War, Peace and Progress: conflict, development, (in)security and violence in the 21st century

Mark T Berger & Heloise Weber

To cite this article: Mark T Berger & Heloise Weber (2009) War, Peace and Progress: conflict, development, (in)security and violence in the 21st century, Third World Quarterly, 30:1, 1-16, DOI: 10.1080/01436590802622219

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802622219

Published online: 19 Jan 2009.

Article views: 2139

Citing articles: 3 View citing articles
War, Peace and Progress: conflict, development, (in)security and violence in the 21st century

MARK T BERGER & HELOISE WEBER

ABSTRACT  The theory and practice of development has a complicated relationship to the history of war and peace in the 20th century. Efforts to realise the promise of progress have been played out against the backdrop of the crisis of colonialism, national liberation, decolonisation and the rise and fall of Third Worldism. Third Worldism, conceptualised as a specific project to realise the promises of progress, was also affected by the transformation and onset of the crisis of the nation-state system and the re-calibration of the development–security nexus in the post-Cold War era. The short history of the ‘three worlds of development’ appears now to have been overlaid by global development; that is, a process which entails intensified social and political network-relations, with accompanying regulatory efforts becoming more global in scope and reach. Yet, the most influential drivers and proponents of ‘progress’ continue to focus on the nation-state as the natural mechanism for the realisation of development, security and to some extent the protection of human rights. A critical reinterpretation, however, of the struggles engendered by this constellation suggests that they are better viewed as struggles for recognition (and redistribution) rather than driven by realising statehood per se. Concurrently, development as an internationally framed global project (underpinned by neoliberalism) has coexisted with alternative conceptions. Collectively, the latter hold out a range of paths-to-progress not-yetaken at a systemic level, and flag the everyday struggles of denigrated multitudes. This special 30th anniversary issue brings together contributions that seek to revisit the dynamics and complexities of the history of war and peace in relation to the pursuit of progress. The issue as a whole foregrounds contemporary crises of violence and insecurity in relation to core organising principles of world politics; the nation state and the inter-state system and underlying assumptions to realise the promises of progress. That this project is beset with crises and contradictions is recognised by both its advocates and critics. However, there is no consensus on either causal dynamics or potential solutions, despite common acknowledgements of the complexities involved. The first part of this introduction broadly examines the ‘crisis’ of the
state and brings to the fore the need to appreciate the dynamics of social and psychological aspects of these struggles. The second part focuses on the contours of the ‘crisis’ of global development.

The Third World was not a place. It was a project. During the seemingly interminable battles against colonialism, the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America dreamed of a new world. They longed for dignity above all else, but also the basic necessities of life (land, peace and freedom). They assembled their grievances and aspirations into various kinds of organizations, where their leadership then formulated a platform of demands . . . The ‘Third World’ comprised these hopes and the institutions produced to carry them forward . . . There is as yet little evidence of an alternative institutional agenda to replace the assassinated Third World project . . . The battles for land rights and water rights, for cultural dignity and economic parity, for women’s rights and indigenous rights, for the construction of democratic institutions and responsive states—these are legion in every country, on every continent. It is from these many creative initiatives that a genuine agenda for the future will arise. When it does, the Third World will have found its successor.¹

The first issue of Third World Quarterly was published in 1979, against the backdrop of an increasingly complex but still potent, even resurgent, ‘Third Worldism’.² That year was an important year in the history of both the Cold War and of Third Worldism. At the beginning of 1979 the Shah of Iran was ousted in a broad popular revolution that ultimately narrowed its political agenda once in power to produce a major neo-theocratic state and usher in the rule of the Ayatollahs. In retrospect this was a key marker in the history of the resurgence of radical political and neo-traditional Islam. Then, in July 1979, the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN—Sandinista National Liberation Front) brought down the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. Anastasio Somoza Jr’s family had ruled the small Central America country since the 1930s. The FSLN victory turned Nicaragua into the focus of a wider socialist revolutionary resurgence in the region (and even beyond) for the next decade. Meanwhile, at the end of 1979, the USSR embarked on a full-scale military occupation of Afghanistan to support the crumbling Afghan communist regime. As in the case of Nicaragua, the war in Afghanistan contributed to the revitalisation of the Cold War. The struggle in Afghanistan also turned into a major drain on Soviet military capacity and contributed to the collapse of the USSR a decade or so later. The end of the war in Afghanistan in 1989 also provided a crucible for the emergence of al-Qaeda, one of the most stridently violent neo-traditional political Islamic organisations of the post-cold war, or long war, era.³

