked outside South Africa, were criminal acts like "necklacing" that were regularly used against informers and apartheid supporters. The most notorious instance of this kind of behaviour was the beating to death of 14-year-old Stompie Seipei at the hands of the youth group led by Winnie Mandela. As having some involvement in this episode she appeared before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and was finally persuaded by the persistent pleading of Archbishop Tutu to admit that "things went horribly wrong... For that I am deeply sorry". Far from being overlooked at the local level, that kind of deed was in fact condemned and vigorously resisted by the Soweto community. The equivalent from early in Jamaica to necklacing has been the criminal prescription for informers – "dem fi dead", an intention widely and ruthlessly implemented.

If for most youth a political vision and a passion for party politics are virtually dead, what still virulently remains is the commitment of a small and very hard core to party power and the benefits it can bring. As the elections in 2007 showed and as the data below on Mountain View illustrates, there are the few who will commit violent acts on behalf of a political candidate; and carried by the core, there is, at least as an election looms, a pushing by one party into the territory, especially garrison territory, of the other party, a low-level war of attrition. The same aggression also occurs *after* an election, the line being "Our party is in power now, so we are due the *economic fruits* denied us by the other party and we are taking them", with the confidence that the ruling party, glad for the gains, will not come down hard on them. There is of course in all such initiatives that essential feature of the garrison, intimidation and violence.

4. Parents, schools, state neglect of youth

If youth have found corner crews and community gangs so attractive, it is in large part because of weaknesses in the Jamaican family, deficiencies in the schools, and what the political parties, exploiting state power, have done to impoverish and marginalize communities in which lower income families and schools find themselves. In the case of the family, the most frequent structure lasting for many years, which is the visiting relationship preliminary to common law or marital union, does not provide children with that constant presence and example of a father that is a basic need of especially boys. Earlier generations had a functioning substitute in the extended family which was then commonplace. However, in the current urban work-world not only are single parent household heads (mothers 46.7 per cent of all heads, fathers 8 per cent) out on jobs but so also are a younger set of grandmothers; and migration has become for all a regular survival route, leaving “barrel children” to the care of an aunt, older sister, or even, in the case of some teenagers, themselves.

Place that frequent family scene within an inner city community garrisoned for tribal conflict and the current result is inexorable. The working parent comes home in the evening only to terrorise misbehaving children. *Parenting* is the basic problem identified by inner city people themselves. Many young parents haven’t a clue what parenting really means, that there is such a thing as respect for children. Beatings are the chief and only method of discipline and are often savage, driving many boys into escape onto the streets. In any case, this is where schoolboys pass after-school or (under a misguided shift system) pre-school hours, supervision – while the parent is at work and there is no extended family – being an arrangement that is often virtually unknown. More fundamental to the problem is a “loose the bull, tie the heifer” mentality which guides lower-income thinking on the different ways of rearing male and female children. Chevannes is adamant that the family has declined as a functioning unit, that absolutely it must be rebuilt and that “rebuilding the family... begins with restoring the place of the male, but without undermining the gains made by women”.

All of this is further compounded by a school system that because of old-fashioned methods was failing to attract and keep a large percentage of male youth and that until 2007 terminated education for those below a certain academic level at age 15 after grade nine. The state simply declared itself unable financially to make or find school space for them. Two-thirds

perhaps of these youth, 4,500 annually, with the inner city having its share, are functionally illiterate and without a trade skill. The 50,000 unemployed in the 14-24 age group undoubtedly include many of their number accumulated over the years (although it has been found that male high school graduates have an unemployment rate more than twice the rate of those with no secondary education). Youth unemployment has averaged 32.8 per cent over the past decade, three to four times the rate of adult unemployment. Specific communities have rates considerably higher, and females higher than males.

A recently published study has one in four 10-15 year-olds reporting being hungry, 13% reporting a lifetime of physical abuse, 48% having seen a dead body, with death, for 39%, due to gunshot. Male members of the 12-24 age group were identified in 2006 as offenders for 23.2 per cent of major crimes and represented 51% of murder suspects; and 17-25 year-olds represented 35 per cent of those in adult correctional facilities. One would really have expected that youth in such circumstances would be attracting more, not less, attention and assistance from the state.

Yet this is the context of an under-resourced Social Development Commission (SDC) shifting its focus in the late 1990s from youth, a decades-old responsibility, to the organizational structures meant to lead to community participation in local government. In 2000 the youth portfolio was moved to the National Centre for Youth Development (NCYD). Notwithstanding Cabinet approval of a National Youth Policy in 2004, the NCYD was unable, for want of resources, to assess or monitor the youth projects that it funded. The two highly successful Youth Information Centres established by the NCYD in St Mary and St Catherine were under-resourced and the needed replication in every parish or major town only began to happen in 2006 with a third opened in Kingston. To top off this neglect of youth, in 2002 the Institute of Sport had its portfolio limited to schools and umbrella organisations while *community* sport was removed from it (to be covered, one might suppose, by the NCYD).

No impartial observer surveying the foregoing scene can escape concluding that precious little attention is being given to poor youth by the state in spite of their manifest needs at home, in school and at their peer group level. The National Youth Service takes in less than 5,000 and not by any means the least educated and neediest youth. The political parties are far more focused on their own intra-party problems and

conflicts. National issues attended to are given little community reference except that the garrison structure is left nearly untouched so as to continue to serve the interests of party and politician. The upshot is the continuing impact of exclusion and impoverishment, toward the criminalizing of youth.

5. Community collapse, approaching culture of violence

Essentially the problem is not only political and socio-economic, it is also cultural. It is clearly political in the abuse of communities, their purpose and organizational vitality by their subordination through garrisons and garrison violence to party power. It is social and economic in the unemployment, the neglect and the poverty. While these are serious enough, the crisis in its depth is revealed in the cultural wrongheadedness of parenting *attitudes* and *practices*, in the devaluing of education from the high esteem in which it was formerly held, and especially in the role that violence now plays in Jamaican society.

Collecting much already said and adding the unsaid, let us just catalogue where violence has been inserted in the Jamaican way of life:

- ◆ the availability of weapons of violence – knives, machetes and especially guns
- ◆ the high and worsening levels of homicide and criminality shown in its brutality and callousness, the killing, for example, of women and children, of parents in front of their children
- ◆ the excessive killing perpetrated by the police, agents of the state, and along with this the popularity of the former head of a special squad accused of such excess and the rejection by many of criticisms leveled at them by Amnesty International
- ◆ the threat first, then the vote, of a majority of politicians, of the return of capital punishment by hanging, and the regular call in the press for it by many members of civil society and even, astonishingly, of the clergy of the Christian church
- ◆ in the meanwhile, the inhumane treatment of prisoners in penitentiaries and lock-ups designed for much smaller numbers
- ◆ the institutional violence embodied in a totally inadequate court system against a whole class of people

- ♦ the structural violence carried by social exclusion and a level of inequality that perpetually shames, scorns and degrades inner-city people
- ♦ the violence of males towards women expressed in the frequency of the carnal abuse of young girls, including family members, of rape, of daily domestic conflict and of a very visible machismo
- ♦ severe parental beatings of children that often cross the line into physical abuse and outright cruelty
- ♦ the conviction among young inner city males that manhood is achieved by having and using a gun to “make duppies”
- ♦ the sensationalization of homicide and other acts of violence by sections of the media which has the undoubted effect of provoking even worse acts of violence
- ♦ the popularity of movies, videos and video games that feature, many of them, the most extreme forms of violence
- ♦ the many dancehall songs that glorify violence by the gun and enjoy great popularity among youth
- ♦ the fear and therefore a kind of respect of violent men expressed in witnesses to homicides refusing to testify in court.

It is clear from even such a bare-bones enumeration, without even dwelling on the inter-connections, that violence occupies a central place in the life and culture of Jamaican society. It appears to be an integral component of what life means to many of its people. Heavy influence in this direction has come from North America, a powerful magnet and example in its films and behaviour, which officially has sought to justify the killing of women and children in Iraq as just “collateral damage”. The principal sources of what is approaching a culture of violence are to found, however, in Jamaican society itself, in its unfolding over the past sixty years.

Homicide in particular has reached the level of a *social epidemic*, a term that is not just a metaphor or word-play. Epidemics that affect bodily health involve a germ that is spread through water, air, touch or body fluid. In a social epidemic the example of a murder, which is the “germ”, is spread by communication, whether by word of mouth or above all by the media. Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that a suicide by a

prominent person like an actress is immediately in some countries copied by scores of others, even down to details of the method employed. The “Ceasefire” programme in Chicago, USA, has been addressing the homicide problem there in identical terms – as an epidemic, the spread of a germ.

Against that background one would have to describe the media in Jamaica as with few exceptions irresponsible in the *front-page, pictorially graphic way* in which they – both print and electronic media – have reported homicide over the past several years. Reportage of massacres and other gruesome acts *in that way* – one is not arguing for total concealment of the facts – has been a major contributor, without a doubt, to the current epidemic of homicide. Instances of criminal killers looking out for and taking pleasure in the publicity given to their deeds, or expressing the desire to outdo someone else’s killing spree, as publicised, have been witnessed.

The partner in this culture is the *collapsed community*, both at the local level and, I dare to say, at the national as well. At the local level when businesses have moved out, when churches draw only women and most of these are former residents, when schools have to spend most of their efforts trying feebly to maintain discipline, when state agencies offer meagre services, when many families are poor and disorganized and parents find their efforts effectively countered by the environment, when a significant number of police are either corrupt or incompetent or brutal killers, when gunfire is normal and drives young children to wet their beds when they are not hiding under them, when in short violence is *the norm*, the outlook for young folk is bleak. Yet these are the circumstances into which thousands of young black males in the inner city are born. Can we be surprised at the outcome?

Certainly the circumstances at the national level may not appear in many respects so extreme. Yet it is there in the “outer city” that the police force has its headquarters, there that the educational system and other service agencies are based, there that the same standard of lawlessness and norm of violence are to be found, from there that social exclusion and marginalization have proceeded. The cultural centrality of violence is national, not local. Blame for the absence of social capital bonding inner and outer city, for the existence of “two Jamaicas”, must be shared, with the larger part of it apportioned, however, to the leadership outside.

