October 2013


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By Sir Shridath Ramphal

Fifty-plus years ago, in 1962, I lived in Trinidad, in Port of Spain, my West Indian Capital. ‘The West Indies,’ with a capital T, the Federation for which West Indian leaders had struggled, intellectually and politically, for 40 years: Trinidadians like Captain Cipriani and Uriah ‘Buzz’ Butler, Jamaicans like Norman Manley, Grenadians like T.A. Marryshaw, Dominicans like Cecil Rawle, Guyanese like Hubert Nathaniel Critchlow, Barbadians like Grantley Adams—and for which its people had yearned—that Federation was about to become Independent on May 31, 1962.

That is how close the Caribbean came to reaching the ‘holy grail.’ Instead, on that same day, the Federation was dissolved. The immediate cause of the dissolution was, of course, Jamaica’s referendum and Dr Williams’ inventive arithmetic that “one from 10 leaves nought.” But these were only the proximate causes. Federation’s failure had many fathers.

In 1962 I was engaged with drafting the Federal Constitution. My vision, my mission, was regional—an independent West Indies. I left Port of Spain the day before Independence for Harvard, where I would be reassured by the example of other federal founding fathers who had overcome their trials—trials much greater and more traumatic than our own—through sustained vision and leadership. That reassurance has helped me to sustain faith in Caribbean unity as our regional destiny.

Nor, did everyone lose faith. In the last pages of “From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean – 1492 to 1969,” completed while still Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Eric Williams wrote this:

“The real case for unity in Commonwealth Caribbean countries rests on the creation of a more unified front in dealing with the outside world – diplomacy, foreign trade, foreign investment and similar matters. Without such a unified front the territories will continue to be playthings of outside Governments and outside investors. To increase the ‘countervailing power’ of the small individual units vis-a-vis the strong outside Governments and outside companies requires that they should aim at nothing less than a single centre of decision-making vis-a-vis the outside world.”

He had earlier written in those same pages:

“Increasingly, the Commonwealth Caribbean countries such as Trinidad and Tobago will become aware that the goals of greater economic independence and the development of a cultural identity will involve them in even closer ties one with another – at economic and other levels. For the present disgraceful state of fragmentation of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries makes it extremely difficult (although not impossible) for a single country to adopt a more independent and less ‘open’ strategy of development.”

This statement perhaps explains why within months of its writing, he would send me a copy of “From Columbus to Castro” inscribed as follows:

“My dear Sonny. We are both labourers in the vineyard. It is in this spirit that I send you this book. Bill.”

The vineyard was economic integration: the new variety of unity, after “federation” had withered. It was his hope that the efforts of the 1960s—the drive from CARIFTA to Community and the fulfilment of the integrationist dream of Chaguararmas could ameliorate “the present disgraceful state of fragmentation of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries”—a state of disunity he so palpably deplored, yet had countenanced with sham arithmetic.

From all this, three questions invite answers. The first is whether West Indians would have been better off were we celebrating last year the 50th anniversary of the Independence of The West Indies? The second, given that we abandoned federation, is whether we have rectified what Eric Williams called (in 1969) our “disgraceful state of fragmentation.” The third, of course, as has been asked by Prime Minister Kenny Anthony of St. Lucia, is: CARICOM: Quo Vadis?

Against what might have been has to be placed what has been. Independence on an island basis (and I regard Belize and Guyana as islands for this purpose) with our one West Indies formally fragmented into separate states, with many flags and anthems and seats in the United Nations. But, most of all, independence in the context of very small communities without the checks and balances that larger size brings. In his frank Epilogue to Sir John Mordecai’s invaluable record, “The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations,” Sir Arthur Lewis, after asserting that “(t)he case for a West Indian federation is as a strong as ever,” concluded his reasoning with the following:

“Lastly, Federation is needed to preserve political freedom. A small island falls easily under the domination of a boss, who crudely or subtly intimidates the police, the newspapers, the magistrates and private employers. The road is thus open to persecution and corruption. If the Island is part of a federation the aggrieved citizen can appeal to influences outside: to Federal Courts, to the Federal police, to the Federal auditors, the Federal Civil service Commission, the newspapers of other islands, and so on. If the Government creates disorder, or is menaced by violence beyond its control, the Federal Government will step in to uphold the law. These protections do not exist when the small island is independent on its own. So far West Indian governments have a fine tradition for respecting law and order, but in these turbulent days traditions are easily set aside. The West Indies needs a federation as the ultimate guardian of political freedom in each island”.