Well before the end of the Cold War and the start of the so-called ‘Long War’, the history of war and peace had a complicated relationship to the theory and practice of progress.⁴ Efforts to realise the promise of progress in the 20th century have been played out against the backdrop of the crisis of colonialism, national liberation, decolonisation, the Cold War and the rise and fall of Third Worldism. The pursuit of progress was at the heart of the
global cold war struggle between ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism and ‘genuinely existing’ state socialism. It was also central to the rise, universalisation and transformation of the nation-state system and the subsequent recalibration of the development–security nexus in the post-cold war era. With the end of the Cold War the ‘three worlds of development’, in the sense of broadly competing political ideologies, have been clearly displaced by an emphasis on development as a global project of ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism. Or, at least, this is reflective of the theory and practice of key international development institutions and/or institutions of global governance but, to be sure, it is one that remains contested. As this introduction is being written ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism is ‘yet again’ in crisis. More accurately the dominant model of global development is actually premised on everyday crises for many, whether we think of this in terms of the toil of plantation workers who produced wealth enjoyed by some in Europe (or in the so-called ‘Third World’) or the proletariat of Europe who also contributed to this project. The everyday lived experiences of hunger and vulnerabilities faced by so many across the globe is the human cost of the everyday crisis of ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism, even where these experiences are not directly related to conflict and violence. As many of the contributions in this special issue attest, violence and conflict are embedded in efforts to pursue a modernity that is beset with contradictions, and thus is not unrelated to the crisis of everyday lived experiences and the fact that ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism is both grounded in and driven by a boom-and-bust cycle of economic crisis.

Despite concerted efforts in some quarters to establish regional or global regulation frameworks, the perception even of those involved in such initiatives remains captivated by an ostensible commitment to the political utility of the nation-state. Policy makers and most international political theorists and analysts see little or no contradiction between an effort to consolidate neoliberal development strategies at the global level and the continued framing, and measuring, of development in terms of the nation-state. Neither do they see the everyday crises as intricately related to—and emanating from—a systemic (dis)order built into ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism. This observation is not premised on the ontological centrality of structure but, rather, is grounded in the choices and commitment of influential actors and ideologies. Thus the state-centred analysis of the crisis, while important, does not necessarily sufficiently recast the social and political framework in a way that grasps the nettle of the crisis. This continues despite the fact that a growing number of nation-states have clearly failed to realise the hopes and expectations for development and security that many thought the nation-state system and its component parts could deliver. Furthermore, the likelihood of these states doing so seems even more remote now than in an earlier period. Nevertheless the main actors and policy makers in the international arena, as well as those who govern nation-states and movements, continue to seek progress through the nation-state or the institution of their own sovereign nation-state. At the same time the rise and fall of the three worlds of development and the contemporary order of global
development in the form of ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism continue to coexist with a wide range of alternative conceptions and approaches to progress. Collectively they reflect the deep frustration with the dismal situation in large parts of the world today where development and security remain elusive, and conflict, violence and crisis are part of everyday life.

For thirty years *Third World Quarterly* has provided an intellectual and political touchstone for critical engagement with issues of war, peace and progress. This special 30th anniversary volume brings together a wide range of contributions to address both the old and the new concerns that have been the focus of *Third World Quarterly* over the decades. One common theme of this volume is the effort to contribute directly or indirectly to understanding the contemporary ‘crisis’ of the nation-state and the future of the nation-state system. Another common focus is what we have called the ‘crisis of global development’. The contributors bring to bear a range of important insights in relation to the crisis of the nation-state and/or the crisis of global development. Importantly all the contributions implicitly or explicitly allude to the intrinsic relation between the two, and hence locate the crises as ultimately a crisis of global development (or a crisis of ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism). The latter encompasses conceptions of progress and the structural framework through which this is assumed to be realisable.

The volume as a whole is divided into two sections. One focuses on the crisis of the nation-state, and a second, closely linked, focuses on the crisis of global development. In an effort to provide the overall backdrop for the contributions that follow in relation to war, peace and progress, this introduction begins with a short overview of the history and contemporary crisis of the nation-state. This is followed by an examination of the contemporary crisis of global development, with an emphasis on setting the overall scene for the various contributions that follow. It includes looking at the relationship between global development and security and insecurity world-wide to round off an effort to place the collection as a whole in context. We are not suggesting that we have set the scene for grand solutions to global problems. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the contributions individually and the volume as a whole will help set the parameters for a new, and more ambitious, agenda for addressing the ongoing and deepening double ‘crisis’ of the nation-state system and of global development.