It may be useful to listen to the sober voice of social anthropologist Barry Chevannes, who after thoughtful reflection on “The Values We Live By” concludes thus:

[T]raditional communities have been eroded by migration and neglect. Impoverishment is greater in rural than in urban Jamaica.... [U]rban communities, particularly inner-city, are little better off. They too are affected by the flight of intellectual capital, the deprivation of services, and by politicization, which has created monolithic dependency, giving way to armed terror. *They remain communities only in the sense of being dense settlements of people living in face-to-face relationships, but lacking in the processes of civility and a social order based on morality rather than fear.* (emphasis mine)

THE COMMUNITY APPROACH TO COMMUNITY HOMICIDE

We have seen some of the principal factors connected with social exclusion and the garrisons that have brought an onslaught of pressure to bear on inner-city communities and in particular on their male youth. The outcome has been a criminalizing process reflected in indiscriminate killing and a sharp deterioration in the life of communities, the rule of law replaced by the bark of the gun, the collective wisdom of seniors by don-controlled gang war, business and talent driven out, murder the daily fare, entire neighbourhoods pulled down and shunned. Nothing can better expose the thoroughly perverse power-seeking character of garrisons as originally conceived and still operative, particularly in the trend among a few fractured areas to return to a “one order” or centralized rule.

Together with their openness to positive outside forces, one hopeful spark in some garrisons is youth disinterest in tribalist politics. These have provided a basis, in fact, for other positive and inclusivist forces to begin to push ahead with anti-garrison efforts. It is the purpose of this section to bring these forward into public view.

THREE DIFFERENT APPROACHES

Approaches to solving the homicide puzzle in Jamaica have been broadly of three kinds. The first was by the *Jamaica Constabulary Force* (JCF) in a succession of efforts – paramilitary, community policing and finally intelligence channels. The paramilitary was in keeping with the Force’s colonial tradition dating from its establishment shortly after the Bogle Rebellion of 1865 on the British model in North Ireland. In keeping with this tradition, noted for its brutality toward black lower-income people and consequent alienation of them, literally one dozen police special squads were formed over the past three decades to deal with crime and

homicide, each replacing the previous deemed ineffective and none making any lasting impact on the problem except to exacerbate it.

Overlapping with the last of these squads in the late 1990s came the turn to community policing. This was widely promoted, to the point now of having a Britisher appointed to lead it as an Assistant Commissioner, and in fact it has been taken on board by a fairly wide section of the constabulary. Community police are looked down on by the rest of the Force, however, and their work is consistently undermined by the paramilitary tradition rooted in the Force. Trust built up by the “good cops” is regularly shattered by the “bad cops” showing up to play jury, judge and executioner in a community. Currently the additional preferred method is the use of intelligence and claims for its successful employment appear to have some foundation. It is exemplified in Kingfish, the team mentioned earlier for its achievements with the drug trade, now reportedly assigned to targeting corruption. There was also the 20% homicide reduction in 2006 by broader sections of the JCF where intelligence is also employed.

The second approach was *electoral* through the implementation of a series of legislative acts starting from the 1970s but expanded especially after the 1993 national elections when incidents of electoral fraud and connected violence came sharply to public notice. These steps have been extremely effective, the establishment in particular of an Electoral Commission with wide powers for eliminating electoral fraud. The Commission has on occasion actually voided election results, which has had definite impact on fraud and connected violence. This approach is essentially *political* and has contributed, along with considerable pressure from civil society, to political representatives putting some distance between themselves and community dons responsible for violence. Often the distance has been more for public consumption. The deeper problem of partisan politics which has been repeatedly identified – in the *Report on Political Tribalism* (1997), for instance, as well as the *Report of the National Committee on Crime and Violence* (2002) – is yet to be decisively tackled. Much community violence would cease if political support were withdrawn from key persons responsible for the community conflicts.

The third approach to the homicides was initiated in January 2002 by Minister of National Security Dr Peter Phillips in the form of the Peace Management Initiative. This was the first time that *community* explosions were being specifically and formally targeted, an explicitly *non-bloodletting*

approach advanced and, to this end, members of *civil society* involved. In all these respects, this was a thoroughly new departure. To be especially noted is its alliance between the state and the civil sector. The state is present in representatives of the two main political parties, several of them ministers in the government, on the PMI board, as well as in its financial support and some oversight on the part of the Ministry of National Security. Civil society is present in the board membership of ministers of religion, University of the West Indies lecturers and the Dispute Resolution Foundation Director, as well as crucially in the actual work carried out on the ground by them and by the field staff.

The PMI board is not the usual one. Without recompense of any kind, a number of its members (seven or eight in recent years) have been active from the outset in the work in the field. And with a bishop as chairman and a significant number of members either pastors or ex-clergy, it is normal for board proceedings to begin with a prayer. Often mediation sessions with community youth end with a very heart-felt prayer and the holding of hands in a circle, a rare event for community shottas. Not much has been made of it publicly, but it is clear that an ethos of spiritual care and Christian forgiveness has permeated and played an important role in the PMI's approach. It is certainly very important in the work of the counseling team organised by a member of the PMI's field staff.

The Jamaican state had, of course, over the years, as we showed earlier in the history of Jamaica Welfare and the Social Development Commission, undertaken social measures to address social and specifically community problems. More recently the Jamaica Social Investment Fund, which was established in 1996 following on the 1995 United Nations Conference on Social Development, requires active community involvement as a requirement for receipt of its funding. For the first time, however, in the PMI, the state was applying *social* measures to address the problem of community *violence and homicide*, measures not based on physical force but on dialogue and, to do so, calling on the involvement of civil society. The point was explicitly made by Minister Phillips both at the opening meeting of the PMI and reportedly also in his presentation to Cabinet in which the proposal for a PMI was paired with the proposed establishment of the last of the special police squads under the flamboyant Superintendent Renato Adams.

Obviously all three approaches – security force, political/electoral and civil society – have each a specific task to execute. What is also quite

evident, as in the anti-crime measures announced by Prime Minister Bruce Golding in Parliament on July 22, 2008, is the tendency to keep returning to the hard policing and longer detention kind of measures in spite of their manifest inability to cope with the homicide problem, instead of both frontally addressing the political roots of and responsibility for garrisons and fully exploring with sufficient resources the civil society approach. A subsequent statement by the Prime Minister did speak of additional resources going to “social interventions”, but with criticism of the failures of previous efforts in this direction and not a critical word against the numerous extra-judicial killings carried out by police, while the political dimension was entirely ignored. On the other hand, tougher policing, extended detention and mandatory court sentences were given central focus. To no one’s surprise, considerable criticism of the measures has been mounted by human rights groups and the legal fraternity.

THE PMI AND ITS METHODS

The PMI proceeded to tackle, up front, community violence, which meant addressing both the violence and its community matrix. 2002 was a national election year and the violence then was between community gangs in communities separated and opposed by their affiliation to the two main political parties. Particularly as a result of a violent, mid-2001 clash between police and men in Tivoli Gardens, a community closely linked with the Jamaica Labour Party, the leaders of the parties themselves were anxious for a violence-free election and worked behind the scenes to that end. The result was a 7.5 per cent reduction in homicides nationally over the previous year (and a similar reduction the following year), with much of the credit given to the PMI, although not only the parties but also the police and a number of non-governmental bodies were also already active in the field. The PMI stood out, however, for doing what almost no other organization was doing – meeting and dealing directly with the community gangs, seeking to put an end to their aggression through developmental measures and settling the communities. This focus on community gangs and their community bases has been its distinguishing feature.

The first line of PMI effort is mediation, followed by counseling of those children and adults traumatized by the sudden loss of a parent, relative or friend, and then, if and as a cease-fire takes hold, by the various

developmental initiatives itemized below. To get the mediation under way, PMI board members, and later also field staff, simply walk into a community rocked by shooting and homicide and meet with whoever come forward. To the PMI this coming forward signals a desire to end the “war”, a definite degree of good will. It feels free, therefore, and indeed compelled to work with such respondents and assumes no responsibility to investigate or take action on their possible past crimes or delinquencies – any such is a police matter outside the PMI’s competence and remit. In fact, as the PMI came to recognise, such respondents usually do not include the criminal-minded, who prefer a climate of gunshots and violence. The PMI only advises any wanted men who show up among those it is dealing with, to turn themselves over to the police.

Initially, sometimes, those who came forward were the “older heads”. There was an early occasion in a Mountain View community when those present in the Community Centre, most of them women, had to be asked where were the young men; and being fetched, after a few moments five or six of them trooped in, all looking rather sheepish. Later, as word got around, it would be mostly the young men, the “shottas”, who stepped forward to meet with the PMI. Police were never present at these meetings, not after they showed up once, when PMI was just started, to offer protection, and had it politely declined.

These initial encounters with each side are then followed by a series of mediation sessions in which rivals are brought face to face, reluctantly at first, often to hear from the other side its own line as to who started the firefight. These meetings, held outside the communities in some neutral place like an upscale hotel, can be quite stormy, with walk-outs threatened but never quite happening. As the PMI came to learn, there has to be space for a large amount of venting, which often has to be repeated as those absent from the first session turn up for the second or third. Little wonder, when one considers the pent-up suffering, fear, anger and grief flowing from years of killing, death and loss. The real wonder is that in spite of years of such experiences reconciliation can be achieved.

Contributing to but distinct from the mediation efforts the PMI’s second main thrust, the counseling of the traumatised, would also be going forward. The initiative here, with at first little appreciation on the part of the board of its significance, came from a member of staff. Gradually, however, she built up a team of pastors, counselors and psychologists who went into the communities quieted, at least

momentarily, by the mediation, to meet with and help those grieving for a family member or comrade lost in the violence. The first to be helped are the children, whose psychological health and maturing could be severely damaged; but the women and men, the latter in spite of their efforts to hide their tears, also come in for attention. A given community usually receives a concentrated series of visits and counseling, sometimes with visits to a counseling centre at the University of the West Indies or out-of-town excursions to Serenity Park type places. Not only personal psychological health is at stake but also the need to head off reprisals where possible by those wanting to even the score. This kind of sustained, behind-the-scene, unrecognised work by the counseling team accounts for much of the success of the PMI.

It can hardly be overemphasized that what takes place through the PMI's mediation and counseling efforts is a process of reconciliation and restorative justice, on a micro and modest scale not unlike the work on a national scale of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The PMI has been in effect Jamaica's TRC, community people showing the way to the wider society. Homicidal violence had initially stemmed, as in the case of apartheid, from political antagonisms, and that continued in a few areas even in 2007 and 2008. But whether from politics or just over turf the dispossession, deep hurt and grief flowing from so many cruel deaths and confrontations cannot at one stroke just be covered up and forgotten. A current of mutual understanding, forgiveness and exculpation has to flow and to the credit of many, given the national context of an Old Testament, eye-for-eye mentality, it has flowed. But it has not, therefore, been an easy process. Combatants, mostly youthful, have to be persuaded that this is the best, indeed the only, way to move forward. Only as fear and distrust over time dissipates, hurt is salved and developmental measures come into play, can a sense of community be fully restored.