That was 1968. By 2013, we have had 45 years of experience of separate independence to say whether he was right—not only in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago but in all the independences that followed, in Barbados and then in the smaller OECS islands—and, of course, in Guyana and Belize. Judgement will not be uniform, but I believe that many West Indians, in many parts of our region, will say that Sir Arthur was right—and is—and that the answer to my speculative question is ‘Yes,’ we would be better off as West Indians, had we celebrated the 50th Anniversary of the Independence of the Federated West Indies in 2012.

Whatever our speculation—and it can be no more than that—in 1962 the moving finger of history wrote out “federation,” and having “writ” moved on. But in writing out solutions, history does not erase needs. What about those needs of which Eric Williams wrote in 1969, within seven years of Independence? How have we done in our separate independences in responding to the “real case for unity” that he saw in “the creation of a more united front in dealing with the outside world – diplomacy, foreign trade, foreign investment and similar matters” —or that Arthur Lewis saw in the realm of political freedom?

How have we acted to change “the present disgraceful state of fragmentation of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries” that Eric Williams disdained in 1969? Having disposed of Federation for better or for worse, have we retrieved through economic integration the gains we had hoped for from Federation? What success has attended our labours in the vineyard? Have we been labouring?

When Eric Williams inscribed From Columbus to Castro to me in 1970, the seed of CARIFTA had sprouted; the Caribbean Community and Common Market was on its way to being agreed. Work on the Treaty to formalise and fill it out was in hand under the guidance of William Demas at the Secretariat as he toiled in the vineyard of regional economic integration and inspired a generation of West Indian regionalists: economists and others. The Treaty was signed at Chaguaramas on July 4, 1973—the original Treaty of Chaguaramas—signed initially by Prime Ministers Errol Barrow, Forbes Burnham, Michael Manley and Eric Williams. The signing of the Treaty has been described as “a landmark in the history of West Indian people;” and so it was.

But we had flattered to deceive. We gloried in the parchment, but ignored what it required. Within years, we had relapsed into inertia and worse. For seven years, from 1975 to 1982, the Heads of Government Conference—with the Common Market Council, CARICOM’s ‘principal organ’—did not meet.

The Grenada invasion in 1983—30 years ago this month—effectively put paid to any “re-launch” of CARICOM. As Professor Anthony Payne commented in his indispensable 2008 “Political History of CARICOM”:

“It was not just that the region disagreed about what to do in Grenada once the internal coup had taken place, but that the countries that actively supported and promoted the idea of a US Invasion (Jamaica, Barbados and the OECS states) deliberately connived to conceal their intentions from their remaining CARICOM partners—Trinidad, Guyana and Belize... No mention was made of such a commitment during the CARICOM discussions, which focussed exclusively upon the sanctions which could be brought to bear on the new military regime in Grenada.

In these circumstances, the other leaders—especially George Chambers and Forbes Burnham... understandably felt that they had been made to look foolish. Bitter recrimination followed... Many commentators wondered whether CARICOM would finally fall apart. The critical factor was whether anyone would actually work to destroy it... A number of (leaders) came increasingly to suspect that (the then Prime Minister of Jamaica) Edward Seaga’s real aim was the replacement of CARICOM with a looser organisation embracing non-Commonwealth countries and excluding any existing member state that was not willing to accept US leadership in regional affairs. He fuelled these fears by speaking of the possible creation of CARICOM Mark II, arousing the suspicion in Trinidad and Guyana that he was making a threat directed mainly at them. ...The Region was left in no doubt that during the 1980s CARICOM matters were a much lower priority in Kingston than the question of Jamaica’s dealings with Washington.”

I have quoted Professor Payne at length because we need to remember—especially now¬—how at that time we used our separateness, some will say our sovereignty, against each other—and in pawn to an imperium.

No wonder that CARICOM languished during the 1980s as well. But towards the end of the decade fortunes changed. Michael Manley replaced Seaga in Jamaica and in Trinidad and Tobago A.N.R. Robinson entered the vineyard lamenting CARICOM’s lack of “not only political but philosophical underpinnings.” Manley brought Jamaica back to its Caribbean roots; but it was Robinson who helped CARICOM return to its intellectual moorings. His Paper addressed to the 1989 Heads of Government Conference at Grand Anse, Grenada, which he entitled ‘The West Indies Beyond 1992’ was a wake-up call to the region. 1992 was 500 years since Columbus’ mis-named voyage of “discovery.”