**Conflict, violence and the crisis of the nation-state**

Many observers increasingly acknowledge that we are in the midst of a crisis of the nation-state system, regardless of whether that particular terminology is used. For example, the fourth annual ‘Failed States Index’ published by the Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, uses a mix of a dozen political, social, economic and military indicators to rank 177 states world-wide in terms of their relative potential for instability, conflict and failure. They focus on the 60 most vulnerable states: these include 20 that are regarded as ‘critical’; 20 more that are categorised as being
‘in danger’ and a third tier of 20 states that are regarded as ‘borderline’ in relation to two more categories of ‘stable’ and ‘most stable’. There are, of course, problems with such categorisations and even the idea of failed or failing states, particularly if this kind of quantitative analysis glosses over the complexity of state formation, the vagaries of nationalism, and the problems inherent in nation building (or state building) in many parts of the world. The problem is most acute when the crisis of the nation-state is acknowledged at the same time as proponents of various solutions continue to accept the technocratic parameters of contemporary nation-building and state-building discourse. This is a discourse that continues to naturalise the nation-state and the nation-state system. The dominant prescriptions for nation building or state building in the post-cold war and post-9/11 era have limited or no prospects for success if they fail to locate what they are doing in a far more critical and historical context.

Awareness of the historical context of state formation and nationalism, and the particular importance of warfare to state building are not new, but they remain neglected. Over 30 years ago Charles Tilly argued that ‘war made the state and the state made war’. In particular the financial imperatives of war making in Europe over an extended period of time led to heightened levels of economic extraction, mobilisation and repression, and, where successful, resulted in the formation of strong states and latterly ‘nation-states’. Meanwhile, as Bruce Porter has argued: ‘industrialized warfare is the most bitterly conflictual of human phenomena’. At the same time it is ‘also the most intensely cooperative’. The ‘power’ of full-scale conventional warfare ‘channeled through deep grooves of societal cooperation etched by war, is a formidable engine of collective action’. The modern state, then the modern nation-state as it emerged out of centuries of warfare in Europe was by the early decades of the 20th century ‘an offspring of the total warfare of the industrial age’.

With the end of World War II the rules changed dramatically. The establishment of the United Nations and decolonisation after 1945 had profound and unforeseen implications against the backdrop of the end of formal colonialism and the universalisation of the nation-state system. In relation to the period prior to 1945 Brian Taylor and Roxana Botea have argued that strong national states emerged over an extended historical period. This has meant that, for warfare to lay the groundwork for strong national states in the post-1945 era, ‘they must have at least some degree of the political and national coherence that was created as a consequence of war in modern Europe’ over centuries. Reversing Tilly’s formulation, they emphasise that the ‘state made war, and war made the state’. But, more importantly in the post-1945 era, ‘war now takes place in a state system that has already been created rather than acting to create that system’. The juridical sovereignty provided by the United Nations does not actually create modern nation-states and if it did we would not be looking out, in the first decade of the 21st century, on a world with an increasing number of weak, collapsing or failed states. This point is made in a complementary fashion by Niall Ferguson. For Ferguson the key to the violence and instability of the
20th century is to be found in the ongoing dynamics of ‘ethnic conflict’, ‘economic volatility’ and ‘empires in decline’.12

Meanwhile, the rise of the USA to a position of unrivalled global power is closely linked to the universalisation of the nation-state system and the end of the Cold War. The contemporary crisis of the nation-state system is occurring against the backdrop of the global triumph of a US-style ‘genuinely existing’ economic and political liberalism, with all the attendant shortcomings and encrustations that accompany it. At the same time, while the crisis of the nation-state system and the vicissitudes of ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism may signal a reorientation in US power, they do not necessarily represent signs of the decline of US power: a deepening of the crises may well allow for a related deepening of the US ascendancy. At the same time the profound limitations of the nation-state system that are increasingly apparent with the end of the Cold War have, as some observers have stated, important implications for the future of US foreign policy generally, but more importantly we should add, also for the theory and practice of state building specifically.13