Mediation meetings can stretch on, then, for weeks depending on various factors, above all the seriousness of the commitment of participants to a cease-fire and their adherence to or violation of "hold it down" agreements, until a stable situation can be reached. As (and if) a cease-fire gradually takes firm hold, discussions turn to developmental matters and there are also welfare requests. If the commitment of both or all sides to peace is absent, as on occasion happened, the PMI simply withdraws (the situation being viewed as a police matter) until, as has happened, it is

invited back in or learns of a change making a second try feasible. Increasingly in the last two years mediation has come to hinge on contact with the key individuals active in or directing community conflicts. Staff and board have had to develop an intimate knowledge of the personalities involved in order to distinguish between those for a peace and those against it, the latter for criminal reasons.

A critical issue, however, has been the dilemma that the PMI faced from early. This was its having to respond to community clashes in several different areas in rapid succession but needing simultaneously to focus intensively on an individual community or set of communities with developmental initiatives in order to make their cease-fire sustainable. With only one staff person for the first 21 months and a board of unpaid volunteers saddled with their regular and mostly demanding jobs, it was the first 'extensive' option that was generally pursued. Outbreaks of violence, what with their publicity, always won immediate attention. At that stage and in those circumstances, the 'intensive' option was not clearly recognized by all PMI members or even possible. Thus the PMI had no choice but to combine the two approaches. But it is clear from the results achieved that a heavier emphasis on the intensive through having more resources – which not being granted could have been more vigorously sought – would have brought much greater benefit.

Rema, for instance, it is true, did get continuous attention over several months in the middle of the first year (2002) with good results – two years of freedom from gang warfare; but it did not receive the internal organization and development it really needed to prevent the relapse that followed. Thus, it was a year and a half before a group of communities in one area received on-going, really intensive treatment, the kind of community developmental inputs that could guide and steady an area onto an entirely new path. Mountain View was that area, from July 2003 after a series of eight killings triggered by the local government elections. As the data below will show, the outcome in terms of numbers of deaths, was very positive – until 2006-07, when a national election politician sowed the land mines that reversed many of the earlier gains.

The development referred to here is not the housing, schools and infrastructure of various kinds that people tend to think of when that word is used. It is rather what some refer to as *social* development:

- ♦ training in skills/trades or academic subjects (at e.g. Excelsior Educational Centre(EXED) or HEART National Training Agency)

- ♦ training in mediation and conflict resolution (by the Dispute Resolution Foundation)
- ♦ small grants for group income-earning projects, as well as job-locating outside the community by a professional person employed for this purpose
- ♦ inter-community sport competitions (e.g. in 2007 right through the election period, of 26 football teams city-wide, each team comprising members from rival corners, funded by especially the UN Fund for Population but also USAID and also of netball for the girls), and 6-a-side corner leagues
- ♦ cultural activities (e.g. led very effectively in Mountain View and Rose Town by Area Youth Krew/Foundation)
- ♦ residential retreats out of the city (for 50-70 youth from widely separate communities) around such topics as violence, revenge, sex, health, discipline, careers and community life.
- ♦ health and information or opportunity fairs
- ♦ community-based summer camps
- ♦ community fix-up projects, e.g. repainting a basic school
- ♦ counseling and (for traumatized young children and mothers) therapeutic field trips involving a specially organized team of counselors, and victim support
- ♦ open community and leadership meetings
- ♦ cross-city leadership conferences
- ♦ a “peace council” of leaders of the rival adjoining communities or community sections.

This last, the “peace council”, has been particularly important. It grows naturally out of weekly or fortnightly mediation meetings. The council is essential not only initially for maintaining communication between sections and thus quelling the rumours that tend to abound, become “real” and lead to fresh outbreaks of shooting, but also for building trust and as an on-going forum for sharing ideas on developmental and welfare needs and the steps to be taken to meet them. To address those needs, the council is put in touch with other agencies better resourced financially than the PMI and with specific interests, or these bodies are invited to

council meetings. The PMI has had a long list of partners, drawn in and on according to the particular aspect of the work, as well as a few funding sources. The PMI *opened up* communities so that other agencies like the Jamaica Social Investment Fund or Citizen Security and Justice Programme could enter and make their input, the violence having prevented or terminated their initiatives. With the Violence Prevention Alliance, an umbrella grouping out of the Ministry of Health, and also with Grace and Staff (whose community work director sits on the PMI board), especially vibrant and helpful partnerships developed.

As is evident from the catalogue of development initiatives outlined above, the PMI's efforts were focused both on the young men carrying out the violence and on the communities as a whole. Although the youth often got the larger share, on no occasion did others ever resent this: they saw clearly the benefits coming to the community, even if in many instances indirectly. Criticism did come from those communities where violence was absent or at a low level and where the PMI was consequently not active. They felt it to be grossly unfair that their keeping of the peace was not being rewarded, and of course they were right. The simple fact was, however, that the PMI's resources could not stretch that far, not even to assist those communities in which it was present with their overall needs, infrastructural, for example.

OUTCOMES

As already indicated and the following table sets out, the PMI had best results, i.e. cease-fires passing into peace sustained over a reasonably lengthy time, in those communities and areas on which it was able to focus personnel and development initiatives intensively over a prolonged period. The numbers were arrived at by interviewing knowledgeable individuals, singly in some cases, in others by bringing together a group comprised of representatives of the different sections or corners of a community who would identify by name those killed and the circumstances. These sources of the information attested that it is very likely that not all killed have been remembered.

As the table below shows, the PMI was active in Dunkirk in the last few months of 2004 with no evident effect in 2005 but a dramatic turn-around in 2006 and later a council embracing some six different sections was formed; in Mountain View from July, 2003, after eight homicides; in Rock

Hall from October, 2002, after seven of the homicides; in Jones Town/Torrington from homicides; in Jones Town/Torrington from the end of March, 2007, but it took several months before the full impact of its presence was felt. Even where some homicides continued to occur in 2007 and 2008 – as in Majestic Gardens for the first five months, in Jones Town from April to July, or in Duhaney Park where outsiders killed two, what the table cannot record was the end of nightly shooting and *inter-group feuding*. This meant an entirely *different climate for the community*.

Table 2 – Results of PMI interventions

COMMUNITY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008 Sep
Duhaney Park (pop. est. 2100)	Average 2 per year			0	0	0	1	0
Dunkirk, Franklyn Twn (pop. 12,900)					51	7	7	12 (+2?)
Jones Town & Torrington Pk (pop. 10,200)				11	17	21	22 but only 2 after July	7 (+5?)
Majestic Gardens (pop. 1567)					10	5	4	8
Mountain View (pop. est. 10,000)	13	8	10	2	5	10	24	11
Rock Hall (pop. est. 1,000)		10	0	0	0	0	0	0
Woodford Park (pop. 2,750)		9	5	5	1	3	2	0?

(Note: 1. Population figures are from the 2001 Census unless estimates are indicated.
2. Gray colour in a box indicates that the PMI was active in the community represented by that row, for at least a part of the year of that column.)

Also not captured in the table are the inputs of the communities themselves and of the police. It was clear from the moment that PMI set foot in Jones Town that the people of the community wanted the three-year war with its over 60 (at that point, 70 eventually) killings “to done”. Thus PMI’s task was to *facilitate* the process of bringing it to an end. In Duhaney Park a telephone conversation – a PMI tactic was to insist at mediation meetings on an exchange of numbers and to persuade that they be used if ever someone on one side did something provocative –

was what did the trick: over the phone the two gangs decided on a joint walk and so said, so done. Another factor was police activity including the arrest or killing of wanted criminals (some figures were given above), for example in Dunkirk in 2006 the killing of the notorious Dellibop.

Mountain View illustrates starkly on-going party politics in the garrison. A composite of seven communities on both sides of a mile-long piece of a highway leading out of the city to an international airport, it made national news with the shooting and burning to death of two policemen and a security guard at a road block in 2000, the massacre of four in one yard the following year, and the find of two bodies in a pit in the same community. Internal conflict in that community, Jacques Road, incipient from 2005 (after the 2004 decline) but sharpened by party politics in 2006-07 led to the huge homicidal increase recorded above. PMI-originating, resource-limited achievements were simply not sufficient to withstand deeply imbedded and renewed partisan political forces. Party politics simply took over, derailing community-focused efforts and nullifying the progress made.

Of particular importance in the above table are the quantities, important for showing both the gravity of the problem and the impact of the countering action. The total number of homicides in the table in 2005 was 84, and 78 in 2007, but the communities there listed are only a small part of those in the Kingston Metropolitan Area and St Catherine, which reveals the size of the community contribution to the country's overall homicides. The scene worsens when one considers that the 51 homicides in Dunkirk/Franklyn Town, population 13,000, works out to a rate of 392/100,000; the 10 homicides in Majestic Gardens, population 1567, to approximately 600/100,000. These are war-time and devastating rates for any set of humans. Clearly by token of the reduced number of homicides to 46 in 2006 (although spiked again by politics in 2007) the PMI has made a significant impact. What would the homicide count have been but for its intervention!

A most interesting outcome of PMI efforts to date was the Peace Agreement reached in August Town in late June 2008. This was a formally signed document, the first of its kind for the PMI and perhaps for Jamaica, between the five "corners", formerly at each other's throats, three versus two. The suggestion to have such a signing and to do it in front of television cameras came actually from the leader of one of the corners. Four or five meetings were held over as many weeks to hammer out the

terms of the Agreement – no gun salutes, no “brandishing” (i.e. exhibition) of guns, free movement across borders, corner leaders to guide and counsel followers away from theft, extortion, rape and other wrong doing, and, critically, the establishment of a Peace Council to meet monthly to monitor adherence to the rules and plan the development of the community.

The signing of the Agreement drew a good deal of media attention, with the press there in strength along with the Principal of the University of the West Indies and representatives of the police and the church. Unfortunately, because of police harassment of the leader of the African Gardens corner, he was absent though represented and the other leaders took the decision to exclude television cameras. Sections of the print media mounted extensive criticism of the event, of the PMI and of the police – the churchman refused to sign – most of it quite unjustified and strongly refuted. Their demand, and the demand of many, that all guns be turned in immediately was quite unrealistic, given the decades of ingrainment of gun culture and the continued inability of the security forces to guarantee protection for any corner against armed rivals. It was obvious to most observers that that kind of situation could not be ended overnight and that this was a reasonable first step in a process.

