The Russian invasion of Ukraine, which started in February 2022, can be viewed within a realist framework of power transitions in which major shifts in balance of power could potentially be a source of conflict and war. Western hegemony is increasingly being challenged and Ukraine is the battle ground for balancing Russia’s place in the region and the world. This development could lead to a recalibration of global power relations and the violent transition to a new global geopolitical order. Today’s scenario is unlike the bipolar order of the Cold War era which had a clear division between capitalist and communist blocs surrounded by non-aligned states. Instead, the geopolitical environment is marked by a myriad of actors with multiple and contradictory interests struggling to advance their priorities in an environment defined by COVID-19 and global economic slowdown.
This invasion has deep historical roots, going back to the founding of the first Slavic state in the 9th century, Kievan Rus, which was a federation of states consisting of modern-day Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Ukraine’s independence from it, coupled with Russia’s increasing sense of insecurity, are among the contemporary roots of the invasion. Considering Russia’s reduced status, it feels threatened by Western incursion in its sphere of influence and the disregard for its position regionally and globally, after the implosion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). Moscow has seen the Soviet space crumble at a juncture where the importance of preserving areas of influence -as agreed in 1945 during the Yalta Conference- is key to maintaining the geopolitical order. Russia presents itself as a fortress under siege, threatened by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Ukraine has become the arena in which Russia aspires to neutralise the threats to its security and, in the eyes of many, to restore the glory of the Soviet era and feed ambitious nationalist dreams of imperial restoration emulating the Catherinian Era.
Russia’s armed invasion is a clear violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the principles of international law. It has led to a great humanitarian catastrophe, worsening impoverishment, and deepening bitter divisions in a multiethnic and culturally diverse society that used to live in peaceful coexistence decades ago. The invasion is only one among many current armed conflicts, such as the civil wars in Ethiopia and Myanmar, and the wars in Yemen and Syria, all of which deserve our consideration and support for civilians and victims.
The Russia-Ukraine war also has implications for South–South relations, particularly for the Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa (BRICS) group. Among other things, the bloc is seen to represent the interests of developing countries in global fora. Since 2015, several developments have fragmented and weakened the group and reduced its effectiveness and prestige. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and now its illegal war against Ukraine is increasing its international isolation. This is a further blow to the BRICS group’s credibility to advance the interests of the global South, the vast majority of which subscribe to the norms of the global order. Besides, BRICS countries have subordinated these principles to selfish realist interests, in their stance on Russia’s actions. Politically, the war strengthens Russia’s bonds with China and India, both of which would like to re-integrate Taiwan and Pakistani Kashmir, into their respective countries.
The BRICS group, particularly through its New Development Bank (NDB) offers Russia a way around Western sanction. After Crimea’s annexation, in contravention of its policies to not fund sanctioned parties, the NDB continued supporting Russian projects because Russia is a co–founder and significant shareholder. The NDB’s financing in local currency allows Russia to evade international sanctions which involve transactions in US dollars only.
The invasion sets a dangerous precedent for territorial disputes and the behaviour of more powerful parties in these circumstances, including in the Caribbean region. For example, the invasion conveys a particular message to Venezuela in relation to its claim of 3/4 of Guyana. Although Caracas has indicated otherwise, Guyana’s new oil finds may further incentivise Venezuela’s territorial claim. The invasion could also give support to secessionist movements, globally, and in the Caribbean region.
Considering economic interdependence, the war will impact the global economy mainly through financial and trade channels. The sanctions imposed on Russia have already had far-reaching adverse effects on the international commodity and financial markets. The V-shaped global economic recovery expected in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic is therefore in doubt. At the very least, global growth which was projected to be 4.4 per cent in 2022 will be marked down. The extent of the decline will depend on the duration of the conflict, whether it widens to include other countries, the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic and other potential shocks that may arise such as natural disasters and other geopolitical conflicts. In the Caribbean, the main impact of the war will be on food and energy price inflation. The region is therefore likely to experience increased difficulty in terms of food and energy security. This will complicate already fraught supply chains and place increased pressures on businesses and consumers. The spike in energy prices will benefit the energy producers but most other Caribbean countries are energy importers. In general, countries are to expect huge increases in their import bills.
Caribbean Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have pre-existing weaknesses in their external accounts which are likely to intensify. International financial conditions may also tighten which would accentuate problems for countries with high external financing requirements. In this context, it is likely that some states may require support from multilateral financial institutions, implying that the footprint of the IMF in the region may get larger. Employment and income levels weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic could deteriorate further, and increase poverty. These developments will complicate the economic recovery process underway in the region.
Considering the economic constraints and the geopolitical challenges related to the conflict, the Caribbean must act decisively and strategically. The region must make full use of instruments created or retrofitted by the IMF in the wake of the international financial crisis. Central banks will have to sharpen surveillance of financial institutions to safeguard financial stability. Leveraging international and regional cooperation would be critical to the region’s successful navigation of this crisis. In particular, the global community will need to preserve and increase access to international liquidity and facilitate orderly sovereign debt restructurings. Investing in renewable energy and making economies more resilient to climate change is also critical in a region with high exposure to extreme meteorological events.
Additionally, the region needs to continue to raise its voice as champions of peace and diplomacy. It should strengthen regional integration and improve alliances with Latin America. Promoting regional food and energy security, together with safeguarding the permanence of Latin American and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace, should be at the core of Caribbean SIDS interests in this time of uncertainties where, unfortunately, history has showed us that the smallest and more vulnerable suffer the most.