To put it another way, far too many observers continue to assume that nation-states (even those states that have never been modern nation-states, or are currently ‘collapsing’) can still be turned into stable units of a wider international order if the right mix of policy prescriptions are embraced. Yet history suggests that we live in a world filled with nations-that-never-were-nations, or nation-states, and furthermore that social and political relations and experiences have never been confined to the boundaries of the nation-state.14 The way beyond the current crisis of the nation-state system lies in a careful understanding of the specific social histories and political economies of the nations-that-never-were-nations. More importantly we ought to ask why is it that these ‘nation-states’ are all characterised by a history of failure in terms of the formation of a strong sense of national identity linked to a process of state formation and state building that could deliver infrastructure and public goods within a clearly defined and controlled territory. We suggest that answers to these questions (and some are evident in the contributions to this volume) cannot be derived from a state-centred analytical perspective, but must be sought in a more relationally conceived approach to global social and political change. The pursuit of development and security can only be successful when we move beyond the current enthusiasm for state building and beyond the current capacity-building initiatives which are aimed at establishing the legal and political framework for ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism.

There are many ways that this could happen: one strategy would be to think about social and political relations in the context of new regional and/or global frameworks of development and security that view the nation-state as the problem rather than the solution. This has, of course, been articulated in simplistic terms for many years by proponents of economic regionalisation and globalisation.15 Contrary to the view that regionalisation and globalisation (along ‘genuinely existing’ liberal lines) are more or less of a panacea for the crisis of the nation-state, the crisis is actually a symptom of the
profoundly uneven, and destructive and creative, character of regionalisation and globalisation. Furthermore, we should avoid ignoring identity generally or national identity more specifically, but acknowledge that in many instances identities remain stronger at the sub-national level, while new institutions could be bolstered by notions of more regional, or even global, ideas about citizenship and rights and obligations. To this end there also needs to be more attention paid to both the political economy of violence and the social and cultural dynamics of globalisation. This will in turn allow us to think about human rights, human development and human security in terms that are regional or global in their scope.

In short, there is a need rethink national sovereignty and establish frameworks for the protection of rights (not those rights as embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO), but collective rights) which will allow people(s) to live a life of dignity. This needs to be done in ways that are neither ad hoc, nor piecemeal. Furthermore it needs to be done in ways that acknowledge the local content of identity and citizenship, but set much higher standards at the regional and global level for the protection of those rights and for the receipt of obligations associated with citizenship. There is more than ever a need to formulate approaches to security and development that take ‘common humanity’ far more seriously than the current nation-state system and ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism are capable of doing. This ultimately leads to a framing of the problem as a ‘crisis’ of global development.

**Conflict, violence and the crisis of global development**

Whatever the shortcomings of the formulation, the growing attention to, and the identification of, failed or failing states can be seen as a symptom of both the crisis of the nation-state system and the contemporary crisis of global development. What is also important here is the way in which the universalisation of the nation-state system, followed by the turn to neoliberal globalisation, have, in an increasingly uneven fashion, pushed the nation-state to its limits and beyond. Central to global development in the post-cold war era is the reorientation of nation-states and the nation-state system. While this process is clearly globally constituted, the US trajectory is both a driving force of, and a template for, this wider project. Since the 1980s the orientation of the US government has increasingly been towards the redirection of government funds away from social programmes and towards the promotion of economic and geopolitical initiatives overseas. This is linked to the ongoing efforts to bring down domestic wages and standards of living in support of higher profits and the pursuit of increased global market share for US-based corporations. Successive governments are profoundly influenced by, and well integrated with, externally oriented elites who are the primary beneficiaries of a regressive tax system that effectively redistributes income upwards. The socioeconomic order in North America is one in which large numbers of people are connected to declining national institutions and economic networks at the same time as transnationalised elites and an
important and substantial section of the middle class have benefited dramatically from the economic boom of the 1990s. This is a situation that now seems like ancient history as the inherent boom-and-bust cycles of ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism have come home to roost on Wall Street itself in the final months of 2008. Although the orientation of the Bush administration after 11 September 2001 shifted (and it should be emphasised that what occurred was a reorientation, or a military deepening of globalisation rather than a retreat from ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism), US-based companies and other transnational corporations will continue to have far more interest in the maintenance of an open world economy than in a tilt toward increased national, regional or even global regulation that is contrary to the objectives of profit maximisation and wealth accumulation.

Nevertheless this emergent and uneven ‘new’ order, based on a somewhat different relationship between the global political economy and the nation-state system, has transformed rather than diminished the role of nation-states. While neoliberal globalisation has dramatically reoriented the state away from national development through redistribution and welfare provision, state intervention continues to be necessary in order to successfully realise the neoliberal globalisation project. Ultimately the nation-state system itself has been transformed by and has provided the framework for the development of ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism in its starkest form. For example, the elimination of constraints on international financial flows, the privatisation of the public sector and a whole range of changes to financial and economic regulation and control have occurred as a result of interventions by states across the nation-state system.