To date, several months later, the Agreement in August Town is holding, blips, tensions and threats notwithstanding. Its participants have been vigorous in controlling any show or use of guns but weak in taking part in agreed council meetings. Giving much hope for success in August Town is the on-going project of the adjoining University of the West Indies (UWI) to make it into a “university town”. In essence this is a major community building initiative in which university representatives and community leaders work side by side in every important area. Thus a serious upgrading of basic schools has begun. Members of a home-owners associations are to get loans from a building society to add rooms that can be rented to university students in need of lodging – in effect another “hall of residence” for UWI. A women’s group is working with the several primary schools in the area in monitoring and assisting the at-risk and their parents. A citizen/police crime prevention committee has been meeting, on a foundation of over a dozen mediators trained over several years and an active Youth Crime Watch. Also in place over several years is a sports programme under the aegis of the August Town Sport Foundation.

The August Town achievement has given the PMI leverage in its efforts in other communities. In two others so far, Waterhouse and Allman Town, it has been pursuing similar agreements and the groups in those areas have been very accepting of this initiative and seven sections in Waterhouse and Drewsland signed in mid October, 2008. The formality and publicity of such agreements strengthens its participants besides putting pressure on them to keep their word. They become aware that the entire city and even country is watching and would feel foolish to be found rapidly violating something so seriously entered into – indeed, the seriousness of the participants and of the entire watching community during the speeches leading up to the signing was palpable.

The PMI has been presented here as an example of a particular approach, an outstanding example and the one with the widest reach made possible through partnership. The overall impact of PMI's efforts, as the Programme Development Officer, Damian Hutchinson, has pointed out to me, has been an acceptance of the peace objective and the beginnings of a peace-building climate in a wide range of communities. This is a significant thrust against the tendencies toward violence outlined above.

However, the PMI is not the only agency contributing to this effect: there are other examples, some also outstanding. Over the past two years, first the Spanish Town Crime Prevention Committee, on which the Kingston PMI has been represented by its chairman and a member of staff, has come into existence, more recently the Clarendon Crime Prevention Committee, to which the Kingston PMI has also provided some small input. Mandeville (in the parish of Manchester) and St Thomas also have their Crime Committees, and Flanker in Montego Bay its excellent Dispute Resolution Foundation centre. The Grants Pen project initiated by the Jamaican American Chamber of Commerce has also taken a community approach, although combined with the erection of an entire police station with community centre features, a central but costly element of the project that is not likely to be replicable elsewhere in the near future, and marred by subsequent setbacks. Taking note of the PMI's work and the climb in homicides at the western end of the island, the Ministry of National Security established in 2004 another PMI in the parish of St James. This Montego Bay PMI is independent of the first and while there has been some assistance provided from the Kingston end, it has been more a matter of example; resources and distance have made collaboration minimal.

These bodies have been doing important work in their respective areas, though, with the data from them not yet available, this is still to be assessed. Good community work is also being led by a number of faith-motivated groups such as the Covenant Community Church's Joy Town and Operation Restoration in Trench Town, Henley Morgan's Agency for Innercity Renewal – these collaborating closely with the PMI – St Patrick's Foundation in Seaview Gardens, and most recently a group of churches led by Church on the Rock in Cassava Piece. And there are others like Moira Morgan's Hush the Guns in Tower Hill.

Special mention must be made, however, of Grace and Staff, a private sector initiative centered in the area of Southside, Tel Aviv and Parade Gardens of central Kingston but also doing work in several other communities. With an annual budget of \$10 million, a staff of seven led by a very experienced social worker, an established homework centre and a focus on education and health, this programme currently has on scholarships 317 students in high school, another 42 in tertiary institutions (UTECH, Edna Manley, EXED, MICO, UWI and elsewhere) and 40-50 being guided on Saturdays in the second half of the year by four instructors on how to take the S.A.T. exam. Eyeglasses, vitamins and, for the HIV-infected, needed medication are also provided. Even apart from long-term benefits of the education programme which are beyond immediate measurement, the outcome has been not just excellence in academic marks but also, through mediation and leadership meetings, effective management of the violence for which this very volatile area was long noted – three straight years without a single homicide. That was until two months in early 2008 when partisan politics led to 14 homicides, many of the victims women.

Along with the earlier indicated data on Mountain View, this Southside experience sharply illustrates several very important ingredients of the garrison situation. The first is the difficulty of making lasting impact if political representatives continue to push garrison behaviour. PMI success in Duhaney Park, Dunkirk, Jones Town and earlier in Mountain View was only possible to the extent that political representatives of those constituencies and divisions cooperated either directly and actively or at least by just staying out of the picture and allowing the PMI an unimpeded hand. Political input of this kind is clearly an essential condition for putting an end to community violence and for rebuilding the social and cultural life of communities.

A second essential condition is the quality of policing. The 1995 research from which came *They Cry 'Respect'* showed that, even before the concept and the term 'community policing' became popular, inner city people were calling for it (p 43, 56). Without the trust that this engenders, no fruitful relation with the police can result. The removal of criminals from communities – which their people ardently desire – by the intelligence that trust generates is the only path for effective policing and to a vibrant community life. The so-called "hard" policing of brutal treatment and ruthless extra-judicial killings "makes the youth think wicked... makes them vile" (p 43) and creates a vicious circle that blocks the service that is the mission of the Constabulary.

A third ingredient in the Southside experience was the significant assistance from Grace and Staff, in which the staff's contribution has been matched by the contribution of Grace Kennedy Company. In both extent and quality this joint effort far exceeded the neighbourhood help that some businesses engage in for often purely selfish reasons. It speaks to a high and praiseworthy level both of voluntary citizen and of private sector concern for inner city people. On impressionistic evidence, charity by individuals appears to be considerable in Jamaica. Not so, however, the input of the private sector. Although other businesses giving sizeable assistance to inner city developmental efforts can be identified, they are relatively few in number. In general, the business sector has been conspicuous by its absence.

CIVIL SOCIETY, LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

In addition to the reduction in homicides there are other outcomes of the work of the PMI and similar bodies. They are implicit in that work and the foregoing narrative but deserve to be particularly noted. They have to do with changes in perception that have substantive consequences or implications and they are in the critical areas of delinquency, leadership and the role of civil society.

Initially when the concept of a difference between community violence and criminal violence, community crews and criminal gangs, was first aired in Jamaica, it was greeted by the security forces, both police and army, with a show of politeness (as due to a University lecturer) but complete scepticism if not grins of derision. Since then, seven years ago, as a consequence of the impact of Grace and Staff, the Violence Prevention

Alliance, PMI and others, acceptance of that fact has crept in, even if the ability to differentiate in the practical treatment of individuals, or statistically in classifying instances, remains to be achieved. Most people may still have difficulty grasping that the commission of a crime does not automatically mean that the guilty person is a 'criminal'. A Member of Parliament who took the view that all those engaged in community conflict are criminals and refused to intervene contributed thereby to a serious "war" with many resulting deaths. All the same, many *have* come to appreciate that delinquency is distinct from criminality and this is important for their assessment of the PMI's handling of community gangs.

With these perceptions and the consequent more humane treatment of inner city youth by some in the security forces has also come acceptance of the PMI claim that many youth involved in community violence can be rescued from it and without going to prison turned into positive life-channels and inspiring leadership roles. Some in fact have become "peace-makers" and "barefoot" social workers, active change-agents in their own right alongside the PMI. Their personal experience provides them with a sympathetic understanding of what so many youth are going through, giving particular power to their leadership. More than one that I know of has been killed for taking this path.

What must be appreciated is the profound change in outlook and behaviour required of a corner leader, a "lesser don", to move into the new paradigm of a genuine community peace. He is not only called upon to take part in the collective leadership of a peace council comprised of five, seven or twelve corner leaders and their seconds, but more radically he himself has to give up dependence on hand-outs from a politician – the PMI with its unselfish objectives cannot be cast in that role – *and*, hardest of all, teach his "soldiers" and their dependents to do the same in his regard. In the current situation of widespread economic hardship this is a tough challenge and the transition to the new paradigm will of necessity take time and considerable struggle.

The specific civil society character of this leadership is another aspect to be noted. The re-building of the community strength of inner city communities, which is what the so-called "dismantling" of garrisons really means, *has to* mean, is concretely to bring back the civil dimension that garrison militarization disabled, rendered impotent. Not illogically it is the PMI, an outstanding example of civil society, that is facilitating the

process. Notwithstanding the fact that it was established and is financially sustained by the state and has on its board representatives of the state in significant number in the shape of ministers in government as appointees of the two main political parties, it is the civil society element of the PMI that is most active and prominent. In the field and even on the board the party members function in a civil society, not a partisan, capacity. This civil rather than state, party or security forces factor is a large part of the originality of the PMI and of why it has won the trust of inner city warriors and therefore been effective.

Undergirding these efforts of the PMI, Grace and Staff and others is the desire of community *people* themselves (as in the Jones Town case referred to earlier) for peace and the transformation of their communities. Garri-soning has not been able to entirely kill the basic human instinct toward community. The first steps on an organizational path may be tentative but there is no lack of basic interest and desire into which the vision and determination of local leaders can tap. The perseverance, continuity and achievements of the councils formed not just by PMI input but by community and community-leadership in the Jones Town, Mountain View and Duhaney Park areas testify to this.

However, inner city organizations and community leaders are only one piece, albeit a crucial piece, of the larger and growing civil society movement that encompasses the outer city and the churches. The evangelical churches in the inner city that up to 12 years ago were focused almost exclusively on personal salvation and some welfare work have begun on a significant scale to link these with social concerns and development. This is a major positive change toward a deeper understanding of the Christian message. Civil society organizations are more active today, more numerous, better organized and carrying greater public weight. In the last category, one can point, for example, to Jamaicans for Justice and the Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights, to environmental NGOs like the Jamaica Environmental Trust (JET), to PALS and the Change from Within project, now in over 30 schools, as well as to the collaboration with PMI and in the Violence Prevention Alliance of civil society and the state.

Established in late 2004 by medical doctors Deanna Ashley and Elizabeth Ward, then in the Ministry of Health, as the Jamaican chapter of World Health Organisation's VPA, the local VPA has enabled considerable collaboration between agencies and generated a range of educational

materials and activities – GIS mapping of violence helpful to the police, literacy self-taught through a computer programme, murals, an annual peace march, to name a few.

Of particular interest here is VPA's proposed programme, the brain-child of Professor Barry Chevannes re-worked collectively and with community input, for moving communities through incentives up a graded ladder toward full community safety. The attached matrix sets out in short-hand its essentials. What should come across is the number, range and interplay of ingredients required for communities to be transformed into places of safety, with the evident corollary that the re-building process will need input from many quarters and, of course, time.