Though I was in London at the time his paper was being prepared, the Prime Minister consulted with me on it. I was enthused that a new leadership was emerging. The response of his colleagues at Grand Anse was equally encouraging, and among the conclusions embodied in the “Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the Advancement of the Integration Movement” was:

“We are determined to work towards the establishment in the shortest possible time of a single market and economy for the Caribbean Community.”

It is now more than 25 years since that assertion. West Indian technicians took their leaders to the brink of implementation with the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. But there was no action—no political action, no political will to act. In all the years, over two decades, nothing decisive has happened to fulfil the integration dream of Grand Anse.

Twenty years ago, in 1993, following the rejection of the West Indian Commission’s proposal for an executive authority for the Caribbean Community, I expressed concern that the emphasis of the political and bureaucratic establishment thereafter would be on “sovereignty” and national turf in general—a cloistered immaturity; because now, in the era of globalisation, sovereignty has so little content. How, for example, has the individual sovereignty of Caribbean countries insulated them from the power of external forces? The World Bank has graduated them from concessional financing; the OECD has imposed criteria for financial services that are enforced by the IMF; the WTO has refused to accord special and differential treatment to the small and vulnerable economies of the region; the 27-nation EU demanded reciprocity with each of the Caribbean countries individually under an Economic Partnership Agreement; and several of the region’s governments have individually entered economic and financing arrangements with China which lack any real negotiation.

Powerlessness, not power, is the political reality at every national level. Sovereignty, still touted, has lost much of its meaning. Yet West Indian governments, unable to assert it in the wider world, seek fulfilment in asserting it against each other.

Have West Indian leaders been advised that all is well? No, of course not. In the face of the storm, they have sought shelter in the old refuge of “local control,” not the new haven of regional integration. CARICOM’s leaders appear to have settled for nominal unity—the lowest level of regionalism consistent with identity. So, it seems that where vision is vital, there is stagnation; where leadership is essential, there is inertia. But, to pause in a rapidly moving world is really to stop; and to pause in mid-flight is to plummet.

It is not as if the region’s political leaders are not able and enlightened West Indians. Each of them possesses these qualities and more. So why, when acting collectively, does a vision of Caribbean integration elude them and leadership to drive the process lapse? It is because both vision and leadership point to the necessity for them to share control—and sharing requires a commitment to mature regionalism.

If in 300 years the Caribbean has not reached there, will it ever? I know that the region must; and I believe that it can. But, in doing so it must recapture the spirit of its earlier efforts that, after the federal project failed, brought the region from CARIFTA to CARICOM and saw it deal with the fledgling European Community with a unity then that was stronger than theirs. It is important to retain the vision of “Time for Action” and fulfil the hopes of West Indians for West Indian lives.

It is instructive that, while last year Caribbean leaders were “pausing” integration, there appeared in the Barbados Nation newspaper an account of a verbatim conversation with a local food vendor. I value the vendor’s sentiments, expressed in her own words, for their honest reflection of how West Indian people feel:

“From Jamaica to Guyana is one West Indian nation. What’s the reason for a CARICOM passport if we can’t have a Caribbean nation? I can’t tell you what a Bajan is, because what you find in a Barbadian, you find in a Trinidadian, in a Vincentian, in a Jamaican. Because people are just people; and West Indian people, we are a gem. I don’t see Grenadians, Guyanese, St. Lucians. I see people. The only thing that separates us is us.”

I meant to stop there. But no conversation with you tonight can now exclude the cornerstone decision of the Caribbean Court of Justice in the Myrie case given last Friday. My West Indian vendor should feel good. The CCJ confirmed her assertion that “from Jamaica to Guyana is one West Indian nation.”

Its finding on the facts about Ms Myrie’s mistreatment is timely and, I feel, incontrovertible. But its greatest contribution is the regional jurisprudence it affirmed. The ruling has established the paramountcy of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas over national law—in regional matters. It has confirmed the status of the Treaty as the Constitution of the CARICOM Caribbean—a founding document which no claim to national sovereignty can transgress. It has taken great learning and courage for the CCJ to pronounce it in so erudite and authoritative a manner. To shun the Court in its wider jurisdiction is now a reflection on the country opting out.

Now, let us converse.

This is the lecture delivered by Sir Shridath Ramphal on October 7 at the beginning of International Week 2013 on the St. Augustine campus, which was hosted by the Institute of International Relations.