Until the 1970s the dominant narrative on progress centred on the promotion of national development, with a political commitment that for the most part retained redistribution and welfare at its core. This shift away from redistribution involved efforts to deepen ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism and to counter ‘genuinely existing’ state socialism. With the shift from national development (as conceptualised through the redistribution lens) to neoliberal global development, the deepening of global capitalism has been even more geographically uneven than in the 1950s and 1960s, when development strategies were, in theory, more attuned to questions of redistribution and the need to address the uneven development that took place within nation-states and between them. In much of the world governments and ruling elites now increasingly use the institutions of the state to advance the process of neoliberal development strategies (and their own interests) and to undermine or roll back whatever institutions, if any, of national development were erected in earlier decades to facilitate redistribution. A key characteristic of global development by the 1990s was the growing concentration of economic power in the hands of a small number of large oligopolistic corporations.

This process of global development has involved the coalescence of regionalised economic systems that provide the main motors of the global economy. These regions are North America, Western Europe and East Asia.
Instead of the international economy expanding in spatial terms, since the 1970s the various financial, trading and production networks that connect these economic regions have been getting deeper and stronger. The economic elites of these regions can increasingly take advantage of the broad range of connections to diversify their investments and business operations within and between these regions. The rapid movement of capital also allows for a quick exit by local or transnational investors from those regions, or those parts of regions, where the risks to unimpeded accumulation are seen as too great. The particularly uneven geographical spaces of wealth and exclusion (or spaces of dispossession) are clearly reflected in the way that, in the 1990s, the most economically significant post-communist nation-states that arose from the collapse of Soviet power (including Russia itself), were reconfigured as part of the ‘emerging economies’ or ‘emerging markets’. The idea of emerging markets, as applied to the major developing nations of the one-time Third World, had first appeared in the early 1980s. In 1981, at the same time as neoliberal economic policies and structural adjustment were gaining momentum, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), an organisation affiliated with the World Bank, introduced the idea of the emerging market. The main factor used to identify an emerging market was relative wealth. By the 1990s nation-states from South Africa to Russia were identified by the World Bank as emerging markets because their average annual per capita incomes were above the mean world annual income. In this formulation the remaining nation-states of the erstwhile Second and Third Worlds (the ‘least developed nations’) are implicitly, if not explicitly, viewed as unimportant or irrelevant to the wider world economy unless they are seen to directly threaten the security of the core regions. While such observations have their merit, we must remain critical about what such categorisations and indicators do not tell us; such as the ecological cost of accumulation, the social cost or lived experiences of ‘growth’ indicators as well as the fact that GDP tells us nothing about redistribution anyway.

Furthermore it is important to approach conceptions of ‘regional exclusion’ with caution for at least two reasons. First, it does not just involve the economic neglect of a particular region or economies, even though that can appear as a key trend. Importantly many of the regions concerned have a history related to the political economy of colonialism and the colonial encounter, the legacy of which is prevalent. Moreover, contemporary processes of ‘economic inclusion’ entail efforts to establish global development strategies, which for many will mean further dispossession and an increase in their already vulnerable living conditions. Second, in most spaces generally regarded as ‘excluded’ there is an increasing elaboration of humanitarian networks and activities by the UN and a wide range of aid organisations. There are also important military interventions by outside governments in the ‘marginalised’ regions, sometimes under UN auspices and at other times operating under the authority of a particular national government or group of national governments, or a regional organisation. The UN was central to the elaboration of the nation-state system after 1945 and to the diffusion of the ideas and practices associated
with state-mediated national development up to the 1970s (with redistribution at the core). At the same time the UN and its various agencies have been major sites for the elaboration of the neoliberal globalisation project since the 1980s. Part of this trend can be understood by examining the history of US hegemony in the second half of the 20th century and how it came to be closely bound up with the UN. The USA was a key force behind the establishment of the UN at the end of World War II and the actual Charter of the United Nations that was finalised in 1945 was effectively a US document, in contrast to the Covenant of the League of Nations which had been based on both US and British drafts. Fifty-one governments signed the Charter in June 1945. By the early 1970s UN membership exceeded 120 and was over 150 by 1980, reaching 185 nation-states by the end of the 1990s. As of 2008 UN membership stands at over 190 nation-states and counting.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s the Cold War undermined the expectation that the UN, centred on the Security Council, would provide the overall framework for international security after 1945. The Security Council was established with five permanent members and 10 rotating members. The permanent members are the major allied powers that won World War II: the USA, the USSR (now Russia), Great Britain, France and China (Taiwan held the Chinese seat until 1971). After 1945 international politics, as played out at the UN, were directly linked to the centrality of these five states to UN security decisions and initiatives. And, although these five powers were prevented in theory from using force in a fashion that went against the UN Charter, their veto in the Security Council protected them from sanction or censure if they did engage in unilateral action. The Security Council thus represented a major arena for cold war politics at the same time as the Cold War ensured that the ability of the Security Council to act was often profoundly constrained.