It is not, however, just the considerable quantity of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and church involvement both in the inner city and more widely that is being emphasized here. It is their particular character of citizen participation in and responsibility for civic affairs and what this means. It means personal *leadership* operating within a collective framework, which allows for a diversity and broad range of input. Outstanding leaders have emerged inside the inner city, who have struggled in the face of huge obstacles to guide their communities out of the morass of violence. Without such leaders the efforts of the PMI and other agencies would have achieved very little. Some of these leaders are now grouped in the Kingston and St Andrew Action Forum, an organization spanning the city that grew out of an earlier UNDP project, Civic Dialogue.

The methods and achievements of the Change From Within project, the brain-child of Philip Sherlock and Pauletta Chevannes, in spurring leadership from school teachers, principals, parents and students is an extraordinarily good example, in the context of the school, of what collective leadership entails. It stands in marked contrast to don rule and present-day politics which function on the basis of a top-down model. Guiding many inner city youth away from violence, as *They Cry 'Respect'* has pointed out, has been the example given by Rastafarians: they have provided pre-eminent leadership in sport, music, and Black-conscious moral values.

Even, however, as I emphasize the importance of civil society, it is essential to also note carefully its collaboration in the PMI and other agencies with the state and with the private sector, in board composition, funding and support of communities in projects and other activities.

Table 3 – THE SAFE COMMUNITY LADDER

	One Star	Two Star	Three Star	Four Star	Five Star
Violence	1. no gun violence for six months 2. no war	3. no tension 4. no interpersonal violence 5. No rape 6. No robbery with aggravation	7. no family violence 8. no violence against children	9. no gun brandishing 10. no gun "strapping"	11. guns handed in 12. no extortion
Dispute Resolution	1. organised mediators	2. peacefully mediated dispute resolution	3. general reasoning & dialogue over disputes	4. effective Justice of the Peace services 5. community tribunals	6. restorative justice & external dispute resolution services
Community Governance		1. youth club 2. sports club or interest association	3. peace council 4. citizens association	5. women's organization 6. link to Parish Development Committee 7. efforts to link with political representatives	8. freedom of movement 9. political intolerance extinguished
Education & Health	1. 75% school attendance	2. free access for health workers 3. free community health access 4. 90% immunization	5. program to reach vulnerable 6. family life education 7. men in family life education 8. grief counseling	9. active PTA 10. remedial education & training 11. after school life education 12. fewer than one in five new teen pregnancies	13. mentoring 14. 100% school attendance 15. no teen pregnancies
Police relations	1. dialogue with police started	2. fairly good relations with police	3. good relations with police 4. police-community anti-crime action	5. police active in youth club led by youth 6. no police/citizen conflict	7. very good relations with community police 8. citizens charter
Developmnt	1. sport & culture activities	2. work opportunities fairly distributed &/or own income projects	3. training for youth 4. infrastructural development	5. training in parenting 6. leadership training	7. collective decision-making 8. signs of personal development
SCORE	70 min.	210 minimum	350 minimum	510 minimum	640 minimum/max

Rule: Lower star grades may make up for *weakness* in a required criterion by *strength* from a *higher* grade criterion. The **violence** criterion (each scored 15, other categories are 10 each) is **the exception: it must always be there as assigned.**

What this adds up to is the *governance* to which attention was called in the earlier section on theory, of which the Violence Prevention Alliance and the Community Safety matrix are outstanding examples. Here it is at work uninhibitedly on the ground, the only regret being that the support from state and private sector is insufficiently generous and that police

conduct, in contradiction with the mission of the Force, too often clashes with efforts of civil society. What certainly cannot be gainsaid is the earlier theoretical point of the central place of communities in civil society and – both historically and currently – on the national scene. This is starkly brought home when, if nothing else, one considers the negative side of violence-prone communities, namely the impact of the violence emanating from them on the national budget, for example, in the billions of dollars of hospital expenditures, or in lost productivity, or in creating a climate of fear and apprehension driving talented people to emigrate.

Of course, the sceptics continue to voice their doubts, concretely that the PMI and similar entities are not solving the real problem, which is to get in the guns and smash the gangs. In truth the PMI et al are not getting in the guns. That is the job of the police and they are successful in recovering hundreds of guns annually and have removed several prominent gang leaders. This prompt removal and conviction of criminals is a necessary and very positive step. However, given the complexity of the problem, it is not sufficient to put an end to the *process that is turning inner city youth into criminals*. That is why the frequency of homicide is not going down and gang bosses are replaced by seconds. And that is also why the preventive methods of the VPA, PMI, Grace and Staff and others are needed.

The more serious doubt is the sustainability of such methods in the context of a national situation marked by economic stagnation and the debilitating overhang of massive debt, which virtually paralyze any release of resources to the inner city – to solve, for example, its unemployment problem. PMI personnel themselves have to grapple with this doubt, as they witness on the ground the fraying of cease-fires for want of follow-up in the form of jobs and income-earning projects. How much is realistically do-able, is a real question. A huge amount, is the immediate answer, because the resources required are relatively small and some prioritization by the state of its expenditures could easily meet them.

Where many youths are *literally penniless*, all that a group of them ask is a small shop selling basic foods, or a coop with 300 chickens and a deep-freeze, which fifty or seventy thousand dollars respectively are enough to set up and stock, while the cost of a block-making machine at \$200,000 is still relatively small. The PMI has done this kind of thing over and over and seen very positive results. In short, the amount needed to make a

significant impact in own-account small business and cottage industry is not massive – and the potential role of small business is widely acknowledged. \$81 million a year, a pittance compared to the more than \$20 billion spent on the police in 2007, is all that the PMI was asking in mid-2008. As already pointed out, Grace and Staff manage in Southside/Tel Aviv and contribute to several other areas on \$10 million.

The PMI and companion agencies are doing more than saving a few lives and quieting a situation that inevitably will soon bust out again. They are demonstrating to the authorities and the wider society what is possible with limited means and thereby issuing a challenge. Already hundreds of homicides have been prevented. Already hundreds of youth have turned around their lives instead of packing into the overcrowded cells of the general penitentiary. These simple facts are being put to the state and the business sector as urgent invitations to fulfill their mandates by finding the resources required to complete the job. If they fail to respond, yes, a bust-out or a worsening of an already cruel situation is possible, indeed likely, perhaps inevitable. But clearly, therefore, to repeat what has been said before, no claim is being made here for civil society doing it all by itself. It is rather to urge, within the governance structure put forward earlier, the need for politicians and private sector people to provide the support to civil society that it requires for its own mandate.

CONCLUSION

Community life like the family, it is generally accepted, is fundamental to human well-being. It is because of the damage done to inner city Kingston communities, this study has argued, that homicides have steadily climbed and reached their recent high level. Damage to the communities has also, along with other factors, hurt the family in a major way and hurt in particular the role of the male. Blame for the damage to communities cannot be laid at any single door. However, a large part of it must be placed on the social exclusion and garrisoning of the inner city engineered by politicians with the cooperation of community people themselves as well as the wider society. Social exclusion created the conditions for many of the factors leading to the deterioration in family and community life. Courts largely ineffective in criminal cases are exclusionary, as is an educational system that turns an army of boys out into the world at age 15 with no

skill and little ability to read or write. The neglect of inner city youth by the state has been profoundly harmful. It has been truly shameful.

The employment of a combination of violence and community structures to achieve political party power set a trajectory with tragic consequences for the country. The result has been a culture of violence and a process of criminalization responsible for more and more incidents of indiscriminate killing, increasing fear and unparalleled stress among community people, and panic in the wider society. The behaviour of the police, capping the exclusivism of the law and of a culture originating in Europe, only worsened an already bad situation. To have asked security forces to deal with a problem of a political, socio-economic and cultural nature, namely the manifest inequality and hardship assaulting the cherished value of respect, was extremely misplaced, indeed provocative. The outcome has been devastating: through the sensational headlines and pictures of press and television, an epidemic of murder pointing an accusing finger at political and societal leadership and the media.

Only the *community-rebuilding, youth-targeting* approach of the Peace Management Initiatives, Violence Prevention Alliance, Grace and Staff and Crime Prevention Committees now in five parishes has been able to check the homicidal currents from continuing to run. The solution offered by these agencies is clear – cease-fire, to begin with, community policing and, along with these, addressing all of the many facets of human living – training, sport competitions, cultural activity, income-earning projects or employment, peace councils, as well as, where needed proper housing, roads and other infra-structure. Until the shooting is stopped, however, and the guns laid aside, decent human living cannot go forward, the transformation in human potential and the environment that people long for cannot make a start.

This seems obvious but apparently is still not so to the authorities. Substantially more resources have been and are still being poured into some state-directed projects – which are then, in inner city areas like Whitfield Town, lengthily stalled by conflicts – than into first establishing the environment enabling projects to go forward. Social interventions are not enough: they have to be targeted at the youth. Nor can a positive environment be created by police action alone. The PMI, on the other hand, in spite of success patent from even the first two years of work, has had to work across a large area with minimal resources, insufficient certainly for the prolonged and intensive attention to communities

that alone brings sustained peace. Even now (late 2008) it has a field staff of only four, the fourth added in November 2007. A comment by Herbert Gayle is relevant in his regard:

A second observation made by both local and international advocates of programmes for youth with special needs is that 'success stories' are often not duplicated. Quite often Government and private sector agencies focus much attention and funding on new projects which pale in success when matched against already successful ones. A question often asked at international forums is whether or not it would not be more cost effective to expand the successful programmes or duplicate the structure and management system which created the success story.

There are positives, therefore, but to extricate this country from where garrisonisation has plunged it will require a changed outlook in every quarter. The starting point will have to be a conscious policy by both state and civil society directed at re-building communities across the inner cities and towns of the country by the deployment of an army of social workers provided with adequate resources. By one of SDC's counts, 785 communities comprise Jamaica, 56 on average for each of the 14 parishes. Given that a large percentage of rural communities already have thriving and even well organized community life, this is not a terrifying number to work with in the multi-faceted way that the PMI and other similar bodies have demonstrated is needed. The task has begun. It needs to be significantly enlarged and sustained. The PMI is acutely aware that what has been achieved to date will not last **unless** significant fresh resources are put into the communities where homicides are most frequent. Frustration is everywhere. The source of the greatest discouragement to those working in these communities is not so much the recurrence of community violence; it is the failure or refusal of the policy makers to **learn from past failures** and to **recognise and give sustenance** to the measures already undertaken and succeeding. Somehow the gap between "uppers" and "lowers" has to be bridged so that those in government, in charge of the state, see their role not as "ruling" but as cooperating with civil society and indeed facilitating its development and jointly with the private sector seeing to the regulation of individual enterprise. The history of Jamaica from 1937 points in the direction we should be moving.

NOTES

- 1 As originally proposed and defined by political scientist Carl Stone, garrison is the term applied to a community controlled by one political party and defended by the use of violence. A fuller description as well as alternate definition follows in the text below.
- 2 See the Jamaica Social Policy Evaluation (JASPEV) unit's *National Progress Report 2004-2006* (Office of the Cabinet, 2008), p 379-80 for the data showing a "steady increase in the number of complaints filed under the Domestic Violence Act" but also the "positive note ... that the disposal rate for complaints ... is two times as high as that for other civil cases".
- 3 See for a trenchant early criticism of this perspective Bernard Headley's *A Spade is Still a Spade: Essays on Crime and The Politics of Jamaica* (Kingston: LMM Publishing, 2002), the first three essays.
- 4 Harriott, Anthony, "'Dis a fi wi Thing': Politics and The Rise of Organised Crime in Jamaica", unpublished, 2007.
- 5 Personal communication.
- 6 Harriott "The Jamaican Crime Problem: Some Policy Considerations" in Harriott, Anthony, Farley Brathwaite and Scot Wortley, eds., *Crime and Criminal Justice in the Caribbean* (Kingston: Arawak Publications, 2004) p 254-62. See also his "Social Identities and the Escalation of Homicidal Violence in Jamaica" in Anthony Harriott, ed., *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2003) and Figueroa, Mark, Anthony Harriott, and Nicola Satchell, "Jamaica's Inner-City Political Economy, A Special Case?" in Rivke Jaffe, ed., *The Caribbean City* (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2008).
- 7 See the "Road Map to a Safe and Secure Jamaica: Report of the Special Task Force on Crime Convened by Leader of the Opposition, Bruce Golding", mimeo, 2006.
- 8 Data from the Statistical Unit of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) show a 23 per cent fall (from 887 to 663) in homicides in the Kingston Metropolitan area between 1997 and 2000. The decline was even more dramatic in particular divisions, e.g. in Kingston Western from 192 homicides to 61. The single most important responsible factor appears to have been the "peace" made between communities. A similar decline took place in August Town after the 1998 peace pact with Hermitage. See my "Corner Crews at War and Peace in August Town", paper presented to the Second International Conference on Crime in the Caribbean, UWI Mona, 2001.
- 9 Gayle, Herbert Samuel, *Urban Poverty and Violence: A Study of Selected Inner City Communities in Jamaica and Britain*, (Doctoral Dissertation, University of London, 2007).
- 10 See references in note 5 above. See also Chevannes, Barry, *Betwixt and Between: Explorations in an African-Caribbean Mindscape* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2006).
- 11 The term is Robert Chambers's in *Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last* (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1997) and refers to all those at the top in relation to the 'lowers' – North (to South), male (to female), white (to black), old (to young), warden (to inmate), doctor (to patient), husband (to wife), teacher (to student) etc, p 58f.
- 12 *The Practice of Macro Social Work* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), p 32.
- 13 Horace Levy, "Jamaica Welfare, Growth and Decline", *Social and Economic Studies*, 1995,

- vol. 44, nos. 2 & 3, p 349. On the history of Jamaica Welfare, see also Sybil Francis, "The Evolution of Community Development in Jamaica (1937-1962), *Caribbean Quarterly*, 1969, vol 15, no. 2/3, p 40-58, and Norman Girvan, ed., *Working Together for Development: D.T.M Girvan on Cooperatives and Community Development 1939-1968* (Kingston: Institute of Jamaica, 1993).
- 14 Ibid., p 252-3.
 - 15 "The Community Enterprise Organisation (CEO) Experience, 1978-1980", unpublished paper.
 - 16 *The underdevelopment of communities and its link to crime, the role of community councils and policies of the People's National Party: A review, twenty-five years after the Second National Conference of Community Councils*, (Kingston: On-the-Ground Publications, 2004), p 5.
 - 17 I am following here and in much of this historical overview the exhaustive study by Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992), p 84f.
 - 18 See *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, translated by T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), par. 188-256.
 - 19 Hoare, Quintin and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p 257-263, 275-6. The comment of Cohen/Arato may be helpful: "Gramsci's conception is presented in a notoriously confusing terminology. Civil society is variously defined as the counterpart of the state..., as a part of the state along with and counterposed to political society, and as identical with the state. The idea that runs through all these attempts at a definition is that the reproduction of the existing system outside the economic 'base' occurs through a combination of two practices – hegemony and domination, consent and coercion – that in turn operate through two institutional frameworks: the social and political associations and cultural institutions of civil society, and the legal, bureaucratic, police and military apparatus of the state or political society..." p 145.
 - 20 For an exhaustive discussion of the opposition, see Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, chs 4-7, "The Discontents of Civil Society".
 - 21 *Reconceptualising Governance* (UNDP: 1997).
 - 22 *Democracy Against Capitalism* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), p 241.
 - 23 Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, ch 8.
 - 24 "A Vision of the Future", in *The Norman Manley Memorial Lectures 1984-1995* (St Johns, Antigua: Hansib Caribbean, 1996), p 89.
 - 25 Faced with the problem of getting an adequate sample of school drop-outs for their research, Herbert Gayle and team turned to the community for help. "The level of cooperation received in some communities in finding these adolescents remains one of the good field memories of the study. It was encouraging to find that the institution of community is still alive in Jamaica – even in the 'forgotten' inner cities... [I]t was pleasing to find community folk wrestling with the research team to elicit some promise that one day something will be done for these unfortunate youth." *The Adolescents of Urban St Catherine: A Study of their Reproductive Health and Survivability* (Spanish Town: Children First Agency, 2004) p 11.
 - 26 *Deadly Consequences* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) p 96-7.
 - 27 Klein, Malcolm N., *The American Street gang: Its Nature, Prevalence and Control* (New York & Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1995); Sheldon, Randall G. et al, *Youth Gangs in American Society* (Belmont CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1997); Gunst, Laurie, *Born fi Dead: A Journey through the Yardie Underworld* (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1995); Blake, Duane, *Shower Posse: the Most Notorious Jamaican Criminal Organisation* (New York: Diamond Publishing,

- 2002). For Harriott's affirmative view of the distinction see his "The Crisis of Public Safety in Jamaica and the Prospects for Change", *Souls* 3:4, Fall 2001, p 61, 64.
- 28 See Harriott, "Social Identities etc". At stake is not just the identity of one community, e.g. Jungleists or Garden men, which is Harriott's point, but, I would suggest, the identity of both sets of combatants vis-à-vis the wider society, as people to be respected and treated accordingly.
- 29 See his *Demeaned but Empowered: The Social Power of the Urban Poor in Jamaica* (Kingston: University of West Indies Press, 2004)
- 30 Chevannes, Barry, *Betwixt and Between: Explorations in an African-Caribbean Mindscape* (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2006) p 163-5.
- 31 "The Rastafari and the Urban Youth" in Stone, Carl and Aggrey Brown, eds. *Perspectives on Jamaica in the Seventies* (Kingston: Jamaica Publishing House, 1981), p 392-422. See also Gray, *op.cit.*
- 32 Harriott, "Social Identities etc", p 91-2, 99-102.
- 33 Levy, Horace, compiler, *They Cry 'Respect': Urban Violence and Poverty in Jamaica* (Kingston: University of the West Indies, 1996, rev. 2001), p 12-14, 18-20 for discussion of the don and the warring.
- 34 "Shotta". Former Peace Management Initiative member and PNP activist Paul Burke, in a personal communication, distinguishes "shottas", those who take part in ad hoc community defence conflicts, from "gunmen", the more "professional" (and therefore criminal?) type.
- 35 See Development Options Ltd & Team, "Crime Victimization and Perception Survey, Kingston Metropolitan Area", p 60-62 (2002).
- 36 "Restorative Justice and International Human Rights" in Galaway, Burt and Joe Hudson, eds. *Restorative Justice: International Perspectives* (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1996), p 22, 23.
- 37 Zehr, H, *Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice* (Scotsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1990).
- 38 Fellatio, i.e. stimulation of the penis with the tongue.
- 39 See Levy, Horace, "Peacemaking on the Front Line", *The Caribbean Journal of Social Work*, 4.
- 40 Post-war administrations of justice, notably the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa with the ending of apartheid, have been confronted by this problem of separating justifiable political action from criminal. For a brief discussion of the grave difficulty faced by the TRC Amnesty Committee in distinguishing political motivation from financial reward and/or personal revenge in cases of robbery, torture and assassination, see Simpson referred to in Note 71 below. Simpson's conclusion (p 17) is worth noting: "[T]he Amnesty Committee's formalistic approach to defining violent conflict in terms of political responsibility and affiliation... disguised the impact of patterns of marginalisation and exclusion that reached beyond mere party identity in shaping the violent nature of South African society. Against this background, it is inevitable that achieving some kind of reconciliation between political parties in fact has limited efficacy in preventing violence that remains rooted in patterns of exclusion that are not adequately addressed by formal political change. As the nature and distribution of violence itself transmutes through the transition, a frame of reference limited to the party-political sphere simply cannot come to terms with the complex relationship between political and criminal violence embedded in the seismic dislocations wrought by apartheid and their enduring impact down the years since 1994."
- 41 *They Cry 'Respect'*, p 47. See also Moser, Caroline and Jeremy Holland, *Urban Poverty and*