With the end of the Cold War, however, the UN was presented with an opportunity to revive the major peacekeeping and security activities that many of its early proponents had anticipated. For example, while the UN dispatched a total of 10,000 peacekeepers to five operations (with an annual budget of about US$233 million) in 1987, by 1995 the total number of troops acting as peacekeepers under UN auspices was 72,000. They were operating in 18 different countries and the total cost of these operations was over $3 billion. Early post-cold war initiatives were thought to augur well for the UN’s new role. The major civil war in El Salvador, which had been fuelled by the Cold War, came to a negotiated end in 1992 under UN auspices. Apart from El Salvador, the countries in which the UN has provided peacekeepers and election monitors include Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, East Timor, Macedonia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and the Western Sahara. While East Timor, for example, is seen as a UN success story thus far, the abject failure of the UN in Angola and Somalia and its more qualified failure in places such as Cambodia highlight the constraints on its role in the post-cold war era. The UN’s new peacekeeping activities in the post-cold war era were closely connected to the appointment of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as Secretary General at the beginning of 1992. Shortly after
taking up his new post Boutros-Ghali presented the Security Council with his ‘Agenda for Peace’. He wanted member states to provide permanently designated military units that could be deployed quickly and overcome the UN’s well known inability to act with alacrity in a time of crisis. A number of states expressed an interest in such an arrangement at the same time as changes were made at UN headquarters in New York. There was even some talk of forming a multinational military establishment, made up of volunteers who would be under the direct control of the UN. Furthermore there was little or no possibility of more effective intervention by the UN in situations where the national interests of the major powers were thought to be at stake. At the same time the fact that a number of countries, including the USA and Russia, had fallen behind in their payment of dues to the UN suggested the prospects for a more activist and revamped organisation were still limited. As a result of concerted US opposition, Boutros-Ghali was not reappointed as Secretary-General for a second term, further dampening the momentum towards a more assertive United Nations.

His replacement, Kofi Annan, emerged as a much more cautious and conciliatory Secretary-General. Annan has subsequently been replaced by another ‘place holder’ as the UN continues to flounder in the deepening crisis of the nation-state system. By the 21st century the United Nations was a profoundly constrained player in a wider post-cold war order centred on the USA, but not without a range of social struggles that counter the political content of US hegemony, and also articulate alternative development paths. This is a post-Cold war order in which instability, terrorism and criminality in the marginalised regions and failing nation-states in various parts of the world have precipitated the emergence (even before 11 September 2001) of a renewed emphasis on the connection between security and development, viewing poverty, inequality and underdevelopment as a threat to global order. This shift is embodied in the growing links between strategies of conflict resolution, social reconstruction and foreign aid policies. While the USA and other OECD governments have been engaged in the post-cold war nation-building (or state-building) efforts that this reorientation represents, this task is also being shifted to new or reconfigured networks that combine national governments, military establishments, myriad private companies and contractors and NGOs. This new merging of security and development in a distinct post-cold war form is reminiscent of, although not the same as, the anti-communist nation-building and poverty-alleviating strategies and efforts that rose and fell during the Cold War. The new, more privatised and more decentralised approach to nation building reflects the shift from state-guided national development to state building in the context of ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism that was consolidated (at least formally) in the 1980s. Like earlier nation- or state-building efforts, the chances of success (measured in terms of the genuine social and economic uplift and political enfranchisement of the majority of the citizens of a given nation-state, as opposed to a more minimal goal of political stability—a standard by which the USA itself can be found wanting) for nation building in the early 21st century remain seriously constrained. In fact, the instrumentalities
available in theory and in practice to carry out nation building in the post-cold war era are clearly more limited than those that were available during the struggles for decolonisation and the Cold War. In the concluding contribution we reflect on some of the contradictions that were already present in the universalisation of the nation-state system and on efforts to secure national development (as conceptualised then) by recourse to the ideals of national liberation.