- Violence in Jamaica* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1997), p 5-6. This was the World Bank's version of the joint study carried out with the University of the West Indies, the emphasis on poverty reflected in its title.
- 42 Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973). Further, if culture is meaning and the disrespect widely shown, then what we have here is a *culture* of disrespect.
 - 43 These examples are all taken from research in Whitfield Town.
 - 44 Levy, Horace, "The Ethics of Social Exclusion" in Noel Cowell and Stan Moore, eds., *Ethical Perspectives in Caribbean Business* (Kingston: Arawak Publishing Co., 2007).
 - 45 *Ibid.*
 - 46 *Ibid.*
 - 47 Hughes, Gordon, *Understanding crime prevention: Social control, risk and late modernity* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), p 138f.
 - 48 *They Cry 'Respect'*, p 24-26.
 - 49 *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, eleventh edition, revised (Oxford University Press, 2006).
 - 50 Levy, Horace et al, "An Assessment of Greater August Town for the Purpose of Reducing and Preventing the Incidence of Violent Crime and Increasing Access to Justice", Study carried out under the Government of Jamaica's Citizen Security and Justice Programme, Kingston, 2001, p 45, 62-63.
 - 51 "Youth just feel that if a man touches his crew, he has to respond."
 - 52 The number 10 indicates the highest level of involvement, 0 shows none. 'Youth prove' is highlighted as their phrase for male pride, the "most destructive factor" on the list. See Herbert Gayle's "Hustling and Juggling: the Art of Survival for the Urban Poor", Master's Dissertation, Dept of Sociology, UWI, 1997.
 - 53 See Deborah Thomas, *Modern Blackness: Nationalism, Globalization and the Politics of Culture in Jamaica* (University of West Indies Press/Duke University Press, 2004)
 - 54 *They Cry 'Respect'*, p 64.
 - 55 But between the extremes of "mere resignation" and "violent outbursts" "exists a vast terrain on which myriad forms of resistance to domination are enacted". "The dominated have the capacity to resist and often find the means to elude power, constrain its effects on them, bargain with it, and adapt it to conform to some of their needs." Gray, *Demeaned* etc p 3 and the rest of chapter one, "Rethinking Power".
 - 56 *Preventing Violence* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2001), p 7. See also his earlier *Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes* (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1996) and Prothrow-Stith, *Deadly Consequences*, p 106-10. Of great interest in this regard, according to Ian Boxill in *Structure, Agency and the Influence of Fanon's Search for Recognition* (Kingston: University of the West Indies, 2008), is the Hegelian theory of recognition taken over and modified by Franz Fanon. For Hegel individuality and freedom are only possible through relationship with others, in particular through recognition by others, recognition implicitly denoting respect. For Fanon, however, the other must cease to be colonizer for the relationship to be fruitful. In the face of the massive disrespect of the colonial situation Fanon appears (the critics differ) to go beyond regarding violence as the unavoidable route to liberating a country to seeing it as psychologically for individuals a positive "cleansing force". "It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect", he writes in *The Wretched of the Earth* (Penguin Books, 1967), p 74.
 - 57 Gilligan's discussion of other aspects of the respect/violence connection is worth noting:

Gilligan goes on to respond to the apparent paradoxes that a serious act of violence is not committed either by most women, though being treated as inferior, or by most of those who are poor, young and/or male. In the case of the gender paradox, he explains, in fact the conventional stereotype of the male requires some violence of him. The greatest insult for a man, to which he is expected to respond aggressively, is to be labeled “coward”, “sissy”, or sexually inadequate (impotent) or different, a “faggot”. For a woman, on the other hand, the insult is unchastity, the labels are “slut”, “whore”, or “tramp”, and an aggressive response from her draws more shame as being “unfeminine”. Women are socialized from birth to be non-violent.

“The central implication of all this,” Gilligan argues (at a length that cannot be matched here), “is that in patriarchal societies men are assigned the role of ‘violence-objects’, and women are assigned the role of ‘sex-objects’” (p 59). When rape is directed at men, as in prisons, they are symbolically “turned into women”. When homosexuality evokes violence (a common response though several others also do occur), it is in order to demonstrate masculinity: I prove that I do not love men by killing them.

“The reason for homophobia has long been recognized as the fear that one is, or is thought to be, homosexual oneself, which to the homophobic person is a source of intolerable shame, and motivates behavior designed to prove... heterosexuality. This is particularly likely to result in violence when the homophobic person is a man, because the most direct defense against the fear... is to engage in an exaggeration of the heterosexual sex-role stereotype... [namely] exaggerated violence” (p 62-3).

In regard to the second paradox, that most poor young males never commit serious acts of violence in their entire lives, the answer is that poverty, racism and other discriminations, though correlated with violence, are as such neither necessary nor sufficient causes of violence. The correlation occurs when “both are also correlated statistically... with the *real cause* of violence, which is overwhelming and *otherwise* inescapable and ineradicable shame” (emphasis mine) (p 67). The “otherwise” must be noted: shame itself is not a necessary cause of violence – many people are able to absorb serious disrespect because it is *counter-balanced by the other sources of self-esteem* that they possess.

The response to the apparent paradox of non-violence by most poor young males is driven home from another angle by Gilligan in his analysis of the series of school massacres in white middle class America, shocking and entirely unexpected events for communities seemingly cleansed of all the causes of violence. However, at Columbine High School, an example replicated in the others, it turned out from subsequent interviews that the perpetrators had been relentlessly teased, taunted and humiliated by other students and saw their use of violence as the only way they could erase their shame and gain respect.

Similarly, Gilligan observed, “there is no one-to-one relationship between unemployment and violence” but a correlation occurs when unemployment brings a loss of self-esteem and of feelings of self-worth. This occurs in patriarchal cultures where men are expected to be the bread-winners, identity is defined by work and to be jobless is a source of shame. These latter features occur more in the United States than Europe, with resulting higher levels of violence.

Another factor found in the U.S. to correlate with rates of violence is rates of single-parent families. Sweden in contrast, Gilligan notes, while having a one-parent family rate nearly equaling that of the U.S., exhibits a homicide rate one-tenth of the U.S. This he ascribes to the Scandinavian country’s lower level of economic inequity, its better treatment of mothers in terms of education, training and free child – care, and a tolerant attitude toward extra-marital sex. In comparison, “welfare” in the U.S. with its “Puritancal and Calvinist cultural heritage” is “miserly and punitive” (p 79), shaming in short.

- 58 On clientelism and its authoritarianism structure see Carl Stone, *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica* (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Books, 1980), ch 5; also Gray in *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1960-1972* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee

- Press 1991) p 9-10 where he argues that political authoritarianism emanates not only from party clientelism and personalist assertions but also from state defense of dominant class power and capitalist accumulation, and in his *Demeaned* etc, especially chapter 2, "A Fateful Alliance".
- 59 For other ways in which garrisons have been formed, see Barry Chevannes, "The Formation of Garrison Communities". Paper presented at the symposium Grassroots Development and the State of the Nation, in honour of Professor Carl Stone, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 1992. Stone assigns two ways a garrison can be formed – housing and one side pushing the other out. To these Chevannes assigns a third – forceful seizure by an invading force from outside.
 - 60 Sives, Amanda, "The Historical Roots of Violence in Jamaica: The Hearne Report 1949" in Anthony Harriott, ed., *Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy* (University of the West Indies Press, 2003).
 - 61 George E. Eaton, *Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica* (Kingston: LMH Publishing, 1995), p 129. See also Richard Hart, *Time for a Change: Constitutional, Political and Labour Developments in Jamaica and Other Colonies in the Caribbean Region, 1944-1955* (Kingston: Arawak Publishers, 2004).
 - 62 *Ibid.*, p 118-120.
 - 63 However, Robin "Jerry" Small, folk historian, has pointed out – and was echoed recently by Mr Edward Seaga, MP for Tivoli for many years, on a radio talk-show (News Talk 93 FM, July 2008) – that the first garrison was Matthews Lane, which took on an organised PNP cast from the mid-1940s.
 - 64 See Paul L. Buchanan, *Community Development in the 'Ranking' Economy* (Kingston: College of Arts, Science and Technology [now the University of Technology], 2nd edition, 1992), p 41f. For Buchanan, with his experience on the ground, the Top Ranking is "The Ghetto Godfather", his power directly based on his criminal economic activities (drugs, robbery, etc). For Buchanan this "godfather" has even dethroned the family unit. The language change from "top ranking" to "don" may have been influenced by movies on the Italian (via the USA) mafia.
 - 65 "Political Tribalism, the use of violence in political activities, the creation of political garrisons were not a natural outgrowth of a political process, but rather they were nurtured and nourished as strategic initiatives to secure or retain political power (emphasis mine)." Bruce Golding, cited by the *Report on Political Tribalism* (1997), p 11.
 - 66 Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York and London: A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1969) p 35, 36, 44, 56.
 - 67 Mark Figueroa, "The Impact of Garrison Communities on Jamaica's Political Culture 1962-1993", paper presented to the conference Democracy and Democratization in Jamaica – Fifty Years of Adult Suffrage, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 1994.
 - 68 "...the violence in Jamaica is politically mobilized. I maintain that all dons are political leaders", Gayle, Urban Poverty etc, p 55. This is changing, however, as some lesser dons focus on turf control.
 - 69 There is a temptation to connect the highly centralized garrisons with the presence of criminal gangs. On the other hand, criminal gangs have operated and flourished for a time in the loosely organized garrisons, e.g. in Spanish Town the Clans and One Order gangs which the police have succeeded in controlling to some extent, in Montego Bay's Norwood-Glendevon area the Stonecrushers still not fully subdued – on this latter see *The Sunday Observer* April 13, 2008, p 6-7 – with community life brought to a standstill.
 - 70 As counted by community representatives organized by the PMI to enumerate killings in

the community.

- 71 Sport and cultural groups with records of enviable achievement do exist in a highly centralized garrison but organized and directed from the top.
- 72 The *Economic and Social Survey 2006* (Kingston: Planning Institute of Jamaica), p 24.6 and 17, puts the increase in the number of children (0-14) murdered between 2004 and 2006 as moving from 22 to 96 for the year and as victims of major crimes (murder, shooting, rape, carnal abuse, robbery and break-in) from 669 to 1159 or 73 per cent (even though the incidence of crime in 2006 declined overall compared with the preceding years). In early 2007 occurred the terrible case of an elderly couple and a young girl burnt to death in a grilled house in spite of their pleas for rescue.
- 73 The assistance of PNP politicians in Rockfort focused on both heading off violence and developmental initiatives. The absence of this kind of political support in Jones Town contributed significantly to the outbreak and length of the war there.
- 74 Prior to 1962, the homicide rate in Jamaica was no different from the rest of the Caribbean. See Figueroa, Harriott and Satchell as in note 5 above.
- 75 On the second condition see Gayle, *Urban Poverty* etc, especially Chapter 3, p 83f.
- 76 Planning Institute of Jamaica, *Report on the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions*, 2000.
- 77 See Sudhanshu Handa, "Poverty paradox: Social sector strategy" in Inter-American Development Bank, ed., *Revitalizing the Jamaican economy: Policies for sustained growth*, (Washington, DC: Inter-American Bank, 2004), p 237-92.
- 78 See Bernard Headley, *The Jamaican Crime Scene: A Perspective* (Washington D.C.: Howard University Press, 1989), 41-2.
- 79 The Planning Institute of Jamaica and The Statistical Institute of Jamaica, *Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2006*, p 11-14. As measured by the GINI Coefficient the level of consumption inequality was 0.3826 in 2006.
- 80 Gayle, *Urban Violence*, p 115-16.
- 81 Harriott in "Dis a fi wi thing..", p 15, explains the "generally understood" distinction between extortion, a predatory crime involving "the demand for payments in return for protection from the danger that the person or group that demands the payment presents", and protection, "more of an enterprise crime" in which payments are demanded in return for the provision of services that protect the victim from others who may present a criminal threat. Both "involve the use of a credible threat of violence... Protection services may ... easily evolve into extortion rackets."
- 82 There the victory of the Jamaica Labour Party in the local government elections of 2003 was seen by the One Order gang located in JLP-affiliated Tawes Pen and Ellerslie Gardens as justifying their right to share in the extortion spoils from a taxi and bus park on the border with the adjoining PNP-held constituency, till then controlled by the Clans gang based there.
- 83 *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p 162.
- 84 For a proposed adaptation of the "broken windows" approach to dealing with such infringements of the law, see Harriott "The Jamaican Crime Problem etc", p 243-45.
- 85 For a broad treatment of the failure of Jamaican law to respect the culture of the people, see chapters 10 in Chevannes's *Betwixt and Between*, and chapter 11 for an excellent detailed treatment on ganja.
- 86 The 25% reduction up to September 30, 2008, still leaves the unacceptably high figure of 158.

- 87 For an extended discussion of structural and institutional violence, which is the topic of this section, see Gregg Barak, *Violence and Non-Violence: Pathways to Understanding* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2003).
- 88 According to *The 2006 Performance Annual Report of the JCF, The Professional Standards Branch*, of the 281 cases sent to him for a ruling in 2006, only 20 were deemed deserving of charge or arrest, with only a single conviction so far reached. There was also one acquittal while 18 are still pending.
- 89 A Murder rate in 1995/96 of 67/100,000. Pre-1994/95 data do not appear to have been published.
- 90 Graeme Simpson, , "Shock Troops and Bandits: Youth, Crime and Politics" in Jonny Steinerberg, ed., *Crime Wave: The South Africa Underworld and Its Foes* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001), p 118. According also to Irvin Kinnes, who has worked extensively with community gangs, *From Urban Street Gangs to Criminal Empires: The changing face of gangs in the Western Cape* (Tshwane (Pretoria): Institute for Security Studies, 2000. Monograph #48, "during times of political transition... the relaxation of social controls coupled with social disorganization and political uncertainty, provides ample opportunities for the growth in crime". While Jamaica did not go through the profound transition to which Kinnes is referring, its tumultuous politics coupled with elements of social disorder have undoubtedly encouraged the growth of crime, the 1960s-to-1980 political conflict leading into the turf war of the 1990s-2000s.
- 91 See Antzie Krog, *Country of My Skull* (Johannesburg: Random House, 1998), especially chapter 20.
- 92 According to Frances Madden, a social worker with decades of experience, a form of "necklacing" did take place regularly in Jamaica in the 1970s in the Majestic Gardens area. It was called "ringing" and involved the torching of a rubber tyre around the waist.
- 93 Children of families heavily dependent on barrels of clothes, tinned food and other goods sent from abroad by relatives.
- 94 For instances of teenagers on their own, see Gayle, *The Adolescents*.
- 95 See Janet Brown, "Parental Resistance to Child Rights" in Christine Barrow, ed., *Jamaica in Children's Rights: Caribbean Realities* (Ian Randle Publishers, 2002), p 114.
- 96 See Gayle, *The Adolescents*, p 153-56 for some examples.
- 97 See Brown, Janet and Barry Chevannes, "Why Man Stay So": *An Examination of Gender Socialization in the Caribbean* (Kingston: University of the West Indies, 1998); or for an extensive presentation of the data on which the same research findings were based, see Barry Chevannes, *Learning to Be a Man: Culture, Socialization and Gender Identity in Five Caribbean Communities* (University of the West Indies Press, 2001), p 149f.
- 98 *Betwixt and Between*, p 165.
- 99 JASPEV, *Annual Progress Report on National Social Policy Goals 2003*, (Office of the Cabinet), p 83.
- 100 In a survey conducted by the Planning Institute of Jamaica, reported in *The Transition of Jamaican Youth to the World of Work*, 2006, p 18-19, 59.4 per cent of out of school youth "had not passed an academic examination", with the percentage of males (64.8 per cent) higher than that of females (54.6 per cent).
- 101 Planning Institute of Jamaica, *Economic and Social Survey 2006*, p 21.6-8.
- 102 Patricia Anderson, "Poverty in Jamaica: Social Target or Social Crisis?", *Souls*, vol 3, no 4, Fall 2001, p 46.
- 103 *Economic and Social Survey 2006*, p 21.8.

- 104 Fox, Kristin and Georgiana Gordon-Strachan, *Jamaican Youth Risk and Resiliency Behaviour Survey 2005: School-based Survey on Risk and Resiliency Behaviour of 10-15 Year Olds*. 2007. USAID/MEASURE Evaluation/Healthy Lifestyles Project, Ministry of Health, available from <http://www.cpc.unc.edu/measure/publications/pdf/tr-or-58.pdf>.
- 105 *Economic and Social Survey 2006*, p 24.6 & 17.
- 106 According to SDC Director of Research Juanita Reid, youth clubs dwindled in number from an all-island 1675 in 1970 to 400 in 1998. In the KMR, according to Regional Manager Courtney Brown, the number has dropped from 308 to an estimated 200 in 2005, with not more than half of these fully or partially active. Cabinet approval of a National Youth Policy in 2004 was thus largely an empty gesture.
- 107 See "Jamaica's Youth Clubs", Policy Paper prepared for the Violence Prevention Alliance and the Ministry of Health, 2006. NCYD assistance to youth clubs has been limited. Identified as the primary causes were (1) the ambiguity that surrounds the role of the NCYD; that is, the extent to which it is a coordinator and monitor of youth programmes, and (2) the lack of funding, which has given way to an understaffed NCYD as well as to an inability to attend adequately to the needs of youths and youth clubs. NCYD's leadership was reported also to be ineffective.
- 108 Duppy in Jamaican English is the spirit of a dead person. To make a duppy is to kill.
- 109 Psychiatrist Dr Wendel Abel sternly criticised the media in an article to the *Gleaner* (July 6, 2005), C1, which that paper illustrated with pictures of eight of its own front pages under the caption "Media Violence Leads to Aggression". Later that year the *Gleaner* Company took the advice and entered on a new policy.
- 110 Prothrow-Stith, *Deadly*, p 75.
- 111 With the failure of politics and church to offer any compelling vision and hope of better, all there has been to fill the vacuum in motivation was the wayward "badness" mentality focused around increasingly localised leaders. It is a climate ruled among young men by the belief that *badness* is how you prove yourself. It is how you show your manhood and win the girls, and badness is demonstrated by your prowess with the gun. The girls flock the bad-men. Having a brand name gun is, therefore, a must, use of it even more so. Reprisal for the death of one of your gang is the rule, taken for granted. This is the air that gunmen youth breathe, absorb, that guides their thoughts and rules their actions. To be a gunman is a way of life, with an excitement and a stimulus of its own. As the leader of one of these groups, an intelligent young man in his early twenties, admitted to me, there is an obscure sense that pumping a bullet into another human being is wrong. But this notion is weak and succumbs easily, he added with a smile, to the attraction of the dominant beliefs carried by peer pressure, by what the group is doing, just as it does in clothes, hair style and slang words. Just a few days before, he had brought his brand-name gun, newly obtained from an up-town big man, to show off to his uncle, whose efforts to counsel him out of its use got very little traction until after the fatal and tragic wounding of the uncle, seven-year peace-maker in that area, by members of the gang rivaling the nephew's.
- 112 From recent national surveys, low levels of trust (social capital) are reported by Lawrence Alfred Powell, Paul Bourne and Lloyd Waller in *Probing Jamaica's Political Culture: Main Trends in the July-August 2006 Leadership and Governance Survey* (Kingston, University of the West Indies), p 22-28 and by Ian Boxill, Balford Lewis, Roy Russell and Arlene Bailey, *Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica: 2006* (University of the West Indies/Americas Barometer/Vanderbilt University, 2007), p 169-85.
- 113 *Betwixt and Between*, p 164-65.
- 114 See Harriott, Anthony, *Police and Crime Control in Jamaica: Problems of Reforming Ex-Colonial Constabularies* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2000).

- 115 For the similar but more engaged role of the church in the Peace and Reconciliation Commission and South Africa's transition out of apartheid, see Desmond Tutu, *No Future Without Forgiveness* (London: Rider, 1999), ch. 3.
- 116 Minutes of the PMI meeting of 14 January, 2002.
- 117 See among many examples the letter by attorney Dennis Daly, *The Gleaner*, July 28; open letter to the Prime Minister from the Independent Jamaican Council for Human Rights, *The Sunday Gleaner*, August 3; and *The Gleaner* of July 31 for apprehension expressed by the Jamaican Bar Association over mandatory sentencing, which was one of the measures proposed by the Prime Minister.
- 118 Ministry of National Security, Citizen Security and Justice Programme, Jamaica Social Investment Fund, Dispute Resolution Foundation, Ministry of Health and Violence Prevention Alliance, Human Employment and Resource Training (HEART Trust), Excelsior Community College (EXED), Area Youth Foundation, Grace and Staff, Social Development Commission, UNDP's Civic Dialogue, Kingston and St Andrew Action Forum, USAID, UNFPA, Jamaica Constabulary Force, Bustamante Children's Hospital, Ministers Fraternals, Roots FM, CHASE, Food for the Poor, Carlong Publishers, Jamaica Biscuit Company, Colgate Jamaica, Heart Foundation and Blue Cross.
- 119 The Community Security Initiative was another entity established by the Ministry of National Security, this time to use the *security forces* to end community violence before trying to establish projects.
- 120 Another umbrella was the Social Intervention Unit operating out of the Prime Minister's Office which sought to bring some coordination to the multiplicity of state agencies and some NGOs (the result in part of the various international fundings but also of increased societal interest) operating in the inner city.
- 121 See Obika Gray's "Civic Politics in Jamaica: New Populism or Political Breakthrough?", paper presented to the Third Annual 'Caribbean Reasonings' Conference, "Culture, Politics, Race and Diaspora. The Thought of Stuart Hall", 2004. UWI, Kingston, Jamaica. See also his *Demeaned but Empowered*, the final chapter. However, Gray's criticism of the CSOs as lacking organized mass support, I am not sure I would agree with. For a list, notwithstanding deficiencies, of CSOs in Jamaica, see the USAID sponsored *Directory of Governmental, Non-Governmental and Community Based Organizations, Associations and Social Safety Net Programmes in Jamaica* (Washington: Management Systems International, 2008).
- 122 See Pauletta Chevannes, "The CFW Methodology", unpublished paper described as "excerpted from a larger study on Change from Within entitled *Emerging Masculinities*"; also *The Story of Four Schools: Findings of the Change From Within Project at the University of the West Indies*, University Printers, n.d.
- 123 *The Adolescents*, p 246.
- 124 See also Harriott's recommendations in his "The Jamaican Crime Problem etc", p 256-63.

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