**Conclusion: new constellations of critiques and Third World Quarterly in the 21st century**

The contributions that follow all in one way or another directly address the themes and issues outlined above. They include critical historical reinterpretations of ‘failed’ states and the crisis of state building, as well as an appreciation of the social and psychological dimensions that underpin violence in relation to the perceived security assumed to derive from the state. Other contributions focus on insecurities and vulnerabilities, including the ecological, as a consequence of efforts to pursue ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism as the dominant form of global development. Overall the contributions reflect a wide range of views on important debates. To a certain degree they also reflect the fact that various fields of study are in flux against the backdrop of the double crisis of the nation-state system and global development. The qualitative shifts identified above have to date only been inadequately, if at all, integrated into new analytical approaches, and many of the practical challenges alluded to are equally poorly conceptualised. The contributions that follow thus represent tentative steps towards facilitating the dialogue required to begin to address many of these shortcomings.

The first contribution—an essay by Kamil Shah on the ‘Failure of State Building’—sets the tone by critically examining the state failure discourse, and suggesting a historically informed social relational approach as a more promising alternative for reconstructing the persistent crises of so-called ‘state failure’. Using the example of Haiti, Shah tracks the contradictions of liberal state building and identifies how a space can be opened for considerations of alternative prospects for social and political order and progress. Similar issues are raised by Shahar Hameiri in a paper on Australia’s state-building efforts in the Solomon Islands. Arguing that Australia’s Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has been misunderstood by both its advocates and its detractors, Hameiri shows RAMSI to be instrumental in installing a particular political regime, foreclosing political alternatives, and contributing to protracted conflict. The next four contributions continue with the theme of political violence in the context of the distortions imposed by the preoccupation with mapping such conflicts onto the co-ordinates of the ‘inter-state’ system. Benjamin Maitre advocates a contextual shift in the analysis of internal wars, and demonstrates the problems associated with statist peace-building and enforcement measures with reference to Sudan’s protracted conflicts.
John Arquilla investigates claims that the use of political violence can be conducive to advancing or achieving developmental goals, and finds such claims wanting in the context of a larger longitudinal analysis of conflict. Gordon McCormick and Lindsay Fritz focus on the important but neglected study of warlordism, which is rarely put front and centre in the debate about the crisis of the nation-state. Their thorough piece charts an important new research agenda as the crisis of the nation-state deepens. In his contribution Kevin Dunn explores some of the conditions which lead to populations developing a readiness to engage in social and political violence, and what sustains this. He concentrates on the discourse of autochthony and elucidates its attractiveness, as well as its problematic consequences. The link to ‘place’ and the formation of social identity based on a specific understanding of one’s relation to the land, Dunn argues, is extended to the perceived stability to be derived from the state. Sebastian Kaempf retracts the different understandings of guerrilla warfare underpinning the doctrines for social struggle espoused in exemplary fashion by Mao Zedong and Frantz Fanon. Kaempf argues that only an amalgam of Mao’s instrumental view of violence, and Fanon’s existentialist conception facilitated the delivery of historically transformative struggles.

With Marcus Taylor’s contribution the emphasis shifts towards the organisation and implications of the global political economy, and the reproduction of economic insecurity as a prime source of social and political conflict. Taylor takes the triple crisis of food, oil and credit as his point of departure, and argues that, rather than being exceptional, current trends are systemic and to be expected, and display the politics of global capitalist displacement. Indeed, Taylor articulates clearly how actually existing liberal capitalist development is premised upon displacement and dispossession. In their contribution, Borer, Everton and Nayve look at the example of Filipino migrant workers returning from the Middle East as converts to Islam, and trace the emergence of radicalised groups and their impact on social and political stability in the Philippines.

The resurgence and importance of religious motifs is also the topic of Sebastian Job’s contribution. He takes us into relatively uncharted territory by examining the desirability of a progressive and inclusive political theology. His proposal rests on a critical reconstruction of what he sees to be the incomplete character of both secular and traditional religious outlooks. Finally, the last two papers reconnect to the overall theme of security and development and demonstrate how integrally connected the state (whether conceived as failed or successful) and the nation-state system are to development and (in)security (we conceive the latter to encompass social experiences of poverty and economic vulnerabilities, as well as violent conflict). Here, the underside of global development is further exposed through the ecological, social economic crises, which point to the need to rethink global development and its institutional framework. Cristina Rojas critically examines the extent to which violence constitutes current efforts to manage the ‘crisis of development’ in Colombia. She demonstrates nicely how the interplay between the crisis of development and the crisis of the
state is translating into what she terms the ‘securitisation of citizenship’. At the same time she also draws out the ‘spaces of hope’ which are intrinsic to the struggles over competing visions of progress and emancipation in Colombia. The final contribution by Phil McMichael produces a wholesale critique of global development from the perspective of its implications for global ecology, arguing that contemporary practices of ‘green market’ development exacerbate a global rift with profound social consequences. The survival of the global habitat requires social and political organisations radically different from those on offer from ‘genuinely existing’ liberal capitalism.

Readers of this volume will find a wide spectrum of concerns addressed. They will find that all of them take on, in their own ways, the issues of development, security and violence. The similarities, and the often major differences among the contributions, whether they are substantive, analytical or normative, point towards the need for a more comprehensive dialogue about the double crisis of the nation-state system and global development. Our hope with this volume is to facilitate such a dialogue. We hope to see part of this dialogue carried out over the next decade and beyond in the pages of Third World Quarterly. As the various contributions below make abundantly clear, the world has changed and Third World Quarterly has changed with it. The journal has provided, and will continue to provide, a forum to debate the politics of development and security from a range of critical perspectives. Indeed, it has been one of the key journals through which the politics of Third Worldism was debated and profiled in terms of a project that challenged the dominant social and political international relations of an earlier era. Despite its contradictions and shortcomings, ‘Third Worldism’ as a political project brought to the fore of world politics concerns of injustice, domination and inequalities, and structures of power were challenged and in some cases transformed. Third Worldism was a critical political project informed by struggles for decolonisation, political recognition and economic justice. To this end Third World Quarterly will continue to provide a space for critical reflection, and efforts to imagine alternative pathways, however inconceivable they might appear at a given historical moment. This represents the lasting legacy and continued relevance of Third World Quarterly as it celebrates 30 years of publication. Without a doubt it continues to be an important and relevant journal for those interested in where we have been and where we are headed in the 21st century.

Notes
CONFlict, development, (in)security and violence in the 21st century

4 It is worth noting that, in the wake of the terrorist attacks carried out by al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001, the USA launched what became formalised as the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This term is now being played down by the Pentagon in favour of the ‘Long War against violent extremist movements’. ‘Win today’s wars first’, The Economist, 9 August 2008, p 56.


8 S Hameiri, ‘Failed states or a failed paradigm? State capacity and the limits of institutionalism’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 10 (2), 2007, pp 122–149; BM Kraxberger, ‘Failed states: temporal obstacles to democratic diffusion or fundamental holes in the world political map?’, Third World Quarterly, 28 (6), 2007, pp 1055–1076; and M Boas & KM Jennings, ‘“Failed states” and “state failure”: threats or opportunities?’, Globalizations, 4 (4), 2007, pp 475–485. Some observers, such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), have argued that states such as the Central African Republic have ‘dropped beyond the level even of a failed state’. From their perspective it is a ‘phantom state’ that has been devoid of any ‘institutional capacity’ since the late 1970s. ‘Central African Republic: beyond a failed state’, The Economist, 26 January 2008, pp 46–47.


23 The most important 25 ‘emerging markets’ that The Economist tracks are: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Egypt, Israel, South Africa, Turkey, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia.


29 Our emphasis here on ‘formally’ is not to indicate that such strategies have not been implemented in practice, with the social impact being a worsening of the lived experiences of many, including the already vulnerable. Rather, we recognise that this process has entailed struggles to counter such ‘development’ strategies and also the articulation of alternative development pathways (see the references in footnotes 4 and 19).

Notes on Contributors

Mark T Berger has been Visiting Professor in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA since July 2006. He is the author of The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization (2004); editor of From Nation-Building to State-Building (2007); co-editor (with Douglas A Borer) of The Long War: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Collapsing States (2008) and editor of After the Third World (2008). His co-authored (with Heloise Weber) work, Rethinking the Third World: International Development and World Politics, is due out in 2009. Heloise Weber is Lecturer at The University of Queensland, School of Political Science and International Studies, Brisbane, Australia. She has published articles in Review of International Political Economy, Review of International Studies, Third World Quarterly and Globalizations. She is co-author (with Mark T Berger) of Rethinking the Third World: International Development and World Politics (2009). She is also working on a monograph Organizing Poverty: The Global Politics of Microfinance.